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A Longitudinal Study: The Impact of a Comprehensive Emergency Management
System on Disaster Response in The Commonwealth of The Bahamas
Erin P. Hughey
ABSTRACT
Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of
people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004).
Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human
interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development
practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and
wealth. In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental
impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and
implementing mitigation measures is a high priority in hazards research.
However despite our best efforts disasters have and will continue to negatively
impact communities resulting in loss of life and property. To that end nations
must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the needs of all
residents potentially at harm.
This study examined the establishment of a comprehensive emergency
management (CEM) system in the nation of The Bahamas.

Employing a

longitudinal study design to examine the six study hurricanes: Andrew 1992,
Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005. The
xiv

goal of this research was two fold; first, to test Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology
for evaluating the management of disaster response to determine if it could be
operationalized and second, to compare response operations under CEM with
response operations prior to its implementation.
Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data. Data for the study
were collected over a six-year period from 2001-2007.

The following data

collection techniques were employed for this study: (1) archival research, (2)
structured

surveys,

(3)

semi-structured

interviews,

and

(4)

participant

observation. Data were analyzed in using three key tools: First, the surveys and
closed-ended questions associated with the interviews were analyzed using
standard statistical techniques. The data were then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria
for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as
outlined by Quarantelli (1997a).

Finally, data were applied to the Model of

Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003).
Results indicated that Quarantelli’s (1997a) model for evaluating the
management of disaster response could be operationalized.

Findings also

revealed an association between the implementation of a CEM system and
improvements in disaster response within The Bahamas.

xv

Chapter One:
Introduction

Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) is the integrated
approach of managing all-hazards through all four phases of the
emergency management cycle.
1.1 Introduction
Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of
people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004).
Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human
interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development
practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and
wealth. In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental
impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and
implementing mitigation measures has and continues to be a high priority in
hazards research. However despite our best efforts disasters continue to
negatively impact communities resulting in loss of life and property. To that end
nations must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the
needs of all residents potentially at harm.
Disaster response is a challenge for every jurisdiction. Meeting the
immediate and long-term needs that result from a disaster is a complex task that
requires a multifaceted integrated approach involving a variety of agencies and
organizations. The hazards literature has shown that a ‘one size fits all’ cookie
1

cutter approach to disaster response is ineffective. For example, White’s (1969a)
and (1974) research acknowledges that differences within communities require
distinctive solutions for each location. CEM builds on that foundation through a
program of risk and vulnerability assessments as well as cataloging of resource
availability. This process allows for the identification of jurisdiction specific
challenges and further facilitates a coordinated environment well suited for
effective response to disasters. Emergency management practitioners have
reported that a centralized and coordinated emergency management system
improves all phases of the emergency management cycle (mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery) by decreasing the duplication of services
and improving communication between all agencies (Krep, 1991a).
This research examines the effectiveness of CEM as a national strategy
for managing disaster response. The Commonwealth of The Bahamas was
selected as the study site for this research, which takes into consideration the
geography, politics, and economic conditions within the nation. Six hurricane
events were selected for this research study; three before the 2002
implementation of a CEM system and three after. This research expands beyond
a comparison between response operations to address key research questions
surrounding the value and effectiveness of emergency management strategies.
Furthermore, this research provides a longitudinal examination of the
development and implementation of a national comprehensive emergency
management system.

2

The Bahamas was selected as a study site for two key reasons: (1)
Geography: The Bahamas faces many challenges to disaster response due in
part to its unique geography. The Bahamas is an archipelago of over seven
hundred islands and cays that stretches almost 100,000 square miles from Great
Inagua in the south to Walker’s Cay in the north (Office of the Prime Minister,
2007). (See Map 1.1) With a dispersed population, inhabiting approximately 20
main islands a coordinated emergency response effort is a considerable
challenge. Moreover, the location of The Bahamas gives it a high and recurrent
risk for hurricanes. (2) In 2002 The Bahamas began the process of developing a
CEM system. This process has been documented from the beginning and
provides for a longitudinal study of CEM suitability for island nations.
1.2 Research Goal and Objectives
The goal of this research is two fold; first, to document the development of
a comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and
second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations
prior to its implementation. This longitudinal approach to hazards research is not
often used; rather the research norm has been to administer case studies
following an event. Although many of the case studies conducted in hazards
research have provided us with critical findings, the longitudinal approach
facilitates the establishment of baseline indicators to gauge progress over long
periods. Long range research, such as this, also facilitates a broader
understanding of the complex and ever evolving dynamics surrounding disaster
response within a given location.
3

1.2.1 Research Objectives
1. To identify and report areas of success, as well as potential barriers to

effective disaster response under the CEM system, in an effort to add
to the geography literature on hazards.
2. Test the validity of Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the

management of disaster response operations.
3. To determine the geographic, and political challenges to emergency

management within the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.
4. To identify techniques being utilized within the Commonwealth of The

Bahamas to respond to and recover from the impacts of disasters.
1.3 Background
This research was initially undertaken through a partnership with The
Commonwealth of The Bahamas and the University of South Florida’s Global
Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action (Global-CDMHA).
Over a six year period (2001-2007) this researcher worked directly with the
government of The Bahamas to build the foundation for a national emergency
management structure based on fundamental hazard and emergency
management theories.
The Bahamas has a long history of extreme events that has required the
mobilization of national resources. Despite extensive experience with disasters,
as recently as June of 2002 The Bahamas had no formalized national disaster
response policy or plan in place. This research includes an evaluation of national
response to six hurricanes as well as the political development of a national
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agency to coordinate emergency response. The study design provided unique
insight into the development process through interviews with top members of the
government, including the Prime Minister. This dissertation research further
facilitated the first geography hazard study to document and analyze the impact
of the CEM system from conception through implementation. It is through this
process that we were able to identify the value of the CEM system. This
research also sheds light on the unique concerns of island nations, beyond just
the challenge of remoteness. It provides insight and relevance to both
researchers and practitioners in a way that allows for the implementation of
successful response and recovery initiatives to reduce or eliminate human
suffering.
1.4

Study Site: The Geography of The Bahamas
Issues of geography relate directly to the ability of The Bahamas to

respond and recover from disasters, with particular consideration given to
hurricanes. The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is an archipelagic nation which
extends over 100,000 sq mi. of the southwestern edge of the North Atlantic
Ocean, with some 700 islands and over 2000 cays totaling a land area of 5,833
sq. mi. (Office of The Prime Minister, 2007). The Bahamas are just 50 miles east
of Florida and extend 750 miles south-east to within 50 miles of Cuba and Haiti
(Office of The Prime Minister, 2007). (See Map 4.1) According to the Bahamas
Environment, Science and Technology (BEST) Commission the largest of The
Bahamas Islands is Andros, with an area of 2,300 square miles. Eighty percent
of Andros is less than one meter above mean sea level leaving it particularly
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vulnerable to storm surge during a hurricane. Harbour Island, with an area of
one and a half square miles (1 ½ sq. mi.), and Spanish Wells, with an area of half
a square mile (½ sq. mi.) are the two smallest inhabited islands (BEST
Commission, 2007).
Traditionally the Islands of The Bahamas are divided into three regions:
Northwest, Central and Southeast Islands. The islands included in the Northwest
are: Abaco, Andros, Bimini, Eleuthera, Grand Bahama, New Providence and The
Berry Islands. Central Islands include Cat Island, Long Island, Exuma and its
Cays, Rum Cay and San Salvador. The Southeast Islands include Acklins,
Crooked Island, Inagua, Mayaguana and Ragged Island. (See Map 4.1) There
are more than twenty inhabited islands with the main population centers being
located on the Islands of New Providence and Grand Bahama. The Capital City
of Nassau is located on the island of New Providence and Freeport, referred to
as the ‘second city’ is located on the island of Grand Bahama. The term ‘Family
Islands’ is used to describe all surrounding islands.
1.4.1 Climate
Consideration of The Bahamas climate is important to identifying and
understanding challenges associated with emergency planning, response and
recovery. The Bahamas is a typical tropical maritime wet/dry climate. The wet
season occurs during the summer months and is usually in association with
tropical activity such as hurricanes (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2006).
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The islands of The Bahamas are insulated from North America by the Straits of
Florida and do not experience extremes in temperature.
Humidity in the Bahamas is extremely high, principally during the summer
months. Winds are predominantly easterly throughout the year and averages
below 10 knots (11.5 mph). The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2006),
reported average rainfall on the Island of New Providence at 2 inches a month
from November through April and 6 inches a month from May through October.
1.4.2 Geology
As shown in Figure 1.2 The Bahamas are low, carbonate islands that rest
on two large bank systems; The Little Bahama Bank in the northern Bahamas;
and the Great Bahama Bank which extends from central to southwestern
Bahamas (Gerace et. al., 2002). The Bahamas Platform, extends more than 840
miles, from the coast of Florida to the island of Hispaniola. The Bahama Platform
became exposed as a result of four major glacial advances during the
Pleistocene. Weathering later altered the landscape creating kart formations
such as caves, sink holes and solution pits (Weech, 2000).
The Islands of the Bahamas have generally low relief. According to data
obtained through the BEST Commission (2007), Cat Island is home to the
highest point in the Bahamas at 206 ft. The capital city of Nassau on the Island
of New Providence has ridges rising to about 100 ft. Consideration for the
geology of the region must be taken into consideration when developing plans to
address response and recovery activities especially when dealing with the
hurricane hazard. For examples, should islands with little relief have evacuation
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plans to move populations off the island in the event of a hurricane or should they
shelter in place? Additionally, what type of resources would it take to move an
entire island population, where would you move them, and for how long?

Figure 1.2 – Geology of the Bahamas (Source: Curran,1985)
1.4.3 Bahamas Hydrologic Setting
Due to the porosity of limestone, water from rainfall and runoff is rapidly
delivered underground, resulting in a scarcity of freshwater rivers and streams in
the Bahamas (Gerace, 2002) Despite being surrounded by water, it is freshwater
that is a scarce commodity on the islands. The Bahamas has no freshwater
rivers or lakes and until recently has relied exclusively on groundwater. It is
important to note however that not all groundwater in the Bahamas is salt free.
“The groundwater resources of The Bahamas are comprised of freshwater,
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brackish, saline and hypersaline waters found in the near and deep subsurface”
(BEST Commission, 2007:16). Many of the islands have large brackish lakes
and others are infiltrated by tidal creeks.
The scarcity of freshwater creates a variety of challenges for a nation on a
daily basis. Couple a limited water supply with the impact of a hurricane and the
situation quickly becomes critical. Having a limited supply of potable water for
residents and tourists must always be a concern for The Bahamas. Cant
(1996:331) cited a limited supply of fresh water facilities as, “a major obstacle to
economic development in The Bahamas and other small carbonate islands.”
In early 2000, following Hurricane Floyd, The Bahamas began the process
of developing the necessary infrastructure to allow for large desalinization
facilities on several of the islands. This effort was intended to ease freshwater
limitations and ensure adequate amounts of water were available to both
residents and tourists (Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation, 2006). In
addition, construction has begun on desalinization plants at many of the large
tourist resorts (i.e. Atlantis, Club Med, Sandals). Despite these efforts potable
water following a disaster remains a top priority. One of the challenges in
response to recent hurricanes is how best to transport water supplies. Usually,
transported between islands by barge the loss of ports and docks as a result of
strong storm surge and heavy winds makes this option impossible in the
immediate aftermath of a storm. Additionally with one gallon of water weighing
eight pounds it is not practical to transport large quantities of water by airliners.
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1.4.4 Demographics
The Bahamas have a relatively small population base dispersed among its
twenty (20) main inhabited islands, with an annual growth rate of 0.86% since
1980. The official 2005 government census reported a population of 303,611.
Twenty-six and a half percent of the population is between the ages of 0-14,
66.1% of the population is between the ages of 15-64, and only 6.4% of the
population is over the age of 65 (Bahamas Census Office, 2005). Table 1.1
shows the population is centered in the two main urban areas of New Providence
and Grand Bahama. Although New Providence, is a small island with only 80
square miles (80 sq. mi.) of area, it is home to 69% of the nations population.
Grand Bahama, with approximately 530 square miles (530 sq. mi.) in area, is
home to 15% of the population. (BEST Commission, 2007) The remaining
population is scattered throughout the Family Islands.
Having a population dispersed throughout a large geographic area adds to
the complexity of disaster planning and response. Special considerations must
be made for communication and logistic challenges that can exist. It is also
critical to note that although The Bahamas has a relatively small population with
just over 300,000 there is a sharp increase in overall island population as a result
of the tourism industry.
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POPULATION IN ISLANDS CENSUS YEARS 1970 - 2000
Island
1970
1980
1990
2000
New
Providence
Grand Bahama
Abaco
Acklins
Andros
Berry Islands
Bimini
Cat Island
Crooked Island
Eleuthera
Exuma and
Cays
Harbour Island
Inagua
Long Island
Mayaguana
Ragged island
Rum Cay
San Salvador
Spanish Wells
The Bahamas

101,503

135,437

172,196

210,832

25,859
6,501
936
8,845
443
1,503
2,657
715
6,247

33,102
7,271
618
8,307
509
1,411
2,215
562
8,331

40,898
10,003
405
8,177
628
1,639
1,698
412
7,993

46,994
13,170
428
7,686
709
1,717
1,647
350
7,999

3,767

3,670

3,556

3,571

2,238
1,109
3,861
581
208
80
776
983
168,812

1,133
924
3,404
464
164
78
747
1,167
209,514

1,219
985
2,949
312
89
53
465
1,372
255,049

1,639
969
2,992
259
72
80
970
1,527
303,611

Table 1.1 - Population in islands Census Years 1970-2000 (Source: Bahamas
Census Office Department of Statistics, 2005)
According to the Bahamas Ministry of Tourism, more than 5 million tourists
visited The Bahamas during the 2005 calendar year. Therefore, all disaster
planning and response activities must take into consideration not only the needs
of its citizens but also the needs of tourists. Appropriate planning activities must
be implemented not only for the purposes of improving disaster response and
saving lives but also to ensure the economic stability of the nation by maintaining
a strong tourism industry.
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Island
The
Bahamas
New
Providence
Grand
Bahama
Abaco
Acklins
Andros
Berry
Islands
Biminis
Cat Island
Crooked
Island
Eleuthera
Exuma and
Cays
Harbour
Island
Inagua
Long Island
Mayaguana
Ragged
Island
Rum Cay
San
Salvador
Spanish
Wells

Total
Population

Males

Females

Number of
Households

303,611

147,778

155,833

87,714

210,832

101,610

109,222

59,707

46,994

23,035

23,959

13,977

13,170
428
7,686

6,711
227
3,780

6459
201
3906

3929
134
2145

709

416

293

265

1,717
1,647

886
854

831
793

552
559

350

172

178

132

7,999

3,933

4066

2408

3,571

1,875

1696

1133

1,639

799

840

493

969
2,992
259

476
1,533
129

493
1459
130

302
961
96

72

44

28

26

80

45

35

30

970

497

473

279

1,527

756

771

586

Table 1.2 – Bahamas Island Population (Source: Bahamas Census Office
Department of Statistics, 2005)
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Key Labour Force Statistics

ITEM
Total Labour
Force
All Bahamas
New Providence
Grand Bahama

Employed
Labour Force
All Bahamas
New Providence
Grand Bahama

Unemployed
Labour Force
All Bahamas
New Providence
Grand Bahama

Labour Force
Participation
Rate
All Bahamas
New Providence
Grand Bahama
Unemployment
Rate
All Bahamas
New Providence
Grand Bahama

1999

1999-2004
2001
2002

2003

2004

157,640

164,675

167,980

173,795

176,330

113,240

117,900

119,700

123,380

125,385

23,900

25,055

25,190

26,350

26,465

145,350

153,310

152,690

154,965

158,340

104,440

109,770

108,255

108,685

111,725

21,625

23,345

23,580

24,050

24,000

12,290

11,365

15,290

18,830

17,990

8,800

8,130

11,445

14,695

13,660

2,275

1,710

1,610

2,300

2,465

76.8%

76.2%

76.4%

76.5%

75.7%

77.7%

78.1%

77.6%

78.0%

77.5%

75.3%

75.2%

74.4%

76.0%

74.7%

7.8%

6.9%

9.1%

10.8%

10.2%

7.8%

6.9%

9.6%

11.9%

10.9%

9.5%

6.8%

6.4%

8.7%

Table 1.3 – Key Labour Force Statistics (Labour Force Data is not available for
the Year 2000, which was a Census year. The Census is a major national
project; therefore the Department during that year undertook no other household
surveys) Source: Bahamas Department of Statistics
Table 1.4 below provides additional demographic information about the
Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Although the population is growing in terms of
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numbers of births, there is a negative net migration of residents. This is
attributed to limited education and job opportunities within the country (Bahamas
Census Office Department of Statistics, 2005). Increased numbers of
Bahamians are moving to the United States and neighboring Caribbean nations.
THE BAHAMAS DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Birth Rate
18.69 births / 1000 population (2002 est.)
Death Rate
7.49 deaths / 1000 population (2002 est.)
Net Migration Rate
-2.63 migrant(s) / 1000 population (2002 est.)
Infant Mortality Rate
17.08 deaths/ 1000 live births (2002 est.)
Total Population: 69.87 years
Life Expectancy at
Birth

Females: 73.49 years (2002 est.)
Males: 66.32 years (2002 est.)
85% Black

Ethnic Groups

12 % White
3% Asian and Hispanic
32% Baptist
20% Anglican
19% Roman Catholic

Religion

6% Methodist
12% Other Protestant
3% None or unknown
2% Other
English

Languages
Creole (among Haitian immigrants)
Total Population: 98.2%
Literacy (age 15+)

Male: 98.5%
Female: 98%

Table 1.4 Demographics (Source: Bahamas Census Office Department of
Statistics)
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1.4.5 Political Structure
The Commonwealth of The Bahamas gained independence from Great
Britain on July 10, 1973. As a Constitutional Parliamentary Democracy the
government structure is based on the Westminister model. This three branch
governmental structure (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) is led by The Prime
Minister and elected by the people. Table 1.5 below provides an overview of the
governmental structure of The Bahamas.
THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAHAMAS
9 Head of Government: Prime Minister
9 Nominal Chief of State: Queen Elizabeth
II (since February 6, 1952), represented by
Governor General
Executive Branch
9 Cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the
governor general on the prime minister's
recommendation
Bicameral Parliament
9

Legislative Branch
9

9

Judicial Branch

9
9

The Senate (16-member body appointed
by the governor general upon the advice of
the prime minister and the opposition
leader for five-year terms)
The House of Assembly (40 seats;
members elected by direct popular vote to
serve five-year terms)
Supreme Court
Court of Appeal
Magistrates Courts

Table 1.5 – The Governmental Structure of The Bahamas (Source: Office of The
Prime Minister, 2007)
The Commonwealth of The Bahamas has a two party political system; The
Free National Movement (FNM) and The Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). Table

15

1.6 below displays the Prime Ministers and their party affiliation that have served
The Bahamas since gaining independence in 1973.
PRIME MINISTERS COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS
Term
Prime Minister
Political Party
July 10, 1973 – Aug.1992 Lynden O. Pindling
Progressive Liberal Party
Aug. 1992- May 2002
Hubert A. Ingraham
Free National Movement
May 2002 – May 2007
Perry G. Christie
Progressive Liberal Party
May 2007 - Present
Hubert A. Ingraham
Free National Movement
Table 1.6 – Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas
The political environment within The Bahamas plays a significant role in
the functioning of the emergency management structure. The Office of The
Prime Minister establishes the tone and direction for national emergency
management and ultimately is seen as the responsible agent. For purposes of
this research, an interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie was conducted
on January 25, 2007.
1.4.6 Economy
Bahamians are tied to the land and sea for economic stability and growth.
Agriculture has been a key component of the economy and continues to be in the
Family Islands were residents are fishermen and/or farmers. It was not until the
development of the modern tourism industry that Bahamians began to move
away from agriculture and more towards the service industries. According to
data from the Central Bank of The Bahamas, tourism currently accounts for over
fifty percent (50%) of the GDP and directly or indirectly employs half of the
nations labor force (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2006). Table 1.7 below
provides 2004 and 2005 economic data on the nation.
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ECONOMY OF THE BAHAMAS
GDP (2005)
$5.8 Billion
Growth Rate (2005)
2.7%
Per capita GDP (2005)
$18,062
Natural Resources (2005)
Salt, aragonite, timber
Tourism (2005)
50% GDP
Government Spending
20% of GDP
(2004)
Financial Services (2005)
15% of GDP
10% of GDP (products are largely tourism
Construction (2004)
related)
8% of GDP (products – plastics,
Manufacturing (2004)
pharmaceuticals, rum)
Agriculture and Fisheries
3% of GDP (products – fruits, vegetables,
(2004)
lobster & fish)
9 Exports -$450.8 million – (plastics, fish,
salt, rum, chemicals)
9 Imports – 2.57 billion – (foodstuffs and
Trade (2005)
animals, machinery and transport
equipment, chemicals, mineral fuels)

Table 1.7– Economy of The Bahamas (Source: Central Bank of The Bahamas)
Imports and Exports are a large component of the economy of The
Bahamas. In 2005, $2.57 billion worth of goods were imported into the
commonwealth. Key imports include food related goods, animals, machinery,
transport equipment, chemicals, and mineral fuels. Key suppliers to The
Bahamas include; United States (84%), Curacao (7.2%), Puerto Rico (1.9%),
European Union (1.2%), and Japan (1.2%) (Central Bank of The Bahamas,
2005). Exports in 2005 were $450.8 million consisting of plastics, fish, salt,
chemicals and rum. Main market destinations of Bahamian exports by
destination: United States (66.6%), European Union (18.3%), Canada (5.1%),
and South Africa (1%) (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2005).
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Income
Group
B$
0-5,000
5,00110,000
10,00115,000
15,00120,000
20,00140,000
40,00160,000
60,00180,000
80,001100,000
100,001 &
OVER
NOT
STATED
TOTAL

Distribution of Household by Income Group
All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama: 2004
ALL BAHAMAS
NEW PROVIDENCE
GRAND BAHAMA
Number.

Amount B$

Number

Amount B$

Number

Amount B$

4,475

11,187,500

2,625

6,562,500

620

1,550,000

7,655

57,412,500

4,745

35,587,500

1,450

10,875,000

8,490

106,125,000

5,855

73,187,500

940

11,750,000

8,235

144,112,500

5,535

96,862,500

1,470

25,725,000

29,735

892,050,000

20,435

613,050,000

4,920

147,600,000

18,680

934,000,000

13,160

658,000,000

3,125

156,250,000

10,185

712,950,000

7,245

507,150,000

1,540

107,800,000

5,210

468,900,000

4,020

361,800,000

550

49,500,000

4,905

539,550,000

3,830

421,300,000

440

48,400,000

2,295

-

1,550

-

275

-

69,000 2,773,500,000

15,330

559,450,000

99,865 3,866,287,500

Table 1.8 – Distribution of Household by Income Group: All Bahamas, New
Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 (Source: Bahamas Department of
Statistics)

To ensure continued economic growth within The Bahamas it is necessary
to ensure tourism, agriculture, and manufacturing are adequately equipped to
plan, mitigate, respond and recover from a potential disaster. This requires that
all national emergency management policies and procedures integrate public and
private industry to ensure economic stability within the nation.
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ISLAND
ALL BAHAMAS
NEW
PROVIDENCE
GRAND
BAHAMA

Number of Households and Household Income,
All Bahamas, New Providence
and Grand Bahama: 2004
Total
Mean
Number
Household
Household
of
Income
Income
Households
B$
B$
97,570
3,866,287,500
39,626

Median
Household
Income
B$
33,600

67,450

2,773,500,000

41,119

34,066

15,055

559,450,000

37,160

30,820

Table 1.9– Number of Households and Household Income: All Bahamas, New
Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 (Source: Bahamas Department of
Statistics)
1.4.7 Hurricane Risk
The Bahamas have a long history of hurricane activity with records
stretching as far back as the 1500’s. Tropical weather is a reality of living on the
islands and residents take the threat of hurricane activity seriously. Long before
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology was around to issue hurricane
warnings residents looked to the sea and sky for clues about approaching
weather.
“Before the onset of an approaching storm, the sea-level often rose
to above normal positions. By watching the rise in the sea-level the
locals could tell whether there was an approaching storm. Today
this rise in the sea-level just before the onset of the storm and
during the storm is referred to as the storm surge. Just before the
onset of an approaching hurricane the seas would give these
residents a small window of opportunity to prepare for a hurricane
or to evacuate to a hurricane shelter” (Neely, 2006:21)
The geographic location of The Bahamas gives it a high and recurrent risk
for hurricanes. The Bahamas has recorded the largest number of storm events
passing within 60 nautical miles of the major Caribbean Islands. In fact, five of
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the top six affected islands of the Caribbean lie within the Bahamas chain; in
descending order of frequency are Abaco, Grand Bahama, Bimini, New
Providence and San Salvador (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2006).
This low-lying archipelagic nation has experienced multi-island, multi-year, and
multi-hurricane impacts.
The commonwealth of the Bahamas is affected by hurricanes of two
different origins, Cape Verde and the Western Caribbean. The island chain lies
on the most common route of the more dominant Cape Verde Hurricanes, which
form over the Atlantic mainly during the mid hurricane season (August-October)
(Dean and Rolle, 1999).
1.4.7.1

Bahamas Hurricane History

The Bahamas has a rich hurricane history. A culture tied to the land and
sea the country has endured numerous hurricanes with records stretching as far
back as 1500. Table 1.10 below highlights the storms for which I was able to find
a record. This table does not presume to capture all of the tropical activity to
have impacted the islands. However, these data do hope to place in perspective
the challenges facing The Bahamas with regards to hurricane preparedness and
response.
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Year
1554
1563

1595
1599
1609
1622
1623

HURRICANES AFFECTING STUDY AREA
Name
Deaths
Damage
1554
unknown
2 ships & crew
‘Urca of Tristan
unknown
1563
35 reported
de Salvatierra’
ship & crew
17 spanish
unknown
1595
unknown
treasure bearing
ships & crew
End of June
1599
unknown
1 ship & crew
‘Sea Adventure’
unknown
1609
32 reported
& crew
Spanish Terra
550
9/15
1622
Firma Fleet &
reported
crew
150
unknown
1623
two ships & crew
reported
Mon/Day
unknown

Landfall
Great Inagua
Grand
Bahama
Abaco
Great Inagua
Central
Islands
Central
Islands
Central
Islands
Grand
Bahama
Southeastern
Bahamas
Central &
Northwest
Islands
Northwest
Islands
Southeastern
Bahamas
Central
Bahamas

1630

unknown

1630

unknown

two ships & crew

1641

September

1641

unknown

one ship & crew

1692

10/24

1629

unknown

unknown

1713

1st week of
September

1713

unknown

one ship & crew

1715

7/30

1715

1000
reported

10 ships & crew

1720

unknown

1720

unknown

2 ships & crew

1729

August

1729

unknown

Significant
damage to
Nassau

New
Providence

1733

7/15

1733

unknown

16 ships & crew

Southeastern
Bahamas

1796

10/3

1796

unknown

1800

August

1800

unknown

1804

9/5

1804

unknown
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Damage homes
in northern
settlements
9 ships & crew
Numerous ships
reported missing
and damage to
settlements
throughout the
island chain.

Northwest
Islands
Inagua

Inagua

1806

8/30

1806

unknown

1806

9/14

1806

unknown

1813

7/26

1813

unknown

1814

10/4

1814

unknown

1815

8/9

1815

unknown

1815

8/29

1815

unknown

1815

9/20

1815

22 reported

1818

10/14

1818

unknown

1819

9/18

1819

unknown

26 ships
destroyed in
Nassau Harbour.
Damage to cotton
machines in the
Exumas.
124 homes
destroyed (2/3 of
the settlement)
will the remaining
homes suffering
some degree of
damage.
1/3 of the Nassau
settlement was
damaged or
destroyed
Damage to crops,
ships in Nassau.
Roof damage
was also reported
One ship and
crew
Damage to
homes on
Eleuthera &
Spanish Wells
Damage to
homes on Cat
Island and Salt
ponds on Inadua
16 ships
destroyed & crew
Damage to ships
in port

1819

9/22

1819

unknown

Major damage to
agriculture and
ships in port

1822

9/26

1822

unknown

Damage to
agriculture and
housing.

unknown

Nassau: damage
to the church,
barracks, jail and
103 homes were
destroyed.

1824

9/13

1824

22

South and
Central
Islands

Eleuthera

New
Providence
South and
Central
Islands
Southern
Islands
Eleuthera

Southern
Islands
Central
Islands
New
Providence
Abaco,
Winward Little
Island, Egg
Island,
Stocking
Island
New
Providence,
Abaco,
Exuma
Central
Islands

1830

1837

1837

8/11

7/30

8/4

1830

1837 (1)

1837 (2)

unknown

Major Damage to
homes and crops
in the northern
islands. One ship
and crew were
lost.

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted with
significant
damage to
San Salvador,
Eleuthera &
Grand
Bahama

unknown

Numerous ships
sank in port
throughout the
Central and
Northern Islands

San Salvador,
Eleuthera &
Grand
Bahama

Over 30 ships
destroyed

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted

25 reported

1837

8/16

1837 (3)

unknown

1837

9/12

1837 (4)

unknown

1837 (5)

“A captured
slave ship
with 500
aboard was
wrecked at
Governor’s
Harbour
with many
fatalities”
(Neely,
2006:30)

1837

10/15

23

Flooding in Grand
Bahama &
destroyed homes
in San Salvador.
Homes, crops
and livestock
were impacted on
Long Island.
Almost all homes
were destroyed
on Rum Cay.
Nassau reported
damage to ships
and homes.

19 ships in
Nassau Harbour

Central and
Northern
Islands

New
Providence

Central
Islands

1844

1848

1866

10/5

Late Aug.

9/24

1844

unknown

1848

unknown

1866

387
reported

1883

9/4

1883

50 reported

1899

unknown

1899

200 plus

1926

8/2

1926 (1)
Nassau
Hurricane of
1926

1926

9/17

1926 (2) The
Great Miami
Hurricane

106

unknown
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“we experienced
a severe
hurricane on the
banks of the night
of Oct. 5th and the
loss of lives and
property has
been greater than
in any previous
gale for some
years” (Redfield,
1846:343)
Damage to
homes and
businesses
throughout the
islands
Over 1034
persons were
reported
homeless as a
result of the
storm. Wide
spread damage
throughout the
islands.
“tremendous
amount of
property damage”
(Neely, 2006:31)
Damage to ships
and homes
Cat. 4 storm.
Delivered
flooding rains and
loss of crops.
Major damage to
structures in
Nassau. Several
thousand
residents were
left homeless.
Cat 3 storm.
Significant
flooding and
damage to crops.

Central
Bahamas

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted
Major impact
reported on
Andros and
Exuma

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted

South and
Central
Islands.

1928

1929

9/14

9/25

1928 Lake
Okeechobee
Hurricane

1929

Unknown

Cat 4 storm.
Destroyed homes
and businesses.
Damage to crops
and ships
reported
throughout the
islands.

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted.
Major damage
reported in
central and
northern
islands.

Hundreds

Cat 5 storm.
Destroyed
Andros, capsized
ships in Nassau
Harbour, and
destroyed
buildings in
downtown
Nassau. Wide
spread damage
was reported
throughout the
islands

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted

Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted
South and
Central
Bahamas
Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted
Northwestern
Islands
Central and
Northwestern
Islands

1933

7/25

1933 (1)

unknown

unknown

1933

8/27

1933 (2)

unknown

unknown

1933

9/7

1933 (3)

unknown

unknown

1933

10/1

1933 (4)

unknown

unknown

1933

10/25

1933 (5)

unknown

Tropical storm

Category 4
Hurricane

Southern
Islands of The
Bahamas

Category 4
Hurricane
Category 1
Hurricane

Northwestern
Islands
Andros &
Bimini

1960

9/7

Donna

114 deaths
from the
Leeward
Islands to
The
Bahamas

1965

9/6

Betsy

1 death

1979

9/3

David

None
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1992

8/23

Andrew

4 deaths

Category 4
Hurricane

1996

10/18

Lili

0

Category 2
Hurricane

1999

9/14

Floyd

2001

11/05

Michelle

2

0

Category 4
Hurricane
Category 2
Hurricane

2
2004

9/2-5

Frances

2004

9/25

Jeanne

2005

10/24

Wilma

2007

10/31

Noel

Category 4
Hurricane
0
1
0

Category 2
Hurricane
Category 3
Hurricane
Tropical Storm

Central and
Northwestern
Islands
Northwestern
Islands
Central and
Northwestern
Islands
Northwestern
Islands
Entire
archipelago
chain
impacted
Northwestern
Islands
Northwestern
Islands
Northwestern
Islands

Table 1.10 Hurricanes Impacting Study Area (Source: Nelly (2006), Government
of The Bahamas (2005))
1.4.7.2

Hurricane Andrew1992

Just prior to the impact of Hurricane Andrew in August of 1992 the nation
went through a change in government lead by Hubert A. Ingraham. This was the
first change in government since The Bahamas gained independence in 1973
and the first national disaster response in the nation’s history. The last major
hurricane to impact The Bahamas was Hurricane Betsy in 1965, while the nation
was still under British rule.
On August 23, 1992, Hurricane Andrew passed over Eleuthera, the Berry
Islands and South Bimini causing severe flooding and property damage. Four (4)
Bahamian lost their lives as a result of hurricane Andrew. Of critical concern for
the nation following landfall were the immediate emergency needs of food and
clean water. The logistics of meeting these needs proved challenging with
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extreme damage to transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways). The
movement of goods between the Family Islands immediately following the event
was nearly impossible. Prime Minister Ingraham placed The Royal Bahamas
Defence Force (RBDF) in charge of responding to hurricane generated needs.
(See Appendix B for detailed storm development and impact information.)

1.4.7.3

Hurricane Floyd 1999

Hurricane Floyd devastated the central and northern islands of The
Bahamas. The key concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emergency
needs of food and clean water to all areas impacted. Damage to well fields, and
transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways) prevented the movement of
emergency goods between islands as well as on the island. A detailed
discussion on the development and impact of Hurricane Floyd can be found in
Appendix B of this dissertation.

1.4.7.4

Hurricane Michelle 2001

A national response to Hurricane Michelle was conducted through the Cabinet
Office with direct reporting to the Office of The Prime Minister. Although
Hurricane Michelle was not as destructive as Hurricanes Andrew or Floyd, the
impact to the nation’s capital highlighted gaps in emergency response
capabilities. Hurricane Michelle response activities were spearheaded by the
RBDF with disorganized levels of support from a variety of ministries and
organizations.
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Long-term recovery operations for Hurricane Floyd were still underway
when Hurricane Michelle impacted the nation. As a result many of the critical
personnel brought together to coordinate recovery efforts for Floyd also took on
the challenge of Hurricane Michelle. Applying the amended version of
Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria for evaluating the management of disaster response
operations reveals that the national response to Michelle was not successful.

1.4.7.5

Hurricane Frances 2004

Every island in The Bahamas was impacted by Hurricane Frances. The
category 4 hurricane remained over the nation for more than 72 hours (Bahamas
Department of Meteorology, 2004a). Of major concern following the passage of
Frances was clean water with extensive damage reported to the water well fields.
Transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways) sustained considerable
damage prevented the movement of emergency goods between islands as well
as on the island (NEMA, 2004a, Hughey, 2004b).
Disaster response operations were for the first time coordinated by NEMA
through the National EOC. The EOC was located in the Churchill Building on the
first floor just below the Cabinet Office and the Office of The Prime Minister
(NEMA, 2004a; Office of the Prime Minister, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b). Table 6.14
shows that seven of the eight criteria were not accomplished. The results of the
evaluation are discussed in detail below.
“My fellow Bahamians and residents of The Bahamas. Good Morning.
You are aware by now that our beloved country and home – The
Commonwealth of The Bahamas – is preparing for the almost certain
landfall of Hurricane Frances. It is of the utmost importance that you
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know and accept that Hurricane Frances as presently constituted is
regarded as the strongest and most intense hurricane force that has
threatened our country. Hurricane Frances has sustained winds of
140mph which makes it a Category 4 Hurricane and the potential exists
for further strengthening. Make no mistake about it, this is a very intense
and powerful hurricane that must be taken with the utmost seriousness by
all of our citizens and visitors.
As, I speak to you, the island of Great Inagua, Mayaguana, Acklins and
Crooked Island and our neighbours the Turks and Caicos Islands are
beginning to feel the wrath of Frances. While hurricane warnings remain
in effect for these areas, in another hour the Government of The Bahamas
will issue hurricanes warnings for the Central Bahamas to include Long
Island, San Salvador, Exuma and Cays, Ragged Island, Long Cay, Cat
Island, Rum Cay, South Eleuthera and South Andros. This means that
hurricane conditions can be felt in the warning areas within 24 hours. A
watch will also be issued for the Northwest Bahamas, including New
Providence, North Eleuthera, Spanish Wells, Harbour Island, North and
Central Andros, Bimini, Berry Islands, Abaco and Grand Bahama.
Hurricane Conditions can be felt in the watch areas within 36 hours.
On the present course it will affect New Providence and Eleuthera by
Thursday night and Friday morning. The Northern Bahamas including
Abaco and Grand Bahama will likely be affected during Friday afternoon
and Saturday morning. For the purpose of impressing upon you the
compelling need for urgent action, I shall again state that Hurricane
Frances is a major and potentially very dangerous hurricane. Hurricane
force winds extend some eighty (80) miles from the centre. Tropical storm
force winds extend some 185 miles from the centre. This hurricane is
therefore a large and powerful system with the potential to severely and
negatively affect many of the communities in our country.
As Prime Minister, I therefore urge all Bahamians and residents of The
Bahamas to take this threat seriously and to rush to complete all
precautions, not in panic, but with a clear-headed resolve and a sober
sense of purpose.
A hurricane of this strength generally has a storm sea surge of between 13
and 18 fee above the normal tide. Persons who live in coastal areas,
small cays, low lying areas and areas that are prone to flooding should
evacuate their homes before the hurricane hits and weather conditions no
longer allow safe evacuations. In addition persons who do not consider
their dwellings to be sound should contact their local Administrators at
the earliest opportunity.
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I have asked the Secretary to the cabinet to allow non-essential staff of
Public Service to leave work today at 12:00 noon so as to enable them to
complete the task of securing their homes and property. I also ask
businesses to release their staff early so that they can likewise secure their
property and homes.
I need hardly tell you that early preparation is essential for mitigating the
damage that can be done by such a large and powerful hurricane. I am
also exhorting businesses not to engage in what is commonly known as
price gouging or profiteering. This is truly a time of emergency when civil
responsibility and conduct befitting good citizenship ought to be
paramount in the minds of all our people.
I urge you to continue to listen by radio to hurricane updates so that you
may act on an informed basis. All of our emergency operations systems
are in place at both the national level in New Providence and throughout
the Family Islands. Every effort has been made to strengthen our
communications and emergency response capacities and where necessary
to put in place additional specially selected personnel.
Additional resources, both skilled manpower, equipment and material
resources, have been made available to the Bahamas by the United States
Government, Caricom countries and other agencies and we are on
standby. On behalf of the Bahamian people I would take this opportunity
to thank all of them for the consideration they have exercised in our
favour.
My fellow Bahamians although we have made every human effort to
prepare ourselves for Hurricane Frances, it is for me, on your behalf, to
acknowledge that we are ultimately in the hands of God. We pray for His
guidance at this time and for safekeeping during this time of crisis and
peril
We have faced many such perils in the course of the centuries and have
always pulled through. With God’s good grace we shall do so again. Be
of good courage then for our faith is in the God of all creation; the God
who rides upon the storm.” (Remarks by the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister
Perry Christies, On Hurricane Frances. 1st September, 2004.)
1.4.7.6

Hurricane Jeanne 2004

As Hurricane Jeanne approached the Islands of The Bahamas,
emergency personnel were just beginning the process of trying to recover from
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Hurricane Frances. Frances, a category four hurricane, had slowly marched its
way up the archipelago less then three weeks earlier. With drained resources,
tired response personnel, and already extensive damage to critical facilities
Jeanne compounded an already extreme emergency situation.
1.4.7.7

Hurricane Wilma 2005

Hurricane Wilma was the only storm requiring a national response to cause
any significant damage to The Bahamas during the 2005 Hurricane Season.
One death was reported as a result of Hurricane Wilma and was directly related
to storm surge inundation. The concentrations of damages were mainly in the
vicinities of the northwestern islands.
1.5 Problem Statement
A large gap exists in the hazards research with regards to emergency
management strategies, specifically the value of the Comprehensive Emergency
Management (CEM) system. The traditional hazard case studies have not
facilitated the necessary understanding of CEM which requires the integration of
all four phases of the emergency management cycle.
Research by Pelling and Uitto (2001) identified remoteness, and lack of
natural resources as major challenges for island nations making them
increasingly vulnerable to disasters, but little is know about approaches utilized
effectively to manage these challenges. No island specific emergency
management techniques have been established as best practices. Additionally,
no analysis has been conducted to see if emergency management techniques
utilized in large developed nations such as the United States and Canada are
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transferable and adequately meet the needs of island nations. Also lacking in the
hazards literature is a longitudinal study that examines the development,
application, and evolution of emergency management techniques within island
nations.
1.6 Research Questions
The primary intent of this longitudinal study is to examine the validity of
CEM as a national strategy for managing disaster response. The following
research questions were examined within the context of the study site.
1. Can Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the management of
disaster response be operationalized?
2. Can CEM, a United States emergency management strategy, be an
effective strategy for an archipelagic nation?
3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response?
1.7

Research Hypotheses
1. It is hypothesized that Quarantelli’s (1997) can be applied successfully to

evaluate disaster response operations.
2. It is hypothesized that CEM is an effective and successful emergency

management strategy for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas.
3. It is hypothesized that the implementation of CEM will improve all areas of

disaster response.
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1.8 Research Design
This exploratory research utilized a longitudinal study design that
incorporated a mixed methods approach to answering the research questions. A
comprehensive literature review was conducted to ensure that findings were
placed in the appropriate context. Through exhaustive archival research, six
study hurricanes (Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004,
Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005) were reconstructed from development to landfall.
National Government response to all six of the hurricanes was evaluated utilizing
an amended version of Quarantelli’s (1997a) Ten Criteria for Evaluating the
Management of Community Disasters to test the metric and determine its
usefulness. Traditional hazards methodologies such as structured surveys and
interviews were also utilized in the research design as a way to further examine
the impact of CEM on emergency response in the Commonwealth of The
Bahamas.
1.9 Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter two provides a review of the foundational literature in the field of
hazards with specific attention provided to our understanding of hazard concepts
and theoretical models. Also provided in chapter two is discussion on the key
components of comprehensive emergency management.
Chapter three details the study design and methodology, to include data
collection, data application and analysis, as well as advantages and limitations of
the methodology.
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Chapter Four begins the results section of the research and provides
discusses the research findings associated with the application of Quarantelli’s
(1997a) eight criteria for evaluating disaster response.
Chapter five discusses the results associated with data collection from the
structured surveys and the semi-structured interviews.
Chapter Six examines the application of The Model of Community
Response to Disasters. This theoretical model was applied in two distinct
phases: (1) pre-CEM phase and (2) post-CEM phase.
Chapter Seven provides a summary and discussion of results associated
with each of the research questions and places the findings within the current
literature on hazards. A set of general conclusions and suggestions for future
research are also provided.
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Chapter Two:
Literature Review

“The increasingly complex nature of hazards means that geography
matters now more than ever.” (Cutter, 1994: xiv)

2.1 Introduction
Hazards research requires an understanding of the complex interactions
between the natural and social systems. This chapter provides a review of key
research studies that have influenced the way we think about hazards.
Historically, hazards research has come from the three intellectual disciplines of
geography, sociology, and engineering. However, with the occurrence of large
multi-jurisdictional disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and
Hurricane Katrina 2005, hazards research has considerably intensified and
expanded. A variety of disciplines including public health, public administration,
economics, and psychology have all produced important hazards research. This
expansion is both timely and necessary as we in the academic community work
to develop better strategies for saving lives and protecting property. Found
throughout this chapter are the foundational components needed to contextualize
this dissertation research.
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2.2 History of Hazards Research in Geography
In the field of geography, hazards research traditionally focused on the
relationship between humans and the environment. In the mid 1940’s
researchers at the University of Chicago began a multidisciplinary research
agenda with sociologists and geographers to explore the environment, hazards,
and the social interaction. It is here that the origins of hazards research took
root. Gilbert F. White, a student in geography in the early 1940’s wrote a
pioneering dissertation that first asked the questions that still direct hazards
research today:



Why are certain adjustments to hazards preferred over others?
Why, despite investments in those adjustments, are social losses
from hazards increasing? (White, 1945)

White, internationally renowned today as the father of natural hazards
research (Mileti, 1999) was influenced by late 1920’s philosopher John Dewey.
Dewey (1929) explored the human ecology school of thought noting that
humanity exists in a natural world that in innately hazardous resulting in human
insecurity. He further explored how environmental perils such as floods and
earthquakes do not exist independently of society because these events are
defined, reshaped and redirected by human activities.
In White’s 1973 research titled Natural Hazards Research, he spoke to the
importance of geography in hazards research. In particular he noted that many
geographers had neglected “the theory of man-environment relationships” and its
applications to public policy (White, 1973:193). “The geographer loses an
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opportunity to apply his knowledge, skills, and insights to fundamental questions
of the survival and quality of human life. He [The Geographer] also fails to
sharpen and advance theoretical thinking by testing it in a challenging arena of
action” (White, 1973:193). When addressing the questions associated with
hazards research and geography, White also points out that hazards research is
well situated within the discipline. “The research seeks application of new
techniques to one of the old and recurring traditions of geographical enterprise –
the ecology of human choice” (White, 1973:194).
White’s work further influenced the hazards field by first utilizing a
research approach related to the study of policy activities. This approach was
intended to expand our understanding of the decision-making process as it
relates to extreme events. His work continued to develop the field by utilizing a
research paradigm and model of decision-making focused on how man copes
with risk and uncertainty in the midst of environmental events (White, 1936,
1962, 1964,1974a, 1974b). This research not only expanded the interdisciplinary
field of hazards research he also illustrated how hazards research is a traditional
theme in geography and places geographers in the critical role of bridging the
gap between the physical and social sciences.
2.3 Hazards Terminology
To place this dissertation research into context, it is critical to review the
theoretical debate over the definition of hazards terminology. Researchers have
worked to define and conceptualize ‘natural hazards.’ As in all fields, attempting
to classify events is critical. Research must be placed within the appropriate
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theoretical framework in order to obtain meaningful findings/results and move the
discipline forward.
As mentioned previously, hazards research is a multi-disciplinary study.
The lack of clear and widely agreed upon vocabulary has plagued studies and
led to some confusion. Tobin and Montz (1997) point out that much of the
terminology used in natural hazards has been used interchangeably, including
references to hazard, disaster, risk, and vulnerability. Additionally, Chakraborty,
et al., (2005) note how problematic the estimation of risk and vulnerability can be,
partly due to a lack of accurate data and partly due to the way in which available
data are utilized. It is because of these challenges that before moving forward in
an effort to expand the literature we must first fully understand the current state
of the discipline.
It is through the examination of our current frameworks within natural
hazards research that we are better able to reshape and expand our views. The
following section provides discussion on the discourse surrounding hazards
terminology and the theoretical frameworks currently being applied. This
provides the opportunity to perhaps rethink and re-conceptualize our
understanding of hazards, facilitating a new way of examining our research
questions. Furthermore, it is by doing this that we will ultimately influence the
shape of the potential solutions, as well as the shape and character of the means
we use to attain those solutions and make them operational.
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2.3.1 Defining the Field of Natural Hazards
Many of the early dominant views in the field of natural hazards research
identified disasters as a result of geophysical processes. A geophysical event
was seen as a trigger for loss of life and damage to property. This approach
identified the root cause of large-scale death and destruction as directly
attributed to the extremes of nature rather than encompassing the social
structures. White (1945) identified natural hazards as the result of interacting
natural and social forces. Table 2.1 below provides a temporal examination of
how the field of natural hazards has been defined. Although White’s work
identified an interaction between the physical and social components other
researchers were slow to move away from viewing natural hazards as only a
geo-physical process.
By the early-1980’s steps towards a more human explanation of natural
hazards was taking hold. Hewitt (1983) research strongly spoke out against the
overwhelming attention devoted to geophysical process and neglect of social
forces. Throughout the mid-1980’s and 1990’s natural hazards research
embraced the physical and human components influencing hazards. Our current
understanding of ‘natural hazards’ as a field of study is one that embraces the
human and physical geography.
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Author

Year

Natural Hazard Definition

1945

Natural Hazards are the result of interacting
natural and social forces.

1964

Those elements of the physical environment
harmful to man and caused by forces
extraneous to him.

1984

A naturally occurring or man-made geologic
condition or phenomenon that presents a risk or
is a potential danger to life or property.

Smith, Keith

1996

The potential for extreme geophysical events,
such as floods, to create an unexpected threat
to human life and property.

Tobin and Montz

1997

The potential interaction between humans and
extreme natural events.

2004

A potentially damaging physical event,
phenomenon or human activity that may cause
the loss of life or injury, property damage, social
and economic disruption or environmental
degradation.

White, Gilbert F.

Burton and Kates

American
Geological Institute

United Nations

Table 2.1 Selected Definitions of Natural Hazards
2.3.1.1

Defining Disaster

The definition of ‘disaster’ has followed a similar path as the development
of the field of natural hazards. Historically disasters were seen as ‘Acts of God’
and generally outside human control. Dynes & Drabek (1992) suggest that
disaster events were made worse by the idea that residents could do nothing to
reduce the impact.
“When such events occurred in communities, they created great fear and
personal trauma. This created social chaos, making local communities
incapable of effective action requiring outside authorities, especially the
military, were needed to re-establish command and control” (Dynes &
Drabek, 1992:12).
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Author

Year

Sheehan & Hewitt

1969

Brown & Goldin

1973

Dynes

1974

Quarantelli &
Dynes

1977

Disaster is primarily a social phenomenon and
is thus identifiable in social terms.

Kreps

1984

Disasters are events observable in time and
space, in which societies or their larger subunits incur physical damages and losses and or
disruption of their routine functions. Both the
causes and consequences of these events are
related to the social structures and processes of
society or their sub-units.

Dynes

1988

Disasters are events, occurrences, situations
which are socially disruptive.

Taylor

1989

Catastrophic events that (a) interfere severely
with everyday life, disrupt communities, and
often cause extensive loss of life and property,
(b) overtax local resources, and (c) create
problems that continue far longer than those
that arise from the normal vicissitudes of life.

Glickman et. al.

1992

The death of 25 persons.

Tobin & Montz

1997

Disaster is defined as an event that has a large
impact on society.

2001

Disasters are more accurately seen as social
phenomena whereas the overall damage due to
natural hazards is the result both of natural
events that act as ‘triggers’ and a series of
societal factors.

Weichselgartner

Disaster Definition
Those events leading to 100 deaths, 1000
injuries, or $1 million in damages.
Disasters are inherently political phenomena
and should be so conceptualized.
The physical agent, the physical consequences
of the agent, the way in which the impact of the
physical agent is evaluated, and the social
disruption and social changes brought about by
the physical agent and its impact.

Table 2.2a – Selected Definitions of Disaster
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Author

McEntire

United Nations

Year

Disaster Definition (Continued)

2004

Disasters are the disruptive and/or deadly and
destructive outcome or result of physical or
human-induced triggering agents when they
interact with and are exacerbated by
vulnerabilities of diverse but overlapping
environments.

2004

A serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society causing widespread
human, material, economic or environmental
losses which exceed the ability of the affected
community or society to cope using its own
resources.

Table 2.2b – Selected Definitions of Disaster
Table 2.2 highlights a variety of selected disaster definitions that have
been used within the hazards literature. The common theme among all of the
definitions is the impact to society. Without an adverse reaction to the society a
disaster does not exist. Brown and Goldin (1973) push the idea of ‘disaster’
further by identifying disasters as the result of political phenomena or ‘society’,
removing completely a geophysical trigger.
Dynes (1974, 1988) and McEntire (2004) utilize a qualitative measure to
define ‘disaster’ identifying ‘disruption to society’ as a disaster. Quantitative
measures have also been utilized, for example, Sheehan and Hewitt (1969)
utilized death, injuries and economic thresholds. Currently there is no national or
international threshold which categorically defines or identifies a disaster. Within
the response community a disaster is many times identified by the types of
resources that must be mobilized in response to an event. A full activation of all
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agencies active in disasters, illustrates an event that is taxing on resources and
requires a large coordinated effort, thus being identified as a disaster.
2.3.1.2

Defining Risk

Author

Year

Risk Definition

Hammer

1972

The sum of possible alternative numbers of
fatalities weighted by their probabilities.

Zenter

1979

Risk as the total number of deaths

Ritter

1981

Risk as the Probability of occurrence for an
undesirable outcome

UNDRO

1982

Risk is equal to loss divided by unit time

Crouch and Wilson

1982

The probability of an event multiplied by the
severity of that event.

1988

Risk is the expected number of lives lost,
persons injured, damage to property and
disruption of economic activity due to a
particular natural phenomenon, and
consequently the product of specific risk and
elements at risk.

1982

Risk is broken into two functions: first, the
probability that an event, or a series of events of
various magnitudes, will occur, and second, the
consequences of those events

1988

Risk is the expected number of lives lost,
persons injured, damage to property and
disruption of economic activity due to a
particular natural phenomenon, and
consequently the product of specific risk and
elements at risk.

Beck

1992

Risk is a systematic way of dealing with hazards
and insecurities induced and introduced by
modernization.

Cutter

1996

Risk is the likelihood of probability that an event
will occur.

Crozier

Petak and
Atkisson

Crozier

Risk as probability of occurrence multiplied by
vulnerability
Table 2.3a – Selected Definitions of Risk
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Tobin and Montz

1997

Author

United Nations

Year

2004

Risk Definition (Continued)
The probability of harmful consequences, or
expected losses (death, injuries, property,
livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or
environment damaged) resulting from
interactions between natural and humaninduced hazards and vulnerable conditions.

Risk is essentially a hazard considered in the
light of its recurrence interval and expected
2006
costs. The greater the hazard and the shorter
its recurrence interval, the greater the risk.
Table 2.3b – Selected Definitions of Risk
Hyndman &
Hyndman

Table 2.3 shows some of the varying definitions of risk employed by
hazards researchers. Examining the table from a temporal perspective highlights
an interesting pattern. During the 1970s, risk was often based primarily on the
number of fatalities, whereas in the 1980s there was at least an effort among
academics to broaden the term to incorporate the probability of a particular
geophysical event recurring. By the 1990’s, researchers turned away from
numbers of dead as a measurement of risk, and focused more on geophysical
mechanisms and probabilities of occurrence.
This changing emphasis reflects the evolving role of emergency
management and hazards research within the United States and, to some extent,
globally. The 1970s witnessed a variety of disasters both natural and
technological that impacted the terminology and definitions used by hazard
researchers. For example, the super outbreak of tornadoes in 1974 and the
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant incident focused attention on the
terminology used in hazard studies.
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The 1980’s brought awareness of catastrophic man-made disasters such
as 1984 Bhopal, India explosion at the Union Carbide Chemical Plant which
killed thousands and sickened tens of thousands more. The 1985 volcanic
eruption of Nevado del Ruiz killed thousands, buried whole towns in ash, and
mud. Additionally, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine (former Soviet
Union) brought worldwide attention to hazards and an increased desire to further
understand the concepts associated with risk.
‘Risk’ and ‘risk assessment’ have raised several research questions. For
example, Cutter (1993) noted, that there is no such thing as a risk-free or hazardfree environment despite American preoccupation with a zero-risk society.
Clearly the idea that any area is completely safe from a natural or man-made
disaster is incorrect. Graham’s (1995) research, which focuses on technological
and environmental disasters, highlighted the need for continued research by
academics on these concepts. “The analytical tools of risk assessment, as
applied to chemicals and radiation, have assumed a critical role in decision
making in the United States” (Graham, 1985:29). The United Nations identifies
risk assessments as:
“a methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by
analyzing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of
vulnerability that could pose a potential threat or harm to people,
property, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend”
(UN 2004:18).
It is through our application of risk assessments that hazard practitioners
have been able to make more informed decision about how best to utilize limited
resources to protect lives and minimize damage. The concept of risk and risk
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assessment has been a hazard concept that practitioners have effectively made
operational during the emergency management mitigation phase.
2.3.1.3

Defining Vulnerability
During the 1990s researchers began to examine not only the geographic

areas with potential risk for geophysical or technological events but also the
populations that are most vulnerable. Table 2.4 below displays selected
variations of the vulnerability definitions that are being utilized in hazards
research. Like risk, no clear agreed upon definition has been developed and
accepted by either academics or practitioners.
Author

Year

Definition

1981

Vulnerability is the degree to which a system
acts adversely to the occurrence of a hazardous
event.

1982

Vulnerability is the degree of the loss to a given
element or set of elements at risk resulting from
the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a
given magnitude.

Susman, O’Keefe,
Wisner

1983

The degree to which different classes in society
are differentially at risk, both in terms of the
probability of occurrence of an extreme physical
event and the degree to which the community
absorbs the effects of extreme physical events
and helps different classes to recover.

Kates

1985

Vulnerability is the capacity to suffer harm and
react adversely.

1988

Vulnerability is the degree of loss to a given
element at risk or a set of such elements
resulting from the occurrence of a natural
phenomenon of a given magnitude and
expressed on a scale of 0 (no damage) to 1
(total loss).

Timmerman

UNDRO

Crozier
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Bogard

1989

Vulnerability is operationally defined as the
inability to take effective measures to insure
against losses.

Mitchell

1989

Vulnerability is the potential for loss.

1991

The degree to which a system, including
population, buildings, infrastructures, economic
activity, social organization and any expansion
and development programs in an area may
react adversely to the occurrence of a
hazardous event.

1993

Vulnerability is defined in terms of exposure,
capacity and potentiality. Accordingly, the
prescriptive and normative response to
vulnerability is to reduce exposure, enhance
coping capacity, strengthen recovery potential
and bolster damage control via private and
public means.

Blaikie et. al.

1994

Vulnerability refers to social and material
conditions derived from characteristics of
individuals and groups that make them
susceptible to harm and loss from
environmental hazards and that constrains their
ability to cope with the adversity of disasters.

Smith

1996

Vulnerability implies a measure of risk combined
with the level of social and economic ability to
cope with the resulting event.

Alexander

1997

Vulnerability is defined as a measure of loss
and as a measure of exposure to a loss

Hewitt

1997

The attributes of persons, or activities and
aspects of community that can serve to increase
damage from given dangers

1997

Vulnerability is a systems approach, a
combination of the physical characteristics of
natural hazards, political/economic factors, and
social characteristics.

1999

Vulnerability are those circumstance that place
people at risk while reducing their means of
response or denying them available protection.

Panizza

Watts & Bohle

Tobin and Montz

Comfort et. al.
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Wisner et. al.

United Nations

2004

The characteristics of a person or group and
their situation that influence their capacity to
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from
the impact of a natural hazard.

2004

The conditions determined by physical, social,
economic and environmental factors or
processes, which increase the susceptibility of a
community to the impact of hazards.

A human-induced situation that results from
Chakraborty,
public policy and resource
2005
Tobin, and Montz
availability/distribution, and it is the root cause
of many disaster impacts.
Table 2.4– Selected Definitions of Vulnerability
As is evident in the above literature review, hazards research is multidisciplinary leading to a variety of interpretations of vulnerability. Susman et al’s.
(1983), definition of vulnerability encompasses elements of risk as well as class
attributes such as poverty and support systems. Panizza (1991) characterizes
vulnerability as the adverse reaction that the ‘system’ (including population,
infrastructure, economy, etc.) may have as a result of a hazardous event. Like
risk it is important for researchers to explore the different variations of
vulnerability in an effort to better prepare practitioners so that they may make
better planning, mitigation, and response decisions.
2.3.2 Phases of Emergency Management
There is general agreement among hazards researchers and practitioners
that there are four distinct phases of a disaster event: mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery (NGA 1979; Clary 1985; FEMA 2003a; Kates and Burton
1986a, 1986b). These phases have slight variations but as explored by Clary’s
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1985 work, all the phases are interrelated with the creation of boundaries as a
simplification which aids discussion, modeling, and application.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the interrelated and cyclical nature of the emergency
management phases. FEMA (2003b:9) refers to this as the “occurrence cycle”.
It is through this process that emergency plans are constantly reviewed and
updated to accurately represent a jurisdictions management capability. As
shown in the figure 2.1, management strategies involving mitigation and
preparedness efforts are designed to improve response and recovery.
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Figure 2.1 Four Phases of Emergency Management

2.3.2.1

Mitigation Phase

Hazard Mitigation refers to “sustained actions taken to reduce or eliminate
long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects” (FEMA,
2006). Mitigation actions involve lasting, often permanent, reduction of exposure
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to, probability of, or potential loss from a hazard. The National Governors
Association in 1979 defined mitigation activities to include “arms build-up to deter
enemy attack or legislation that takes the unstable double-bottom tanker off the
highways” (NGA, 1979:12). Although many researchers have removed the idea
of an arms-build up as a potential mitigation measure it is important to
understand the roots of mitigation lie within the military response to hazards.
In the early to mid-1980’s hazard mitigation took a very strong structural
path in an attempt to control the hazard through engineered concepts. Examples
of this engineered mitigation strategy included the implementation of zoning and
building codes, firewalls, floodwalls, levees and dams. Since the early-1990’s
with hazards researchers focusing on the identification of social factors that may
lead to vulnerability, the emergency management practitioners have slowly
moved in a more balanced direction utilizing both structural and non-structural
mitigation initiatives. Additionally community and state supported events such
as ‘Flood Awareness Week’ in combination with federal flood buyout programs
are providing a more comprehensive understanding of the mitigation phase
(FEMA, 2003b; American Red Cross, 2002; Hughey, 2003).
In communities such as San Francisco, California, emergency managers
have made a concerted effort to educate businesses and the public on simple
measures they can take to reduce loss or injury as a result of an earthquake,
such as fastening bookshelves, water heaters, and file cabinets to walls can
prevent them from falling. These structural measures in combination with an
aggressive program designed to help business identify ‘places of refuge’ during
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an earthquake is a simple and cost effective way, to save lives and protect
property (San Francisco Office of Emergency Services and Homeland Security,
2005).
Viêt Nam provides another notable case study on mitigation. Since 1993
the nation has pursued a methodical strategy of reducing risk through national
development objectives. The National Disaster Management Unit embarked on
a program focused on assisting the residents of the Mekong River Delta in an
effort to help them learn to ‘Live With the Floods’. Mitigation measures under this
new program have ranged from relocating extremely vulnerable communities, to
altering the cropping calendar. Additionally, experience gained from the 2000
and 2001 flood events resulted in an effective mitigation measures designed to
prevent drowning deaths of children. According to data provided by the UN,
2001 flooding in the Mekong River Delta killed 106 people, 99 of whom were
children. As a result a unique mitigation concept known as “emergency
kindergartens” were developed. The emergency kindergartens allow parents to
drop off their children during the rainy season. This allows parents to leave their
children supervised at the time of emergency, when they are otherwise
preoccupied with securing personal possessions and other resources crucial for
their livelihood (UN, 2004:82). This program in combination with a nationwide
information system that provides real-time information for flood and storm control
has dramatically decreased children’s deaths associated with the flood hazard.
During the 2002 floods 918 emergency kindergartens were organized housing
over 20,000 children.
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2.3.2.2

Preparedness

Preparedness is often referred to as planning and many times the two
terms are used interchangeably within the hazards literature. Preparedness is
defined as “planning how to respond when an emergency or disaster occurs and
working to marshal the resources to respond effectively” (FEMA, 2003b:12). The
purpose of disaster planning activities is to help save lives and minimize damage
by preparing individuals and communities to respond appropriately when a
disaster strikes. Emergency planning is not a one-time event. Rather, it is a
continual cycle of planning, training, exercising, and revision that takes place
throughout the four phases of the emergency management cycle. According to
Quarantelli (1988, 2001) disaster planning when based in scientific research
makes an important difference in reducing unknowns. All planning activities must
take into consideration the geophysical components of a hazard which places a
community at risk and the social constructs which create vulnerable populations.
The emergency preparedness phase is where most hazards research
can be applied effectively. Risk studies help to identify geographic areas that
may have an increased probability of experiencing a given disaster. Vulnerability
studies have been effective at identifying those populations which may not be
able to respond and recover from disasters. Results from risk and vulnerability
studies can most effectively be operationalized during the preparedness phase.
The goal of all preparedness activities is to anticipate problems and
present possible solutions. Without regular training and exercising of a disaster
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plan the activation of the plan during a disaster can result in a dysfunctional
response. FEMA (2003b) identifies components of a good disaster plan as:
Based on facts and scientific evidence
Based on community resources inventory
Provides organizational Structure
Uses Simple Language
Elements are coordinated
‘Living Document’ which is tested and updated regularly
A comprehensive document which provides guidelines for response to
any disaster

9
9
9
9
9
9
9

It is through preparedness and mitigation activities that response to a disaster
can ultimately be improved.
2.3.2.3

Response

Response is defined as “the period during and immediately following a
disaster” (FEMA, 2003b). Response activities are designed to provide
emergency assistance to victims of a disaster and reduce the likelihood of
secondary damage. The response phase has five stages: (FEMA, 2003b;
Quarentelli, 1997)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Alert and Notification
Warning
Protection of Citizens and Property
Providing of Public Welfare
Restoration

The length of each of these five stages are dependent on the hazard, for
example alert and notification of a hurricane or flood may be several days while
there may only be minutes or even seconds during the notification stage for a
tornadoes.
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The goal of the response phase is to meet the immediate emergency
needs of the affected population (e.g. search and rescue; immediate medical
care; public safety; evacuation). The emergency services communities are the
first responders and primary component to the response phase. For this reason
it is critical that planning and mitigation activities are done in cooperation with all
individuals and agencies responsible for respond during a disaster.
2.3.2.4

Recovery

Recovery is defined as “activities necessary to restore the jurisdiction to
normal” (FEMA, 2003b). Although researchers agree that recovery is a distinct
phase in the emergency management process (Clary 1985; FEMA 2003a; Kates
and Burton 1986a, 1986b) the activities (e.g. restoration of power, clearing of
roads) and the goal of recovery is an active debate in the hazards literature
(Berke et al., 1993; Mileti, 1999; Mitchel, 1996; Shrubsole, 1999). Like risk and
vulnerability definitions of recovery vary greatly. In contrast to FEMA’s definition
Quarantelli (1999:3) defines recovery as “attempting to and/or bringing the post
disaster situation to some level of acceptability. This may or may not be the
same as the pre-impact level.” The vague conceptualizations of recovery can
make this phase difficult to implement.
2.4

Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM)
To understand the application of each of the four phase of emergency

management the concept of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM)
must be discussed. In the late 1970’s, United States Governors were becoming
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increasingly concerned by the lack of national policy for managing natural and
man-made disasters. It was during this time that a variety of federal agencies
had responsibilities related to disaster response but a clear national strategy for
managing disasters was lacking.
In 1977 amid growing concern that the federal government was ill
equipped to aid state governments in response to a major or catastrophic
disaster the National Governors Association (NGA) formed a subcommittee on
disaster assistance to urge the President to establish a new centralized federal
emergency management agency. The NGA further requested that the federal
government fund a year long analysis of the problems and challenges associated
with managing all types of emergencies.
In 1979 the research findings of the analyses were released by the NGA.
The document presented for the first time a comprehensive emergency
management approach aimed at aiding state leaders in coping with emergencies.
Included in this document was the first set of emergency management tools
based on case studies from a variety of states. The research identified a
fragmentation within and between federal and state agencies as a challenge to
effective emergency management.
The NGA report and the establishment of FEMA was the beginning of a
large consolidation of over thirty plus federal agencies responsible in some way
for disaster management. For the first time, all preparedness, mitigation,
response and recovery programs were being stressed in a coordinated manner
at the federal level. In the eyes of the NGA the goal of FEMA was to provide a
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foundation for a comprehensive national emergency management system
wherein federal, state, and local emergency management organizations become
equal partners.
The 1979 NGA study not only identified fragmentation at the federal and
state level as causes for ineffective emergency management programs but also
identified a keystone in our modern understanding of emergency response by
identifying the intertwined relationship between preparedness, mitigation,
response, and recovery. For the first time in the hazards literature the NGA
study clarifies that each mechanism is equally important to the success of the
others and cannot be divorced from one another.
In 1979 the term Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) was a
new term referring to a “states responsibility and capability for managing all types
of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of numerous agencies”
(NGA, 1979:11). CEM was very different from the then popular term
Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness. Comprehensive Emergency
Preparedness placed the emphasis “in practice if not legislative intent, on the
preparedness phase of emergency management” (NGA, 1979:11). The
preparedness phase of emergency management was focused on the exclusion
of response, mitigation, and recovery for three key reasons: “1) A lack of federal
funds to states to mount mitigation and long-term recovery planning; 2) a lack of
state funds, staff, and time to coordinate these phases, and 3) a lack of
understanding of the relationships between the four phases” (NGA, 1979:11).
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The NGA hoped to present CEM to the federal government in an effort to
have state and federal officials view emergency management in a more holistic
and inter-connected context. The intent of CEM was to develop a program which
was capable of identifying the right agencies and individuals in a common sense
way. Those identified would have useful resources to bring to bear on all phases
of the emergency management cycle and provide the motivation for them to
apply their resources in the most productive manner and in a coordinated
fashion.
McEntire (2004) argues that CEM has for years organized emergency
management into useful but perhaps, overly simplified, disaster phases. CEM
has been the traditional theory of emergency management. Britton (1999),
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (1999) have all noted that this single perspective can
limit understanding and expansion. Britton further argues that CEM has trouble
capturing the wider political, economic and cultural explanations of disasters.
CEM, although developed in the United States, has been adopted
worldwide. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)
utilizes this same concept under the term Comprehensive Disaster Management
(CDM). CDM has been defined as “including integrated management of all
natural and human-induced hazards and involving management through all
phases of the Disaster Management Cycle” (CDERA, 2001:3). CEM and CDM
are used interchangeably. Despite the title both CEM and CDM are multi-hazard,
and multi-sectoral in their application as well as both being concerned primarily
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with integrating vulnerability assessment and risk reduction into planning and
management. Figure 2.2 illustrates the framework of an effective CEM plan.
The major components of the CEM Plan as shown in Figure 2.2 are risk
identification and social vulnerability as applied to the four phases of emergency
management. The effectiveness of the model is based on a solid understanding
of the geophysical risks that a community faces as well the social structure within
that community that creates vulnerable populations. Applying these two
theoretical concepts to CEM allows emergency managers to integrate community
specific elements to the all-hazards planning1 and response approach.

Figure 2.2 – Framework of a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
(Source: Hughey, 2003)
An advantage of the CEM system is the all-hazards approach. The
commonalities among all types of technological and natural disasters indicate
1

All-Hazards approach is a term used in the response community to describe, a generic, basic response
planning component for all types of hazards.
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that many of the same disaster management strategies can be applied to all
hazards. These common management approaches are a primary element of
CEM and CDM (Hughey, 2003; Tobin et al., 2004). The objective of CEM has
been to build capacity to prepare and respond, as well as to implement
institutional mechanisms to reduce the impact of these extreme events. The
integrated and holistic approach that is needed to minimize loss and dislocation
can be advanced through the CEM process.
2.5 Theoretical Frameworks In Hazards Research
By the mid-1980’s through the 1990’s geographers and hazards research
began to examine more closely the social frameworks that influenced how
hazards affected individuals and groups, taking into consideration the interaction
between geophysical aspects and the social environment. Researchers in the
discipline have attempted to develop theoretical frameworks in an attempt to
model the complex social and physical components which cause disasters. This
section will highlight two selected theoretical models (The Hazards-of-Place
Model and The Pressure and Release (PAR) Model) that have been instrumental
in moving the hazards literature forward. Contributions and gaps of each model
will be identified and discussed.
2.5.1 Hazards-of-Place Model
Cutter’s 1996 Hazards-of-Place model shown below in Figure 2.3
develops a framework for looking at the social factors that influence or shape the
susceptibility of various groups to harm as well as those characteristics of
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communities and the built environment which create place inequalities. Cutter
defines risk as an objective measure of the likelihood of a hazard event and
defines mitigation as measures to lessen risks or reduce their impact. These two
components risk and mitigation combine to create what Cutter identifies as the
hazard potential. The Geographic Context or proximity to the hazard potential
and the Social Fabric or experience with the hazard can create biophysical
vulnerability, social vulnerability or both biophysical and social vulnerability. The
combination of the two types of vulnerability intern creates Place Vulnerability.

Figure 2.3 - The Hazards-of-Place Vulnerability Model (Source:
(2003) Modified from Cutter (1996))

Cutter et al.

Although this model provides a path for discussing vulnerability of place, a
gap exists in the understanding of the social aspects of vulnerability in both the
geographic literature and dialogue. Mileti (1999), highlights components of
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biophysical vulnerability and the vulnerability of the built environment; largely
ignoring the socially created vulnerabilities. There is good reason for this;
socially constructed vulnerabilities are difficult to measure. Current hazards
research has utilized individual characteristics of persons (age, race, health,
income, type of dwelling unit, employment) to estimate social vulnerability at a
jurisdictional level (Cutter, 1996, Cutter et al., 2003). I would argue that utilizing
data obtained exclusively through the United States Census as the factors for
determining social vulnerability eliminates the elements that are intrinsic to a
community that may increase or reduce social vulnerability. The model also fails
to take into consideration the political and community structures which exist
within an area.
Cutter et al. (2003:257) describe social vulnerability in the context of the
Hazard-of-Place model as a “multidimensional concept that helps to identify
those characteristics and experiences of communities that enable them to
respond to and recover from environmental hazards”. I would argue however
that Cutter et al (2003) selected variables for use in the study that were based on
case studies that lack a larger theoretical or conceptual understanding of
comparative indicators of social vulnerability. The Hazard-of-Place model
provides a strong foundation but does not have the ability to adapt to each
unique community. The model further has limitations that prevent it from
becoming operational.

61

2.5.2 Pressure and Release Model
Figure 2.4 the Pressure and Release (PAR) Model developed by Wisner
(1994) has been utilized as a tool for illustrating how disasters occur when
natural hazards affect vulnerable people. “The image resembles a nutcracker,
with increasing pressure on people arising from either side – from their
vulnerability and from impact (and severity) of the hazard for those people
(Wisner, 2004:50).” It is only when the physical hazard and the social
components of vulnerability come together that a disaster occurs. The PAR
model identifies the disaster as the intersection between the physical and social
forces.
The PAR model requires communities to trace the connections that link
the impact of a hazard on people with a series of social factors and processes
that generate vulnerability. This model places significant responsibility on the
structures of society believing that natural hazards and hazard vulnerability can
best be determined by understanding the social processes that impact choice.
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Figure 2.4 – Pressure and Release Model (Source: Wisner, 2004)
Wisner (2004) identifies the root causes of vulnerability as economic,
demographic and political processes which impact the allocation and distribution
of resources among different groups. Such root causes are directly connected to
the function/dysfunction of the state. Dynamic pressures are identified as the
activities and processes that translate the effects of root causes both temporally
and spatially into unsafe conditions. Unsafe conditions are the specific forms in
which the vulnerability of a population is expressed in time and space in
conjunction with a hazard.
Placing the recent Hurricane Katrina disaster within the PAR model for
examination illuminates a myriad of root causes such as poor economic
conditions of residents as well as an inadequate local emergency management
structure. Add to the root causes a combination of dynamic pressures like lack of
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resources, training, and planning to create unsafe conditions within the City of
New Orleans. When these vulnerabilities collided with an unprecedented
geophysical force (category four hurricane) the disaster was considerable.
The PAR model provides a valuable tool to researchers and emergency
managers by identifying the components that contribute to social vulnerability.
The identification of these components allow for changes through application at
all levels of government. To prevent another disaster like Hurricane Katrina the
root causes and the dynamic pressures within New Orleans will have to be
addressed. The PAR model provides the identification of key components that
emergency managers and community leaders can make operational.
The PAR model has a wide application in both small and large
communities and at the different levels of governments. Wisner (2004) model
takes into consideration the larger economic and political system that impact
individuals and communities abilities to effectively respond and recover from a
disaster. It additionally identifies the potential mitigation areas to improve future
disaster response.
2.6

Local Response to Disasters
Disasters affect jurisdictional areas in unique ways with differences

attributed to the type of disaster, extent of damage, and available resources. As
jurisdictions plan and mitigate for hazards they need to make sure that the plan
does not fall into the common cookie cutter, one size fits all disaster plan, which
may leave them more vulnerable. White’s (1969, 1974) writings acknowledge
that differences in communities require solutions to be distinctive for every area.
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The acknowledgement of risk to a disaster and the communities understanding of
vulnerability is required to ensure that the planning phase of a disaster is
adequate. Although communities are constantly faced with the risk of hazards,
they are not all equally vulnerable. White (1945) emphasizes the importance of
understanding how individuals and groups make decisions about alternative
programs for managing hazards.
Well trained professionals are an essential component to successful
emergency management (Kates and Burton, 1986a) although, Wolensky and
Wolensky (1990), argue that four other elements are also required: 1) A
foundation of supportive values for local government action, 2) The legal
authority to act, 3) An advocacy supporting action, and 4) Necessary institutional
resources. Applying these five core components to the four stages of a disaster,
the following model (Figure 2.5) is developed. The model which was initially
intended to examine the effectiveness of small communities to respond to
disasters could be applied to any community regardless of size. The model
allows for the identification of elements that may be missing resulting in poor
hazard management strategies.
The Model of Community Response to Disaster (Figure 2.5) takes into
consideration the large contextual setting in which disasters take place. This
model also addresses the concerns of Britton (1999), and Oliver-Smith and
Hoffman (1999) that the traditional theory of emergency management i.e. CEM,
overly simplifies the disaster phases and has trouble capturing the wider political,
economic and cultural explanations of disasters. Figure 2.5 below ensures that
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the policy process and intergovernmental system are not divorced from one
another by applying to the phases of mitigation, planning, response, and
recovery the key components identified by Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) and
Kates and Burton (1986a):






Well trained professionals
A foundation of supportive values for local government action
The legal authority to act,
An advocacy supporting action, and
Necessary institutional resources

Figure 2.5 - Model of Community Response to Disaster (Source: Hughey, 2003)
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2.6.1 Exploring the Model of Community Response to Disaster
The hazard literature illustrates agreement among researchers with
regards to good leadership (Kates and Burton, 1986a). The key to an effective
hazard management plan is good leadership and professionally trained officials.
This element is the keystone to the above model while still illustrating that good
hazard management is more complex then just this one feature.
A foundation of supportive values for government action enables concepts
to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the backing to
spend money in an effort to build resources. This is critical when dealing with
jurisdictions that have a limited economic base. Hazard mitigation and planning
is only one of the many issues facing government and many times gets placed
on the back burner. If both the government and residents place importance on
hazard management the community will be better prepared. Often officials are
also more willing to engage in hazard policy if constituents are encouraging of
such action.
Working within the constraints of any governmental systems and hazard
mitigation boundaries, a jurisdiction can find itself with little or no legal authority
to act. Changing political situations can seriously impair mitigation projects
initiated at the local level. With new political leadership come new political
agendas which can stop or alter mitigation measures before completion. Case
studies such as Tobin and Peacock (1982) evaluations of Soldiers Grove,
Wisconsin, has shed light on the U.S. federal governments’ attitude towards
alternative mitigation measures. Cases in point, when dealing with the flood
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hazard, some communities have chosen to select non-structural adjustments to
regulate the floodplain. However, without the authority to act and the support of
government officials such measures can be halted, continuing to leave citizens
vulnerable.
It is important to realize that strong support from government leaders is
not always enough to ensure that polices and mitigation measures come to
fruition. Clearly following a disaster, citizen support for action is high, but
consensus on which alleviation strategy should be implemented is not always
easy to achieve. As the immediate response phase comes to an end, many
citizens try to get life ‘back to normal’ and are faced with other urgent problems,
such as lost wages or lost industrial production. If a strong support for action
does not exist within the community, policies for hazard reduction can fall through
the cracks.
Every jurisdiction must have an accurate assessment of available
resources. Being familiar with what resources and personnel are available
during a disaster is crucial. Although many jurisdictions have a limited economic
base and fewer immediate resources available, through mutual-aid agreements
with neighboring jurisdictions, resources can be easily mobilized to respond.
Being able to quickly assess the community needs and having the knowledge of
resource availability, aid can be requested in a timely manner to ensure all
immediate emergency needs are met. The application of the Model of
Community Response to Disaster a jurisdiction can evaluate and determine gaps
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that exist. Identification of gaps allows for the improvement and development of
a more effective comprehensive emergency management system.
2.7

Discussion
As a geographer in the field of hazards research I believe it is our

responsibility to bridge not only the gap between physical and social sciences but
also to bridge the gap between theoretical and applied research. We have a
responsibility to ensure that our research findings are presented in an effective
and meaningful way not only to the rest of the hazards research community but
also to emergency managers in the field. In an effort to reduce vulnerability and
disaster losses our research must get into the hands of decision makers and we
must enable them to apply the findings. Examples of research which have not
only made significant contributions to the academic community but also to the
emergency management community includes White (1945, 1958), Cutter (1996),
Quarantelli (1997, 2000), Wisner et al. (2004), and Tobin et al. (2005).
This research attempts to build upon the foundation that has been
developed in the hazards literature and previously discussed in this chapter to
further expand our understanding of comprehensive emergency management
and its impact on disaster response. The selected study design and methods are
discussed in following chapter. Outlined are the data collection tools and
procedures as well as a description of data interpretation and analysis.
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Chapter Three:
Study Design & Methods

3.1

Introduction
This research study used a longitudinal approach to improve our

understanding of the Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) system on
disaster response. The purpose of this study was to identify and report areas of
success, as well as potential barriers to effective disaster response under the
CEM system, in an effort to add to the geography literature on hazards. The
study design and methods utilized in this research tested the validity of
Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster
response operations. This longitudinal study design was intended to determine
the geographic, and political challenges to emergency management within the
Commonwealth of The Bahamas as well as identify and document techniques
being utilized to respond to and recover from disasters. Furthermore, the study
design is intended to produce benchmarks for further evaluation from which we
can continue to gauge the impact of CEM on future disasters within The
Bahamas. The following chapter discusses the qualitative and quantitative
methodology that was used and includes discussion of the study design, data
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collection tools, and procedures. Additionally, provided in this chapter is a
description of the process through which data were interpreted and analyzed.
3.2

Background
The goal of this research was two fold; first, to document the development

of a comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and
second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations
prior to its implementation. This research study used qualitative and quantitative
methods to analyze response operations to six disasters within The Bahamas.
Figure 3.1 below displays the six study hurricanes and their temporal relationship
to the implementation of CEM.

CEM
Implementation
Begins (2002)

Andrew
1992

Michelle
2001

Floyd
1999

Frances Wilma
2004
2005

Jeanne
2004

Figure 3.1 – Timeline of selected study hurricanes
The purpose of examining the above six hurricanes was to determine the impact
of CEM on disaster response. By examining three response operations prior to
the implementation of CEM we are better able to evaluate through comparison
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the extent to which the national response operations were improved or
worsened.
Keeping with the goal of the study, it was imperative that the research
strategy employed answer the three objectives posed by the study:
3.2.1 Research Objectives
1. To identify and report areas of success, as well as potential barriers to
effective disaster response under the CEM system, in an effort to add to
the geography literature on hazards.
2. Test the validity of Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the
management of disaster response operations.
3. To determine the geographic, and political challenges to emergency
management within the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.
4. To identify techniques being utilized within the Commonwealth of The
Bahamas to respond to and recover from the impacts of disasters.
The research strategy additionally required that the selected methods of data
collection and analysis address fully the research questions.
3.2.2 Research Questions
1. Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of
disaster response be operationalized?
2. Can CEM, a United States emergency management strategy, be an
effective strategy for an archipelagic nation?
3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response?
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Based on the literature (NGA, 1979; McLoughlin , 1985; Petak, 1985; Quarantelli,
1997; Britton, 2001; FEMA, 2003a; McEntire 2004; Tobin et al., 2004;) it is
hypothesized that the implementation of CEM will have improved all areas of
disaster response. It is further believed that the CEM system is an appropriate
and effective strategy for disaster response within the Commonwealth of The
Bahamas. The following section characterizes the research strategy utilized for
this study by detailing the study design to include the utilized methods for data
collection and analysis.
3.2.3 Selection of the Six Study Hurricanes
The selection of the six study hurricanes as displayed in Figure 3.1 above
were based on the following criteria.
(1) Any disaster impacting The Commonwealth of The Bahamas that
required a response by the national government following the
implementation of CEM.
(2) A matching number of disasters impacting The Commonwealth of
The Bahamas that required a response by the national government
prior to the implementation of CEM.
To date Hurricanes Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004), and Wilma (2005) are the
only disasters to impact the nation that have required a national response post
CEM. Although there were smaller disaster such as brush fires, localized
flooding events, and a ferry accident that have occurred since the implementation
of CEM none of the events required a national response; for that reason these
events were not selected as part of this study.
73

As a comparison group, three disasters that required a national response
but occurred prior to the implementation of CEM were also included in this study.
Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Floyd (1999), and Michelle (2001) were selected for
the following reasons: (1) they were the most recent national response
operations to take place prior to the CEM implementation, and (2) large amounts
of data were available that documented in detail the national response initiatives.
Excluded from this group were Hurricane Lili (1996) and The Bay Street Fire of
2001. Hurricane Lili was excluded due to the limited documentation dedicated to
the national response. During preliminary archival research only one report from
the Ministry of Public Works could be located which addressed the national
response initiative. The Bay Street Fire was excluded because, although it
created a large negative economic impact to the nation, the response to the
disaster event required the mobilization of only three national agencies. The
partial mobilization of national assets as well as limited data on the national
response removed the fire from inclusion in this study.
3.3

Methods
This longitudinal study used a mixed methods research approach. The

longitudinal design allowed for repeated observations of the impact of CEM on
national disaster response. Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007) define mixed
methods research as the collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative
data. Qualitative data can consist of “open-ended information that the researcher
gathers through interviews with participants” (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007:6).
Qualitative data can also be collected through observation and review of records
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and reports. For this research qualitative data were collected through the
collection of documents, semi-structured interviews, and participant observations.
“Quantitative data includes closed-ended information such as that found on
attitude, behavior, or performance instruments” (Creswell and Plano-Clark,
2007:6). This research collected quantitative data through surveys and census
documents. The mixed methods utilized for data collection and analysis are
discussed in detail below.
3.3.2 Data Collection Tools
This mixed-methods research utilized a triangulation design, the purpose
of which was to obtain different but complementary data on the national response
to disaster operations in The Bahamas. Data for this study were collected over a
six year period from 2001-2007. This study employed the following data
collection techniques:

3.3.2.1



Archival research,



Structured surveys,



Semi-structured interviews, and



Participant observations.

Archival Research

Archival research is often utilized by researchers to provide background
information or to provide details to events that one was unable to witness (Stake,
1995). For this research study archival data were a critical component in
providing clarity with regards to national disaster operations pre- and post- CEM
implementation. Throughout the study period available relevant records and
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reports regarding response to the six study hurricanes were collected. This
archival research was used to reconstruct each disaster with special
consideration given to the response phase. Archival data were additionally used
to ‘fill in the blanks’ with regards to the social and political environment
surrounding each event.
The collection of records and reports were important in this study to
provide a more thorough understanding of national disaster response initiatives
as well as provide insight into the dynamics surrounding emergency
management within The Bahamas. Archival data were collected through the
following agencies, organizations, and ministries.












Department of Meteorology
o
Hurricane Andrew (1992)
o
Hurricane Floyd (1999)
o
Hurricane Michelle (2001)
o
Hurricane Frances (2004)
o
Hurricane Jeanne (2004)
o
Hurricane Wilma (2005)
Office of The Prime Minister
o
Report on Hurricane Andrew
o
Report on Hurricane Floyd
o
The Bahamas National Geographic Information Centre
The Airport Authority
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances and Jeanne
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma
The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
o
National Emergency Response Plan
o
NEMA Hurricane Frances Situation Reports
o
NEMA Hurricane Jeanne Situation Reports
o
NEMA Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne Briefing Notes
o
NEMA Hurricane Wilma Situation Reports
The Bahamas Red Cross
o
Hurricane Andrew Situation Report to the International Federation
of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne
The Bahamas Telecommunication Company
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Hurricane Floyd Report
o
Report on Hurricane Michelle
o
Report on Hurricane Frances & Jeanne
The Royal Bahamas Defence Force
o
Hurricane Michelle After-Action Report
o
Hurricane Frances Situation Report to NEMA
o
Hurricane Jeanne Situation Report to NEMA
o
Hurricane Wilma Situation Report to NEMA
The Royal Bahamas Police Force
o
Hurricane Frances Situation Report to NEMA
The Ministry of Finance
o
Hurricane Wilma
The Ministry of Health and Social Development
o
Report on Hurricane Michelle
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma
The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne
o
Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma
The Ministry of Tourism
o
The Impact of the 2004 Hurricane Season on Tourism
Water and Sewerage Corporation
o
Report on the 2004 Hurricane Season: Hurricanes Frances &
Jeanne
o
Hurricane Wilma Situation Report to NEMA
o












Further data were obtained through regional and international organizations
active in disaster response to include:




The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)
o
Comprehensive Approach for Disaster Management in the
Caribbean
The United Nations (UN)
o
Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction

To aid in the analysis of the archival data, each document was summarized and
placed in chronological order. This established order allowed for the easy
identification of emerging themes and application to the six study hurricanes.
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Strengths and Limitations of Archival Research
The collection of archival data were important for this study to provide a
historic understanding of disaster response initiatives prior to the implementation
of CEM. It is critical when using archival materials in research to understand the
context in which they were written or developed. Researchers must identify the
background of the document to determine the basis on which it was written,
including whether it was written firsthand, through secondary resources, solicited,
signed or edited (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For this study archival data were
validated through semi-structured interviews and observation data.
3.3.2.2

Structured Survey Data

Over the six-year study period that data were collected I developed a
strong working relationship with the NEMA staff and emergency management
support agencies. With strong support from the director of NEMA Mr. Carl Smith,
surveys were conducted by NEMA and the originals were provided to me for
analysis and inclusion in this study. The Structured surveys were designed by
NEMA for the Family Island Administrators2. The surveys were self administered
and voluntary. A copy of the structured survey can be found in Appendix A of
this document. There are a total of twenty Family Island Administrators
responsible for serving as the NEMA representative for each of their respective
jurisdictions. There was a 100% return rate for the surveys.

2

Family Island Administrators are elected officials who represent their respective islands. Many
administrators have a multi-island jurisdiction since many of the family islands are small both in
population and geography. Family Island Administrators also serve as the NEMA representatives
within their jurisdictions.
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The structured surveys provided data on the Family Island Administrators
perspectives on national disaster response to the six study hurricanes as well as
information on disaster planning and training. The SPSS statistical program was
used to run descriptive statistics on the population. The survey data collected
were used in combination with archival research, semi-structured interview, and
participatory observation data to gauge the impact of the CEM system on
national response to the six disaster operations selected for this study.
Strengths and Limitations of Survey Data
There are several benefits to using a self-administered structured survey.
According to Bernard (2000) self-administered surveys allow respondents the
opportunity to answer sensitive questions without the presence and pressure of a
researcher. This makes the respondent feel more comfortable and perhaps
more likely to answer honestly. Regardless of how the survey is administered
the data obtained can have limitations relating to retrospective questions
concerning attitudes, perception, and sequence of events. Another challenge
with administering surveys is participant recall. Accurately reconstructing
activities surrounding an event and the timing of response initiatives is difficult.
During disaster operations a variety of response initiatives are required to take
place simultaneously. This requires that researchers are familiar with the
functional activities that must be executed during a disaster. Limitations
associated with recall as well as question design bias must be considered when
analyzing the data. To validate the data and address potential limitations, survey
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data were used in combination with archival research, semi-structured interviews,
and participant observation data.
A major strength of survey data is the opportunity to collect data that can
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts of response
operations. The survey utilized in this research allowed Family Island
Administrators to rate response initiatives based on their experiences and
perspectives. The surveys utilized both open and closed-ended questions
allowing respondents an opportunity to use their own words to convey their
perspective on the national response.
3.3.2.3

Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with NEMA staff members to
obtain information on the national response to the six study hurricanes as well as
validate archival and survey data. Interviewing is a prominent means of data
collection in the social science, and this study utilized semi-structured face-toface interviews. Semi-structured interviews were selected for this research for
two key reasons. First, the semi-structured format ensured that essential topics
and information were gathered while also providing an opportunity to utilize
probing techniques to draw out additional information. The interviews were an
important component of this research, allowing participants the opportunity to
convey their thoughts on the impact of CEM.
Table 3.1 identifies the interviewees, their official title, and the date each
interview was conducted. Prime Minister Perry G. Christie was selected for an
interview to obtain data on the current and future direction of emergency
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management within The Bahamas. This interview provided insight into the
political and economic importance of a comprehensive emergency management
structure. All six NEMA staff members were interviewed to obtain data on the
management of response operations both pre- and post-CEM. Interviews were
also used to validate archival and survey data. The interviews additionally
provided a broad understanding of the philosophy directing current emergency
management practices within the nation.
Semi-Structured Interviews
Name

Official Title

Interview Date(s)

Perry G. Christie

Prime Minister of The
Bahamas

- January 25, 2007

Carl F. Smith

Under Secretary, Cabinet
Office & Interim Director
NEMA

- December 20, 2006
- January 25, 2007
- June 14, 2007

Chrystal Glinton

First Assistant Secretary

- December 18, 2006
- June 13, 2007

Gayle OuttenMoncur

- December 19, 2006
- December 20, 2006
Senior Assistant Secretary
- January 24, 2007
- June 14, 2007

Luke Bethel

Chief Petty Officer

- December 18, 2006
- June 13, 2007

Eleanor Davis

Administrative Cadet

- December 19, 2006
- June 13, 2007

Wendell Rigby

Supplies Officer

- December 19, 2006
- June 13, 2007

Table 3.1 - Semi-Structured Interviews Conducted
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Strengths and Limitations of Semi-Structured Interviews
There are a number of benefits to conducting semi-structured interviews
including the opportunity it provides to respondents to have control over the flow
of the interview. Instead of forced responses, the semi-structured interview
encourages a two way discussion between the researcher and the participant.
According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998), semi-structured interviews allow
respondents not only the opportunity to provide an answer but also the reasons
behind their answers.
Semi-structured interviews however can prove to be difficult if the
interviewer is not skilled at the technique. The interviewer must identify the
appropriate areas and times to probe as well as know when and how to move the
discussion along. The data obtained through the semi-structured interviews can
be compromised if the interviewer asks leading, vague, or insensitive questions.
Other pitfalls associated with semi-structured interviews include the interviewer’s
failure to keep the discussion on topic, probe properly, and/or a failure to judge
answers correctly. One of the biggest challenges associated with semistructured interviews comes during the analysis phase. The data obtained is rich
with information however; a vast amount of irrelevant information can also be
obtained.
The semi-structured interviews provided clarity to questions that emerged
during archival research and provided support to the survey data that were
collected. To address and overcome the challenges associated with semistructured interviews I developed a strong working relationship with the NEMA
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staff and the Prime Minister before conducting the interviews. This allowed me
the opportunity to develop a rapport with the interviewees and establish an open
dialogue. Furthermore, during the analysis phase the data were used in support
of the archival, survey, and participant observation data.
3.3.2.4

Participant Observation

The intent of the observations was to gain insight into the governmental
and organizational dynamics surrounding disaster response within The
Bahamas. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue that all social research is a
form of participant observation, since we cannot study the social world without
being part of it. Gold (1958) outlined four methods of collecting observational
data: (1) the complete participant, (2) the participant-as-observer, (3) the
observer-as-participant, and (4) the complete observer. In the context of this
study, participant observation represents the established participant role that this
researcher took during the implementation of the comprehensive emergency
management system as well as the active role established during response to
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. According to Gold (1958) this identifies a more
‘participant as observer' role.
For the purposes of this study it was not possible to be a non-participant
naturalistic observer due to the pre-existing relationships nor do I believe that a
naturalistic observation technique would allow for the untangling of intertwined
relationships that govern emergency response within the nation. Furthermore, it
was not possible to go unnoticed and limit the affect of my presence on the
behavior. I believe my interaction with all individuals and agencies active in
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disaster helped reduce bias and prevented participants from changing their
behavior on my behalf. This has lead to a more natural emergency response
environment. According to Becker (1958) sociologists utilize this method when
they are especially interested in understanding a particular organization or
substantive problem. Due to the complex nature of disasters, participation in all
four phases of the emergency management cycle provided a stronger
understand of the complex social dynamics impacting national response
operations.
Historically field research has been associated most strongly with
participant observation (Becker, 1958). Fieldwork in The Bahamas was
undertaken over a six year period (2001 – 2007). Actively participating in the
development of an emergency management structure within The Bahamas I
joined monthly disaster committee meeting, annual disaster preparedness
conferences, planning and training activities, as well as activations of the
National Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to include Hurricanes Frances
and Jeanne 2004. This component of participant observation in combination with
the previously stated data collection methods creates a holistic research
perspective that has produced a very rich data set.
Strengths and Limitations of Participant Observations
There are two key limitations associated with observation data collection
methods. The first limitation is with data validity. Observation data are
susceptible to researcher bias and subjective interpretation. To overcome issues
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associated with validity the data were used in combination with archival research,
survey, and semi-structured interview data.
The second limitation to observation data is ethics. Several features of
observation research make it vulnerable to questions of ethical malpractice.
Invasion of privacy by venturing into private areas or by misrepresenting oneself
as a member can be an issue. During this study NEMA and all of its members
were made aware of my role within the context of disaster response as well as
data collection.
“One great strength of the observational method lies in the ease through
which researchers can gain entrée to settings” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 382).
Participant observation provides an opportunity for researchers to better
understand the complex relationships that exist within an organization. I had the
opportunity with the full support of NEMA to participate in planning, training, and
response operations. The insight gained through participation in these activities
allowed for the development of strong relationships with individuals and agencies
active in disasters. Thus, a better understanding of the complex relationships
that exist at the national level relating to disaster response initiatives within The
Bahamas was achieved.
3.4

Data Application and Analysis
Data collected through archival research, structured surveys, and semi-

structured interview were analyzed in several ways. First, the surveys and
closed-ended question associated with the interviews were analyzed using
standard statistical techniques. The data were then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria
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for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as
outlined by Quarantelli (1997). Finally, data were then applied to the Model of
Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003). Each of these analyses
techniques are discussed in detail below.
3.4.1 Standard Statistical Analysis of Survey and Interview Data
Population data were gathered for both the surveys and interviews.
Descriptive statistics were run utilizing the SPSS software and results are
reported and discussed in chapter 5 of this document.
3.4.2 Measuring The Bahamas National Response to Hurricanes: Andrew
(1992), Floyd (1999), Michelle (2001), Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004) and
Wilma (2005)
Emergency Management is the process of coordinating available
resources to deal with emergencies effectively, thereby saving lives, avoiding
injury, and minimizing economic loss (FEMA, 2003b). The first step towards
understanding the impact of the CEM system on the ability of The Bahamas to
respond during a disaster required an evaluation of response operations.
Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle were selected as three disasters which
required a national response prior to the implementation of a CEM system.
Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma were selected as three disasters which
required a national response following the implementation of a CEM system.
Evaluating the management of each of the six disasters utilizing the same
criteria provides a baseline for comparative analysis. An amended version of
Quarantelli’s (1997a) Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community
86

Disasters was selected. This methodological approach is being used to both
compare and differentiate between each hurricane response in an effort to gauge
how effectively3 each disaster was managed. Employing this comparative
research methodology assisted in expanding our understanding of The Bahamas
disaster response capabilities. It further facilitated the verification and/or
falsification of assumptions surrounding CEM in The Bahamas.
Quarantelli’s (1997a) evaluation criteria were selected for application in
this research because it is rooted in the empirical research previously undertaken
by social and behavioral scientist. The criteria were developed from over 500
different studies on disasters and mass emergencies conducted with the support
of the Disaster Research Center (DRC). (For general summaries of the literature
from which the evaluation criteria were developed see: Kreps 1984, 1989;
Drabek 1986; Dynes, Demarchi and Pelanda 1987; Auf der Heide 1989;
Quarantelli and Pelanda 1989; Lagadec 1990; Drabek and Hoetmer 1991; Clarke
and Short 1993; Quarantelli and Popov 1993; Cutter 1994; Dynes and Tierney
1994; Porfiriev and Quarantelli 1996)
A prominent researcher in the field of hazards Dr. Quarnatelli has worked
closely with local and federal emergency managers to bridge the gap between
researchers and practitioners. Quarantelli’s (1997a) research was chosen for
application in this study to test his criteria to see first, if they can be
operationalized and second, if they are suitable for comparing and contrasting

3

Effective is defined as a desired and intended result has been produced; this definition differs
from that of efficiency which requires that the results be obtained in the best possible way.
(Quarantelli, 1997:43)
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the management of several response operations. Dr. Quarantelli’s research cuts
across natural and technological disasters and identifies that there is no
significant behavioral differences in the two types of crises. This is important to
note since CEM is based on the principal that all disasters, regardless of the
trigger require the same response mechanisms.
The foundation of Quarantelli’s research is, “what is crucial is not
management per se, but good management” (Quarantelli, 1997a:39). The key
question then becomes what constitutes ‘good management’ and how can that
be measured. Quarantelli’s model, developed for evaluating the management of
disaster response operations at the local level provided ten criteria to evaluate if
the response was effective. This study is examining the national response of
The Bahamas to six hurricanes. There are significant differences to local and
national response requirements and even greater difference between response
operations within the United States and an archipelagic nation such as The
Bahamas. Some of the major differences include: availability of resources, legal
authority to act, as well as strong control over governmental agency response.
Because of these differences as well as challenges associated in measuring
some of the criteria developed by Quarantelli, this research utilized only eight of
the ten components. Table 3.2 lists the criteria that were selected for this
research to gauge effective emergency management.
The two criteria suggested by Quarantelli (1997a) that were omitted from
this study are: Generating an appropriate delegation of tasks and division of labor
and blending emergent and established organizational behaviors. There were
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two major challenges in including these criteria in the evaluation of effective
emergency management within The Bahamas that lead to their exclusion. First,
there are no clear benchmarks within the hazards literature to measure if tasks
were delegated appropriately nor is there agreement as to who should be doing
the delegating. Secondly, although research has shown that groups of private
citizens carrying out important disaster tasks can be an essential part of the
disaster management process (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985) the literature is
centered within the United States and does not take into consideration more
remote and dispersed locations such as The Bahamas Family Islands. In areas
that are not easily accessible by outside groups with a small population base it is
likely that disaster related activities are addressed within pre-established
organizational structures such as a churches and/or local government.
Furthermore, archival research and observation data did not identify any
emergent organizations within the national response. For these reasons they
were removed from examination within this study.
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Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of
Disaster Operations Within The Bahamas
1. Adequately carrying out generic functions;

Yes/No

2. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources;

Yes/No

3. Adequately processing information;

Yes/No

4. Properly exercising decision-making;

Yes/No

5. Developing overall coordination;

Yes/No

6. Correctly recognizing differences between response
and agent-generated demands;

Yes/No

7. Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news
media;

Yes/No

8. Having a well-functioning emergency operations center;

Yes/No

Table 3.2 - Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Operations
Within The Bahamas. Source: Amended from Quarantelli (1997a)
3.4.2.1

Eight Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Disaster Response
Operations within The Bahamas

Provided in this section is a detailed discussion of each of the eight criteria
selected for use in this study. A summary of Quarantelli’s (1997a) research as
well as how each criterion was implemented to evaluate the six study hurricanes
is presented.
The first criterion is; carry out generic functions in an adequate way.
Regardless of the disaster agent certain functions must be carried out. For
evaluation of this criteria ten generic functions were identified by Quarantelli
(1997a) and Kreps (1991b). The ten functions include: 1) Warnings; 2)
Evacuations; 3) Sheltering; 4) Emergency Medical Care; 5) Search and Rescue;
6) Protection of Property; 7) Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and
Resources; 8) Assessing the Damage; 9) Coordinating emergency management
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activities; 10) Restoring essential public services. As proposed by Quarantelli
(1997a), the following two questions were applied to each of the ten generic
functions.
1. Was the need for the function recognized early?
2. Was the function carried out without too many problems?
SAMPLE: FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
FUNCTIONS

Was the Need for the
function recognized
early? (Y/N)

Was the function carried
out without too many
problems? (Y/N)

1. Warning
2. Evacuations
3. Sheltering
4. Emergency Medical
Care
5. Search and Rescue
6. Protection of Property
7. Mobilization of
Emergency Personnel
and Resources
8. Assessing the Damage
9. Coordinating
emergency
management activities
10. Restoring essential
public services

Table 3.3 - Sample Function Evaluation Chart. (Data Source:
Quarantelli,1997a)
According to Quarantelli (1997a) if yes can be answered to all of the
above questions then “it is very likely that there was adequate management of
generic functions” (Quarantelli, 1997a:43). To answer these questions as they
apply to the six hurricanes included in this research study (Hurricanes Andrew
1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 2004, Wilma 2005) data
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were gathered from a variety of sources including Official Reports from the Office
of The Prime Minister, Hurricane After-action Reports, Observation, Survey Data
and Personal Interviews with individuals active in the emergency response. Due
to the vague and subjective nature of the two questions, application to the six
hurricanes was problematic and is discussed in detail in chapter 6 of this
dissertation.
The second criterion is: Mobilize personnel and resources effectively.
Quarantelli (1997a) argues that in the majority of disasters, there is no lack of
necessary personnel or resources. Research by Bolin (1990) illustrates that
sooner or later, with no planning, needed personnel and resources become
available. With the exception of catastrophes such as the 2004 Tsunami, this
has generally been true for response. It is important to keep in mind the
challenges associated with the mobilization and movement of
resources/equipment between islands. Quarantelli (1997a) further argues that
the goal is not just mobilization or personnel and resources, but rather effective
mobilization. “Effective means that a desired and intended result has been
produced; this definition differs from that of efficiency which requires that the
results be obtained in the best possible way” (Quarantelli, 1997a:43). The
example of evacuation operations was given to illustrate the distinct difference
between effective and efficient. “An evacuation may have got the population out
of an endangered area and been effective, but it may not have been very efficient
in terms of the use of unnecessary resources, the time consumed by the
problems generated” (Quarantelli, 1997a:43).
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To answer the question of effective mobilization of personnel and
resources for the six hurricanes in this study the following three questions will be
examined.
1. Were the needed personnel and resources identified well in the

crisis?
2. Were they located quickly and brought to bear correctly?
3. Were they appropriate to the problems generated by the disaster?
Quarantelli suggests that if the following questions can be answered
positively then it would suggest that the “needed personnel and resources had
not simply been mobilized but mobilized effectively” (Quarantelli, 1997a:44). To
answer this question, data were gathered from emergency operation center
logbooks, hurricane after-action reports, official reports from the Office of The
Prime Minister, observation, and personal interviews with individuals active in the
emergency response. As with criterion one, the questions proposed by
Quarentelli (1997a) to evaluate the effective mobilization of personnel and
resources are subjective and, as you will see in chapter 6, problematic.
The third criterion is: allow the adequate processing of information. This
criterion focuses less on the technology utilized to ensure communication but
rather places the emphasis on the content of what, when and to whom the
information was made available. Although communication between the islands
can be difficult during times of disasters, that, in itself, does not constitute poor
management of a disaster. The amount and type of information being made
available for decision making can significantly impact the response phase.
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As

Quarantelli (1997a) points out there are multiple streams of information flow
during the response phase of a disaster:
9
9
9
9

Within every responding organization;
Between organizations;
From citizens to organizations; and
From organizations to citizens.

As a result of a disaster, staffing requirements will increase and may alter
the regular flow of information. The addition of new individuals to the daily flow of
information can create real challenges. If individuals are not properly equipped
to provide, receive, and process information the system can become overloaded
and inadequate for managing the disaster response operation. An example of
this is the requirement of around the clock staffing. Extra demands are being
placed on an organizations internal system which may bring about a loss and/or
delay of information.
Quarantelli (1997a) contends that it is possible to evaluate the adequacy
of information flow in a disaster. “If organizations and/or citizens did not get the
information they needed, clearly the disaster management was not as it should
have been” (Quarantelli, 1997a:46). Furthermore “information, the ability to
process it, the relationships in a multi-person communication network and the
authority to structure, control and regulate information across an emergency
command affects the total effectiveness of the response system” (Wybo &
Kowalski, 1998:131-2).
For the purposes of this research communication flow for each of the six
hurricanes were evaluated. Data were gathered from a variety of sources
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including official reports from the Office of The Prime Minister, hurricane afteraction reports, observation, survey data, personal interviews with individuals
active in the emergency response, and local newspaper reports.
The fourth criterion is: permit the proper exercise of decision-making.
Research has illustrated that it is uncommon for the usual chain-of-command
and/or lines-of-authority to break down during response to a disaster. The
problems associated with decision-making are usually associated with four key
areas:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Loss of higher-echelon personnel because of overwork.
Conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks.
Clashes over organizational domains between established and
emergent groups.
Surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences.

Specific tasks such as firefighting and law enforcement have very clear
authorities responsible for performing functions. Rarely in a disaster operation
does confusion over who is responsible for repairs to phone or sewer lines occur.
The problems associated with decision making arise from the introduction of new
challenges. For example number one above occurs from a tendency of key
officials to work too long during the crisis period. “Personnel remaining on the
job round-the-clock will eventually collapse from exhaustion or make bad
decisions” (Quarantelli, 1997a:46). This problem is further compounded by the
fact that when replacements come they will lack the necessary information for
correct decision-making partly because crucial data will not have been formally
recorded or processed.
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Proper decision-making requires all relevant knowledge. If criterion four
was not performed sufficiently or if any of the above four difficulties discussed
occur it is appropriate to say that the proper exercise of decision-making was not
permitted. To evaluate criteria four, each of the four questions identified by
Quarantelli (1997a) were answered based on the data gathered through surveys
of Island Administrators, interviews with individuals active in the emergency
response, hurricane after-action reports, and observations.
The fifth criterion for good disaster management is: focus on the
development of overall coordination. Coordination during a disaster operation
comes into play when more than one emergency organization is involved.
Coordination is critical and required to make sure that the response operation
goes smoothly through the facilitation of information and the synchronization of
critical functions that may require a variety of organizations.
It is vital to remember that control is not coordination. Having ‘someone in
charge’ does not mean that the required coordination of organizations is
occurring. Indeed, the idea that one person is controlling response operations
can prevent the necessary coordination required to meet the emergency needs.
Research by (Dynes, 1994) illustrates the differences and difficulties in utilizing a
‘command and control’ model such as the Incident Command System (ICS) as
opposed to a ‘coordination’ model such as the Comprehensive Emergency
Management (CEM) System in response to a disaster operation.
Coordination between organizations is plagued with difficulties for several
reasons beginning with misunderstandings about what ‘coordination’ really
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means. According to Quarantelli (1997a) coordination is neither self-explanatory
nor a matter of consensus. Some groups view coordination as merely informing
others of what they will be doing. Others see it as the centralization of decisionmaking within a particular agency or among a few key officials. Quarantelli
(1997a:48) defines coordination as “mutually agreed upon cooperation about
how to carry out particular tasks.”
Good disaster management was evaluated on the kinds of efforts made at
coordination and the relative absence of problems. According to Quarantelli
(1997a) a lack of coordination will be apparent if there are problems associated
with the delivery of services due to disagreements between organizations
regarding tasks. Data relating to the delivery of services were gathered for each
of the six study hurricanes through archival research, surveys, personal
interviews and observation.
The sixth criterion identified was, correctly recognizing difference between
response and agent-generated demands. It is important to note that regardless
of the disaster type, hurricane, flood, or radiological event; many of the same
functions or activities must take place. It is critical that these core functions, such
as communication and logistics, are carried out in addition to the unique
demands that are generated from a specific ‘agent’ or disaster type. Part of
Quarantelli’s discussion of ‘good disaster management’ requires that there is
correct reorganization of agent- and response-generated needs and demands.
Agent-generated needs are defined as “demands derived from the particular
disaster agent” (Quarantelli, 1997a:42). An example of an agent-generated need
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would be the necessity of sandbags in response to a flood event. Agentgenerated needs will vary considerably depending upon the disaster impact and
specific nature of the agent. Response-generated needs however are defined as
“demands common to all disasters because they are produced by the very efforts
responding organizations make to manage community disasters” (Quarantelli,
1997a:42). The response-generated demands are predictable and independent
of any particular disaster agency. For example, effective mobilization of
personnel and resources, adequate information flow, good decision making, and
coordination between organizations are all required regardless of the incident to
which you are responding. Disaster planners have termed the planning process
to meet the needs of response-generated demands as ‘all-hazards’ planning.
Quarantelli (1997a) asserts that the correct recognition between agent- and
response-generated demands can be determined if criteria two through five as
listed below were answered in a positive way.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources
Adequately processing information
Properly exercising decision-making
Developing overall coordination

Evaluation of criteria six is dependent upon the assessment of these four
components which were done through the application of date obtained during
archival research, surveys, interviews and observations.
The seventh criterion of good disaster management is: provide the mass
communication system with appropriate and accurate information. With today’s
technology, the media are instantly on the scene of any disaster. The
information being provided through the media can significantly influence the
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perceptions and responses of disaster victims, potential volunteers, and even
response agencies (Fry, 2003; Tobin and Montz, 1997; Quarantelli, 1996). It is
critical that appropriate and accurate information is being provided in a structured
and standardized approach.
According to Quarantelli (1997a:50) “good disaster management should
encourage the development of patterns of relationships that are acceptable and
beneficial to the responding organizations, the mass media and the citizens in
general.” Indicators of good relationship include:
Cooperative interaction between organizational and community
officials and media representatives;
9 Regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the
media;
9 Citizens believe their local media are giving them a relatively
accurate picture of what is happening.
Quarantelli (1997a:51) argues that “when these relationships are good, members
9

of the press are satisfied with the amount and quality of information that is given
to them by officials, who in turn want them to disseminate information about the
disasters.” He further states that if relevant information regarding the response is
not provided to the local media they will disseminate, even if unintentionally,
news that is inaccurate. A measure of good disaster management is if the media
was provided with appropriate and accurate information. Evaluation of this
criterion was done using data obtained from archival research, to include
newspapers, radio, and television archives, as well as data from interviews, and
observations.
The eighth and final criterion for good disaster management is: have a
well-functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC). An EOC serves as the
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nucleus for disaster response activities and facilitates the successful completion
of the previous seven criteria. Given the number of agencies and groups
required to respond to any given disaster the likelihood of response
complications resulting from poor management is high. During a disaster
response operation, a variety of activities are occurring simultaneously all with
equal importance. An EOC is intended to facilitate the effective implementation
of all required response activities and should be seen not just as a place and
structure but also a function (Perry 1991:204, FEMA 1995:27).
It is important to remember that more than just a common location is
needed to be considered a well-functioning EOC. Although a coordinated and
organized response can be improved if all responding organizations are
represented at a common location, it does not ensure success. Response
operations many times last for days and even weeks, this requires that the EOC
meet minimum physical requirements. For Example the EOC should:
9
9
9
9
9
9

Be located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation
routes;
Have sufficient work space;
Have bathroom and sleeping facilities;
Have adequate communication provisions;
Have computers and necessary supplies;
Have maps and equipment inventory.

However, the physical requirements are still not enough for an EOC to be
considered ‘well functioning’. An EOC is of little value if agencies and
organizations active in response do not send liaison personnel to the EOC. In
addition to physical requirements for an EOC, there are social requirements that
are equally essential. For example the EOC should require that:
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9

Liaison personnel be knowledgeable and possess certain decisionmaking responsibilities in their own organizations.

An effective response is unlikely if organizational representatives at the EOC are
low level employees. These individuals may not only have inadequate
knowledge of the organizations capabilities and resources, but they are also not
involved in the decision making process. If there is proper staffing of the EOC,
information can be collected and disseminated appropriately to ensure that tasks
are executed accordingly. Additionally, proper staffing of the EOC provides for
an ideal problem solving environment. Complications with response operations
can be addressed between organizations in a timely fashion to ensure effective
response.
It is dangerous, however, to assume that just because the physical and
social requirements listed above are in place that the EOC will be ‘well
functioning’. The EOC environment is both dynamic and stressful. Personal
dynamics can prevent an operation from running smoothly. “The social climate
of an EOC is a very stressful one: there is pressure to take action, limited and
uncertain information, shifting priorities and overlapping lines of authority and
responsibility” (Perry 1991:210).
Criterion eight for determining good disaster management, have a wellfunctioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC), was measured by first
determining if the previous seven criteria were answered in a positive way.
Additionally data were gathered through the EOC log books, hurricane afteraction reports, interviews with individuals active in disaster response, and
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observation. Data were applied to each of the six study hurricanes to determine
if there was a well-functioning EOC.
3.4.3 The Model of Community Response to Disasters
Evaluating the management of the six study hurricanes utilizing
Quarantelli’s (1997a) ‘Criteria for Good Management’ provided a foundation for
examining the impact of a CEM system. However, to fully understand the
findings as they apply to the dynamic political, social, and economic environment
of The Bahamas, The Model of Community Response to Disasters was also
applied. (See Figure 3.2) This theoretical framework is amended from Hughey
(2003).
Combining the elements put forth by Kates and Burton (1986a) and
Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) as applied to the four phase of emergency
management, allowed for the identification of gap that resulted in poor hazard
management. This theoretical model further illustrates the importance of the
policy process and intergovernmental system that impacts disaster response.
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Figure 3.2- Model of Community Response to Disasters
The model begins with the identification of good leadership by
professionally trained officials as argued by Kates and Burton (1986).
Undoubtedly, well trained and experienced professionals are essential
components to the successful management of a disaster. However the hazards
literature (Quarantelli, 1997a; 1997b; Mileti 1999, Mitchell 1996) has further
illustrated that there is much more required to meet successfully the challenges
of disaster response. Wolensky and Wolensky (1990), argue that four other
elements are also required: (1) a foundation of supportive values for local
government action, (2) the legal authority to act, (3) an advocacy supporting
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action, and (4) necessary institutional resources. These four elements in
combination with good leadership are then applied to the four phases of
emergency management: (1) Preparedness, (2) Response, (3) Recovery, and (4)
Mitigation as displayed above in Figure 3.2.
As discussed in Chapter Two the four phases of emergency management
are widely accepted within the hazard research field with slight variations (Clary
1985; FEMA 2003; Kates and Burton 1986). The phases of disaster
management as pointed out by Bruce (1985) are interrelated, so simplification
and boundaries must be developed in order to discuss them individually,
understanding that many times these phases are occurring simultaneously or
with some overlap. The delineation between the four phases of a disaster has
allowed researchers and responders to find order in a disordered and chaotic
environment.
The application of the model was done in two distinct phases, the preCEM phase, which provides the contextual framework necessary to understand
Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle, and the post-CEM phase, that
examined Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma. By exploring emergency
response in these two phases ensures that the wider political, economic, and
cultural explanations surrounding response to the six study hurricanes is
addressed. This type of examination further allows for a more complete
understanding of the mechanisms that impacted response initiatives.
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3.5

Strengths and Limitations of the Study Design
Longitudinal data permit the measurement of differences or change in a

variable from one period to another, in this case the management of disaster
operations following the implementation of a comprehensive emergency
management system. This allows for the description of patterns of change over
time, and can be used to locate the causes of social phenomena and sleeper
effects, that is, connections between events that are widely separated in time.
The major limitations to a longitudinal study which utilized the retrospective
design are:
1. Recall Bias: Retrospective questions concerning motivational, attitudinal,
cognitive or affective state are particularly problematic because
respondents find it hard to accurately recall the timing of changes in these
states.
2. Retrospective studies must be based on survivors: For this study it means
that I was limited to those individuals who were still working for NEMA or
The Bahamas Government. Any individuals who have moved, changed
jobs, or passed away were omitted and biases may arise.
3.6

Summary
This chapter described the mixed methods approach employed for this

study including the strengths and limitations associated with the four data
collection techniques: (1) archival research, (2) structured surveys, (3) semistructured interviews, and (4) participant observations. Detailed descriptions of
the two theoretical frameworks used as well as how Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria
for evaluating the management of disaster response operations and the model of
community response to disasters (Figure 3.2) were applied. Application and
testing of these two frameworks allowed for the development of a baseline for
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comparison between the six study hurricanes as well as a more comprehensive
understanding of the mechanisms impacting response. Figure 3.3 provides a
flow diagram for the stages of this research.

Research Questions

Data Collection
Archival research
Structured surveys
Semi-structured interviews
Participant observations

Quarantelli’s
Criteria for
Evaluating
Response

Model of
Community
Response

Research Findings

Figure 3.3 – Methodology Flow Diagram
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Chapter Four
Results: Application Of Quarantelli’s Criteria For Evaluating Response

4.1

Introduction
Chapter four discusses the research findings associated with the testing of

Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluating disaster response. The results
are presented in a combination of tabular and written form. The data in this
chapter are formatted to answer the following research questions.


Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management
of disaster response be operationalized?



Based on Quarantelli’s methodology did the implementation of a CEM
system improve disaster response?

The criteria are applied to each of the six study hurricanes to determine if
improvements in disaster response were identified after the implementation of
CEM.
Data obtained through surveys, semi-structured interviews, archival
research, and observations were applied to assess each of the eight evaluation
criteria as outlined in Chapter 3. The eight criteria were equally applied to the six
study hurricanes in an effort to determine if Quarantelii’s methodology could be
operationalized as well as to identify the success of pre- and post-CEM response
operations.
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Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations
to the Six Study Hurricanes
Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

1. Adequately
carrying out
generic
functions;

No

No

No

No

No

No

2. Effectively
mobilizing
personnel and
resources;

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

3. Adequately
processing
information;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

4. Properly
exercising
decision-making;

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

5. Developing
overall
coordination;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

6. Correctly
recognizing
differences
between
response and
agent-generated
demands;

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

7. Providing
appropriate and
accurate reports
for the news
media;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

8. Having a wellfunctioning
emergency
operations
center;

No

No

No

No

No

No

Table 4.1 - Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response
Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes
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Table 4.1 displays the results of the evaluation for all six study hurricanes
using Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria. Each criterion is examined in detail
below to evaluate the usefulness of Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for
evaluating the management of disaster response operations. The methodology,
if it can be operationalized, will be able to examine the shifts in disaster response
as a result of CEM. Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle were managed
under the pre-CEM system. Disaster response during this time was seen as the
responsibility of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) and a ‘command
and control’ model for disaster response was utilized. Hurricanes Frances,
Jeanne, and Wilma were managed under the post-CEM system. Disaster
response after the implementation of CEM in 2002 was the responsibility of the
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and ‘comprehensive
coordination’ model for response was implemented.

4.2

Examination and Application of Quarantelli’s Eight Criteria

4.2.1 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions
The first component of Quarantelli’s methodology was to determine if
generic emergency response functions were carried out adequately. Regardless
of the disaster agent certain functions must be carried out. The ten generic
functions were evaluated for this research were identified by Quarantelli (1997a)
and Kreps (1991b) and include 1) Warnings; 2) Evacuations; 3) Sheltering; 4)
Emergency Medical Care; 5) Search and Rescue; 6) Protection of Property; 7)
Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources; 8) Assessing the Damage;
9) Coordinating emergency management activities; 10) Restoring essential public
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services. According to Quarantelli’s (1997a) the following two questions must be
applied to each of the ten generic functions.
1. Was the need for the function recognized early?
2. Was the function carried out without too many problems?
As discussed in Chapter Three, if ‘yes’ can be answered to both questions then
the function can be considered to be “adequately carried-out”. Table 4.2 shows
that generic functions were not “adequately carried-out” during any of the six
disaster response operations. A detailed description and supporting data for the
responses in Table 4.2 are provided in Table 4.3 and sections 4.2.1.1 – 4.2.1.6.

Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion One
Pre-CEM

Adequately carrying
out generic
functions;

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

No

No

No

Table 4.2 – Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion On
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Hurricane

FUNCTIONS

GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
Pre-CEM
Andrew
Floyd
Michelle
1992
1999
2001
Q2. Was
the
Q1. Was
the
function
Function
carried out
Q1
Q2
Q1
Q2
recognized without too
early?*
many
(Y/N)
problems?*
(Y/N)

Frances
2004

Post-CEM
Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

Q1

Q2

Q1

Q2

Q1

Q2

1. Warning

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2. Evacuations

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

3. Sheltering

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4. Emergency Medical
Care

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5. Search and Rescue

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6. Protection of Property

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

7. Mobilization of
Emergency Personnel
and Resources

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

8. Assessing the Damage

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

9. Coordinating
emergency
management activities

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

10. Restoring essential
public services

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 4.3 Generic Function Evaluation Chart Applied to the Six Study Hurricanes
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4.2.1.1

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out
Generic Functions

Table 4.4 provides a summary of the ten generic functions that were
evaluated for this research and their application to Hurricane Andrew 1992.

Hurricane Andrew 1992
GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
Was the Need for the
function recognized
early? (Y/N)

Was the function
carried out without too
many problems? (Y/N)

1. Warning

Yes

Yes

2. Evacuations

Yes

No

3. Sheltering

No

No

4. Emergency Medical
Care

Yes

Yes

5. Search and Rescue

No

No

6. Protection of Property

Yes

Yes

7. Mobilization of
Emergency Personnel
and Resources

No

No

8. Assessing the
Damage

No

No

9. Coordinating
emergency
management
activities

No

No

10. Restoring essential
public services

No

No

FUNCTIONS

Table 4.4 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Andrew
1992
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 1 (Warning)
Based on data gathered from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology
(1992) and interviews with NEMA staff, warnings for Hurricane Andrew were
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effectively executed. On Saturday August 22nd hurricane warnings were issued
for the islands of the Northwest Bahamas and were maintained until 7am on
Monday the 24th (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 1992). Hurricane
warnings are issued by the Department of Meteorology when hurricane force
winds (sustained winds of 74mph or higher) are expected in an area within the
next 24 hours or less. The warnings issued by the Department of Meteorology
were provide to The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas, ZNS, who then
communicated the warnings throughout the Islands via television and radio.
“I was still with the Defence Force in 1992. Everyone was aware
Hurricane Andrew was going to hit, we were warned to secure our homes
and prepare for a category 5 storm” (Bethel, 2006).
“The Met Department does a great job of tracking the storm and
providing the most up to date information to the public. From Andrew to
Wilma Bahamians knew the storms were coming” (Outten-Moncur,
2007a).
Based on the data from the Department of Meteorology and the interviews with
NEMA staff, the need for warnings was recognized early and the function was
carried out with no notable problems.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)
In 1992 there was no legal authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’
evacuation orders within the Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Through archival
research, interviews with NEMA staff, and informal discussions with Island
Administrators there was no evidence that evacuations were issued. The
Department of Meteorology (1992) did encourage residents in unsafe structures
to relocate and seek shelter in more secure locations. However, ‘official’
requests for evacuation were not issued and national resources were not made
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available to aid residents. The data shows that the need for evacuations was
recognized by the Department of Meteorology however the function was not
carried-out effectively.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)
The Bahamas Red Cross Society (1992) with support from the RBDF and
the Ministry of Social Services (Office of the Prime Minister, 1992) opened
emergency shelters throughout The Bahamas. Data on the number of shelters
opened, individuals housed, and services provided were not available.
“After Hurricane Andrew passed shelters were opened. The shelters were
run mostly by Social Services” (Luke Bethel, December 18, 2006).
Based on informal discussions with Red Cross representatives, Island
Administrators, as well as NEMA staff it appears that many of the shelters were
opened after Andrew made landfall to deal with the dislocation of population due
to housing damage. This post impact sheltering of a population is known as
recovery shelters. In contrast response shelters the focus of this research, are
opened prior to landfall to provide residents with a safe location to ride out the
storm. As a result the available data suggests that emergency response shelters
were not recognized early or carried-out effectively.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)
National emergency medical care was adequate in meeting the needs of
residents in response to Hurricane Andrew. Four deaths were reported (Office of
the Prime Minister, 1992) and based on informal discussions with the Minister of
Health, and Hospital Authority representative Paul Newbold, the national
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emergency medical system was able to coordinate response to injuries. At no
time was the system overwhelmed or incapable of meeting the medical needs of
the nation. Based on the available data, it appears that the function was
recognized early and carried out effectively.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)
Search and Rescue was not a formal function in 1992 during response to
Hurricane Andrew. According to informal discussions that I had at the 2005
national NEMA conference in Nassau, with the Island Administrators from San
Salvador and Bimini, search and rescue was an informal function conducted at
the local level by a variety of organizations in a disjointed and uncoordinated
manner. Local residents, the police and fire department, as well as the RBDF
provided assistance with search and rescue services. Data obtained through
archival research makes no reference to Hurricane Andrew search and rescue
operations. As a result both question posed by Quarantelli to evaluate this
functions were assessed negatively indicating the function was not identified
early or executed effectively.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)
Protection of Government property was carried out by the Ministry of
Works and Transportation (Office of the Prime Minister, 1992). With
responsibility for Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured all
government facilities by installing hurricane shutters and/or plywood to protect
windows. The protection of government property was recognized early and
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carried out with no notable problems. Many residents also took precautions with
their property by securing windows and clearing debris.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and
Resources)
The RBDF controlled disaster operations in response to Hurricane Andrew
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1992; Bethel, 2006; Rigby, 2006). No formal
emergency operations center (EOC) was established to allow for a multiorganizational response, rather the operations was controlled by the RBDF. This
caused several problems, including limited and/or delayed preliminary damage
assessment reports. The lack of a detailed assessment triggered a delay in the
activation of resources and personnel. General comprehensive coordination was
lacking and was evident through the singular response by the RBDF.
Communication was poor and potential support agencies were not activated or
provided with updated information. (Bethel, 2006; Rigby, 2006) As a result there
were significant delays in the activation and movement of emergency materials
and personnel producing a disjointed response. Applying the data to
Quarantelli’s methodology shows that the need for the mobilization of emergency
personnel and resources was not recognized early nor was it carried out
effectively.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)
According to the Office of the Prime Ministers’ (1992) report on the impact
of Andrew, it appears that some informal damage assessments were conducted
by ministries to determine what type of recovery would be required (Office of the
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Prime Minister, 1992). This information however was related to long term fiscal
needs to rebuild and not immediate response needs. There is no evidence that a
comprehensive coordinated assessment was conducted at the national level.
“During Hurricane Andrew damage assessment was not done. We now
have a detailed system in place that ensures uniformed criteria for
assessments” (Bethel, 2006).
Because preliminary damage assessments (PDA) were not conducted it was
difficult to determine in the immediate aftermath of Andrew the full magnitude and
impact of the storm. Informal discussions with Island Administrators during the
2005 and 2006 NEMA conferences revealed that they were not aware of any
assessments that were conducted immediately following Hurricane Andrew to
determine the level of damage. Anecdotal information indicated problems with
duplication and uncoordinated reporting, that resulted in confusion. Although the
assessments by some ministries were conducted they focused on recovery, not
response. The lack of a national PDA following Hurricane Andrew indicates that
the need was not recognized early or carried out effectively.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management
Activities)
During response to Hurricane Andrew there was very little coordination of
emergency management activities, and primary responsibility was assigned to
the RBDF. Utilizing a military ‘command and control’ model of operation there
was limited coordination between multiple agencies.
“Remember I was with the RBDF at that time [1992 Hurricane Andrew],
and there was no structure like there is today to allow for coordination”
(Bethel, 2006).
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“During Hurricane Andrew nothing was coordinated, agencies worked
independently there was no structure in place to ensure the Family Islands
were prepared or able to respond” (Outton-Moncur, 2006b)
Government ministries lead specific emergency activities related to their mission
(Office of The Prime Minister, 1992) however, this was conducted in an
uncoordinated and disjointed manner. According to informal discussions with
Island Administrators and NEMA staff, there was no centralized sharing of
information which lead to duplications of efforts and wasting of resources. Based
on this information and applying Quarantelli’s methodology this function was not
recognized early or implemented effectively.
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)
The restoration of essential services such as water, electricity and phone
were significantly delayed following Hurricane Andrew. Eleuthera, the Berry
Islands and South Bimini all reported interruption to services. The Bahamas
Telecommunication Company (BTC), The Bahamas Electric Corporation (BEC),
and the Water and Sewerage Corporation (W&SC) all worked to restore services
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1992). Data regarding the length of outages could
not be obtained. Informal discussions with the Island Administrator from San
Salvador at the 2005 NEMA Conference indicated that there were portions of the
Family Islands that were without power for several months. There are no data to
suggest that the need for the function was recognized early or implemented
effectively.
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4.2.1.2

Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic
Functions

Table 4.5 provides a summary of the ten generic functions identified by
Quarantelli (1997a) and evaluated for this research as they relate to Hurricane
Floyd.
Hurricane Floyd 1999
GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
Was the Need for the
function recognized
early? (Y/N)

Was the function
carried out without too
many problems? (Y/N)

1. Warning

Yes

Yes

2. Evacuations

Yes

No

3. Sheltering

No

No

Yes

Yes

5. Search and Rescue

No

No

6. Protection of Property

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

FUNCTIONS

4. Emergency Medical

Care

7. Mobilization of

Emergency Personnel
and Resources
8. Assessing the

Damage
9. Coordinating

emergency
management
activities
10. Restoring essential

public services

Table 4.5 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Floyd
1999
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 1 (Warning)
The data gathered from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (1999)
and interviews with NEMA staff indicate that warnings for Hurricane Floyd were
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effectively executed. At 5pm on September 13th, 1999 tropical storm warnings4
were issued for the Southeast Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands. A
hurricane watch5 was also posted for the Central Islands of The Bahamas
(Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 1999). The Broadcasting Corporation of
The Bahamas, communicated the warnings throughout the Islands of The
Bahamas via television and radio.
“The Bahamian public responded well to the hurricane alert messages,
and took advice given to them seriously. This was subsequently reflected
in the fact that there was one casualty [later reclassified as two] and
property damage was minimized in most islands. The department of
Meteorology was commended by the media and the general public, for the
issuing of timely and accurate warnings. The response to our warning
system was just tremendous” (Lightbourne and Dean, 1999:12).
In response to Hurricane Floyd data indicates that need for warnings were
recognized early and the function was carried out effectively.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)
‘Official’ evacuation orders in response to Hurricane Floyd were not issued
for the Islands of The Bahamas. Although the news media and Department of
Meteorology did encourage residents of low lying areas and families with homes
close to the sea to relocate to a more secure location, no ‘official’ request for
evacuations were made (Office of The Prime Minister, 1999). The data indicates
that the general function of evacuations was recognized by the Department of

4

Tropical Storm warnings are issued by The Department of Meteorology when tropical storm
conditions are expected in the specified area within 24 hours.
5
Hurricane watches are issued by the Department of Meteorology to indicate that hurricane
conditions are possible in the specified area, usually within 36 hours. When the Department of
Meteorology issues a hurricane watch they notify residents to prepare to take immediate action to
protect your family and property in case a hurricane warning is issued.
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Meteorology but not carried-out effectively. No resources or coordination took
place to facilitate the movement of residents in response to Hurricane Floyd.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)
The Bahamas Red Cross Society with support from the RBDF and the
Ministry of Social Services and Community Development opened emergency
shelters (Ingraham, 1999). Data on the number of shelters opened, individuals
housed, and services provided were not available for Hurricane Floyd. There are
no data to suggest that the need for shelters was recognized early. Based on the
Prime Minister’s Communication to Parliament regarding shelter operations, it
appears that The Bahamas Red Cross Society in coordination with Social
Services were successful in providing shelter services (Ingraham, 1999).
However, as with Hurricane Andrew the shelters were recovery not emergency
response shelters.
“Social Services worked closely with the Island Administrators to ensure
shelters were open for those that lost their homes [as a result of Hurricane
Floyd]”(Glinton, 2006)
The need for response shelters was not recognized early nor was
the function carried-out effectively.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)
“At no time following the passage of Hurricane Floyd did we [The
Bahamas] experience a medical or public health emergency related to the
hurricane” (Ingraham, 1999:4). National emergency medical care was adequate
in meeting the needs of residents in response to Hurricane Floyd with only two
deaths reported in association with the storm (Office of The Prime Minister,
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1999). The Ministry of Health in coordination with the Pan American Health
Organization additionally provided support in the rapid assessment of water
supplies, waste water and excreta disposal and solid waste management
throughout the islands (Ingraham, 1999). Through informal discussions with Paul
Newbold of The Bahamas Hospital Authority, following Hurricane Andrew
standard operating procedures (SOPs) were put in place in preparation for a
medical emergency. Those SOP’s were followed as identified by Prime Minister
Ingraham (1999) and successfully executed in response to Hurricane Floyd. As a
result, the need for emergency medical care was assessed to have been
recognized early and carried-out with no notable problems.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)
Search and Rescue was not a formal function in 1999 and operations
were conducted by a variety of local and national organizations in an
uncoordinated manner. Based on informal discussions that I had with members
of The Bahamas Police and Defence Force indicated that search and rescue was
never a major focus of training or concern. Buildings that were destroyed by
Hurricane Floyd were searched by local residents, police or fire. This indicates
that the function was not recognized early or executed effectively.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)
Protection of Government property was carried out by the Ministry of
Works and Transportation (Office of The Prime Minister, 1999). The Ministry of
Works was responsible for securing government buildings by installing hurricane
shutters and/or utilizing plywood to protect windows. The Department of
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Meteorology reported that residents responded effectively to their
recommendations regarding the protection of homes in preparation for Hurricane
Floyd (Lightbourne and Dean, 1999). Quarantelli’s criteria were applied to this
function and indicate that the protection of private and government property was
recognized early and carried out with no notable problems.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and
Resources)
Although an emergency operations center was established by the RBDF it
was not a multi-agency command center. This created several problems to
include, limited and/or delayed preliminary damage assessment information
intern generated a delay in the activation of resources and personnel. A lack of
comprehensive coordination and shared communication lead to a disjointed
multi-organizational response. As a result there were delays in the activation and
movement of emergency materials and personnel.
“Hurricane Floyd is unique in that long-term recovery was well
organized. A Disaster Recovery Committee was put in place by the Prime
Minister to coordinate with Social Services and develop protocol for
providing aid. However, this happened weeks after Floyd impacted the
nation and in the interim response efforts were lacking” (Outten-Moncur,
2006a).
Reports from the Office of the Prime Minister (1999) indicate that the
RBDF did provide emergency relief shipments of water, canned and dry food
stuffs, emergency first aid kits, insect repellants and other emergency supplies
such as batteries, flashlights and children’s disposable diapers that had been
donated by the private sector in New Providence. Reports further indicate that
churches, private radio stations and numerous corporate citizens also made
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donations. However, the movement and distribution of emergency relief was
difficult and many times delayed for extended periods of time. Applying the data
to Quarantelli’s methodology indicates that the need for the mobilization of
emergency personnel and resources was not recognized early nor was it carried
out effectively. This is an example of what Quarantelli classifies as eventual
relief.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)
A PDA is used to determine the magnitude and impact of a disaster as
well as identify needs that require immediate attention. Following the impact of
Floyd, damage assessments were conducted by a variety of organizations to
include the RBDF, Ministry of Works, OFDA, and PAHO (Office of the Prime
Minister, 1999). However, all of the assessments utilized different evaluation
criteria for damage classification. There was no uniformity to the process which
created incomplete assessments and duplication of information. According to
Gayle Outten-Moncur (2006) the uncoordinated reporting during response to
Hurricane Floyd created confusion during the response operation. Furthermore,
it created disorder in the collection of data for this research. Applying the data to
Quarantelli’s criteria indicates the need for damage assessment was recognized
but the function was not effectively carried out.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management
Activities)
During response to Hurricane Floyd there was very little ‘coordination’ of
emergency management activities. The RBDF took the lead by establishing an
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EOC while The Bahamas Red Cross Society and Ministry of Social Services
established shelters. Additional ministries lead specific emergency activities
related to there mission however in an uncoordinated and disjointed manner.
“Everything was going so fast, things could have been more organized or
more structured. At that time [1999 Hurricane Floyd], I was still with the
Defence Force, I was confused with trying to find a central point because
there seemed to be so many different central points of operation” (Bethel,
2006)
Informal discussions with Island Administrators during the 2005 and 2006 NEMA
conference, indicated that a contributing factor to the slow response of the
national governments to Floyd was due in part to no centralized sharing of
information. The Island Administrator from Eleuthera also indicated there were
duplications of effort and wasting of resources due to a lack of coordination.
Based on Quarantelli’s criteria this general function of coordinating emergency
management was neither recognized early nor implemented effectively.
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)
The restoration of essential services such as water, electricity and phone
services were significantly delayed following Hurricane Floyd. Reports issued on
October 13th 1999 indicated that a month following the event some islands were
still struggling with water quality and water supply issues (Ingraham, 1999).
Reports from the Water and Sewerage Corporation indicated that “coliform
indicator bacteria have been reported, and were detected during the mission, in
bottled water” (W&SC, 1999). These reports were issued weeks after the
passage of Hurricane Floyd indicating that the essential public service of clean
drinking water had not been restored.
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“The storm [Hurricane Floyd] wreaked havoc on the communications
system of The Bahamas, downing hundreds of telephone and electrical
poles and causing major damage to telecommunications towers. Because
of this, for a time, virtually all communications between our islands and to
the outside world were severed. The absence of stand-by generators on a
number of islands, such as Cat Island, meant that for some twenty four
hours after the eye of the storm had crossed that island emergency
satellite telephones remained inoperable and we were without confirmed
accurate reports” (Ingraham, 1999:81).
The statement by Prime Minister Ingraham, confirms previously provided data
that assessments were not conducted in a timely manner as well as illustrates
that the need for restoration of essential public serves were recognized early.
4.2.1.3

Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out
Generic Functions

Table 4.6 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they were
applied to Hurricane Michelle.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 1 (Warning)
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2001) and NEMA
staff members, warnings for Hurricane Michelle were effectively executed.
According to reports issued by the Department of Meteorology (2001) at 6am of
Saturday, November 3rd, residents of the Northwest and Central Bahamas were
urged to monitor the progress of Hurricane Michelle as a Tropical Cyclone Alert6
was issued. A Hurricane Watch was posted by 11pm that evening for the
following islands: Bimini, Grand Bahama, Abaco, The Berry Islands, Andros,
New Providence, Eleuthera, Exuma, Cat Island, Ragged Island, Long Island,

6

When a tropical cyclone can possibly bring storm or hurricane conditions to some part of The
Bahamas within 60 hours an alert is issued by the Meteorological Department.
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Rum Cay and San Salvador. The warnings issued by the Department of
Meteorology were broadcast on ZNS radio and television channels.
“Everyone took Michelle very seriously. Forecasted to directly impact the
Island of New Providence, residents were uneasy. It is rare for a
Hurricane to impact the capital. Warnings were issued and most residents
took action” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b).
The data indicates that as with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the need for
warnings in response to Michelle was recognized early and the function was
carried out with no notable problems.
Hurricane Michelle 2001
GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
Was the Need for the
function recognized
early? (Y/N)

Was the function carried
out without too many
problems? (Y/N)

1. Warning

Yes

Yes

2. Evacuations

Yes

No

3. Sheltering

Yes

Yes

4. Emergency Medical
Care

Yes

Yes

5. Search and Rescue

Yes

Yes

6. Protection of Property

Yes

Yes

7. Mobilization of
Emergency Personnel
and Resources

No

No

8. Assessing the Damage

Yes

No

9. Coordinating
emergency
management activities

No

No

10. Restoring essential
public services

Yes

No

FUNCTIONS

Table 4.6 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Michelle
2001
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Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)
In 2001 there continued to be no legal authority to act or avenue for
issuing ‘official’ evacuation orders. As Hurricane Michelle approached, The
Department of Meteorology, at 11pm on Saturday, November 3rd informed
residents “to begin securing their properties, and to evacuate the following
islands and cays: Cat Cay, Red Bays, Ocean Cay, Berry Islands, the UpperExuma Cays and similar Cays in the Watch area” (Bahamas Department of
Meteorology, 2001:10-11). Evacuation orders within The Bahamas are voluntary
and once warnings were issued it was the responsibility of residents to obtain the
means to evacuate.
“Michelle did not cause me to evacuate my home. I live on high ground
and am not prone to flooding, plus my home is a very strong structure.
Two or three members of my wife’s family stayed with us during the
storm” (Rigby, 2006)
“Department of Social Services and the Red Cross opened shelters in
church facilities and schools on the island of New Providence” (Glinton,
2006).
Although no ‘official’ evacuation orders were issued by The Government of
The Bahamas or the RBDF, the Department of Meteorology did encourage
residents in unsafe structures to relocate. Although the need for evacuations
was recognized by the Department of Meteorology the function was not carried
out in a formal, uniformed way to aid residents.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)
The Bahamas Red Cross Society with support from the RBDF and the
Ministry of Social Services and Community Development opened emergency
shelters in response to Hurricane Michelle (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).
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Data on the number of shelters opened, individuals housed, and services
provided were not available for Hurricane Michelle. Informal discussions with
NEMA staff members however, indicated that the need for shelters was
recognized early and the function was carried out without too many problems
(Glinton, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b). Unlike Andrew and Floyd, Hurricane
Michelle impacted the capital city of Nassau where resources and personnel
were available to effectively carry out the function of sheltering.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)
The Island of New Providence, home to over 69% of the nation’s
population, was significantly impacted by Hurricane Michelle. The Bahamas
Ministry of Health (2001) reported no major emergencies or deaths in association
with Hurricane Michelle. According to Paul Newbold, representative with The
Bahamas Hospital Authority, all area hospitals and clinics were functioning
normally. National emergency medical capabilities were adequate to meet all
health related needs generated as a result of Hurricane Michelle. Based on
available data it appears that the need for emergency medical care was
recognized early and the function was carried out with no notable problems.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)
Flooding was the major concern with Hurricane Michelle. Although
damage to buildings was reported, unlike Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the
islands did not experience extensive damage. The requirement for urban search
and rescue was minimal and was successfully addressed by the RBDF and the
Fire Department (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). Also important was the
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need for maritime search and rescue in response to a sailboat with Haitian
migrants on the Shores of Long Island (Bahamas Department of Meteorology,
2001). This was also successfully addressed by the RBDF. Based on available
data it appears that search and rescue requirements in response to Hurricane
Michelle were recognized early and carried out effectively.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)
Protection of Government property was carried out by the Ministry of
Works and Transportation. With responsibility for Government Buildings the
Ministry of Works secured government facilities by installing hurricane shutters
and utilizing plywood to protect windows. Business owners in downtown Nassau
also utilized sandbags to protect against flooding. According to informal
discussions with NEMA staff members many residents of New Providence did
not take any mitigative action to protect their properties in preparation for
Hurricane Michelle believing that the hurricane would not hit them. Based on the
official after action report issued by the Bahamas Department of Meteorology
(2001), warnings were issued to residents to secure property illustrating that the
need for the function was identified early. Yet many residents did not heeding
warnings. To ensure consistent and uniformed evaluation of this generic function
the focus stayed on the protection of government property as it had in response
to Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd. The data shows that the need for the function
was both recognized early and carried out effectively by the Ministry of Works
and Transportation.
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Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel
and Resources)
Hurricane Michelle was the first hurricane to make landfall on the island of
New Providence since Hurricane Janice in 1958. Mobilization of personnel was
very difficult since many residents were responding to needs at their own home
and were not available to participate in official response operations. Additionally,
as with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd the RBDF established an EOC, however it
was not multi-agency. This created several problems, including limited PDA
information intern a delaying the activation of resources and personnel (Office of
The Prime Minister, 2001).
“We [the nation of The Bahamas] were not prepared to deal with a direct
hit to Nassau. Many residents did not secure food and water prior to
landfall. The heavy rain and sea surge washed out many of the roads
making it difficult for emergency personnel and residents to move around
the island” (Davis, 2006).
“Hurricane Michelle brought awareness about emergency management
and the need to have a well coordinated response” (Outten-Moncur,
2006b).
As with previous response operations a lack of comprehensive coordination and
shared communication created a disjointed multi-organizational response. The
need for the mobilization of emergency personnel and resources was not
recognized early nor was it carried out effectively.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)
According to the Office of the Prime Minister (2001) damage assessment
in response to Hurricane Michelle was completed by multiple ministries and
organizations. The uncoordinated function produced inconsistent reporting, for
instance, the RBDF (2001) indicated extensive damage to ports on the north side
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of New Providence, while the Ministry of Works reported no damage (Office of
the Prime Minister, 2001).
“Had uniformed assessment protocol been in place response could have
been better organized” (Bethel, 2006).
Duplicated information and uncoordinated reporting caused a slowdown in
response efforts. The need for damage assessment was recognized, however
the function was not effectively carried out.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management
Activities)
During response to Hurricane Michelle there was very little coordination of
emergency management activities. Ministries responded independently of one
another to needs as they arose.
“Following Michelle it was difficult to communicate as a result of downed
phone lines. Offices were closed and government employees were dealing
with issues at their home so it was hard to get things done” (Rigby, 2006).
As during Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd the RBDF established an EOC at the
Cabinet Office, providing support and briefings to the Office of the Prime Minister
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). Overall response activities were
uncoordinated, with no centralized sharing of information resulting in duplication
of efforts (Bethel, 2006). The coordination function was not recognized early nor
was it implemented effectively.
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)
Interruption to essential public services such as water, electrical power,
and telecommunication operations were significant for the northwestern and
central islands of The Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2001;

132

Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). An estimated 200,000 residents were
affected by power outages (BEC, 2001). Extensive flooding compromised the
delicate fresh water system of the nation as well as damaged key
communications hubs on the island of New Providence. Data suggests that the
need to restore essential public services were recognized early however, a lack
of planning, resources, and information produced extensive delays in executing
the function (Office of the Prime Minster, 2001).
4.2.1.4

Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out
Generic Functions

Table 4.7 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they apply to
Hurricane Frances. Data obtained through interviews, surveys, and archival
research indicate that most of the generic functions were both recognized early
and carried out without too many problems. However, according to Quarantelli
(1997a) for us to answer yes to the first criteria we must answer yes to all ten
functions. Since generic function seven (7), mobilization of emergency personnel
and resources, was not carried out without too many problems criterion one must
be answered no. A detailed review of the ten generic functions is provided
below.
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Hurricane Frances 2004
GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
Was the Need for the
function recognized
early? (Y/N)

Was the function
carried out without too
many problems? (Y/N)

1. Warning

Yes

Yes

2. Evacuations

Yes

No

3. Sheltering

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5. Search and Rescue

Yes

Yes

6. Protection of Property

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

FUNCTIONS

4. Emergency Medical

Care

7. Mobilization of

Emergency Personnel
and Resources
8. Assessing the

Damage
9. Coordinating

emergency
management
activities
10. Restoring essential

public services

Table 4.7 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Frances
2004
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 1 (Warning)
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2004a) issued its first alert on
Hurricane Frances at 6pm on August 30th when the projected tracks indicated
that the hurricane would impact the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Islands of
the Southeast Bahamas. Within twelve hours of the first alert Frances was
upgraded to a Hurricane Watch. Hurricane Warnings were issued at noon on
August 31st for The Turks and Caicos Islands and the Southeast Islands of the
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Bahamas. A Hurricane Watch was still in effect for the Central Islands of The
Bahamas and a Hurricane Alert was issued for the Northwestern Islands
(Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004a).
At noon on September 1st, Hurricane warnings for the Central Bahamas
were issued as the warnings for the Southeast Islands remained in effect. The
Northwest Bahamas remained under a Hurricane Watch. By 9am that evening
while Frances was some 80 miles east-southeast of the Island of Mayaguana,
Hurricane Warnings were issued for the entire archipelago. The Broadcasting
Corporation of The Bahamas, communicated the alerts, watches, and warnings
throughout the Islands of The Bahamas via television and radio (Bahamas
Department of Meteorology, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a).
Warnings were also issued through ZNS by the Director of the National
Emergency Management Agency, Mr. Carl Smith and Prime Minister Perry
Christie (NEMA, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b). The need for warnings were
recognized early and based on available data the function was carried out with
no problems. The Bahamian public responded well to the hurricane alert
messages securing their homes and property. All available data indicates that
the general function one, warning, was both recognized early and effectively
carried-out.
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)
As with the previous three hurricanes examined in this study no legal
authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ evacuation orders was in place
during response to Frances. Utilizing the media, NEMA in coordination with the
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Department of Meteorology, encouraged residents of low lying areas and families
with homes close to the water to relocate to more secure areas (Bahamas
Department of Meteorology, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a). These were voluntary
actions Bahamians were encouraged to heed. Also important to note, although
the government in the form of NEMA encouraged the population to move the
responsibility to take action remained with residents. Data gathered indicates in
response to Hurricane Frances the need for the function was recognized early
but the facilitation and execution of the function was not carried-out effectively
(Hughey 2004b).
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)
The RBDF with strong support from The Bahamas Red Cross Society,
Ministry of Social Services, and the Ministry of Health, opened emergency
shelters in response to Hurricane Frances throughout the islands (NEMA, 2004a;
Hughey, 2004b). Island Administrators, serving as the NEMA representative on
the Family Island, reported back to the national EOC on a regular basis with the
status of shelter operations. Around 2am on September 2nd, Prime Minister Perry
Christie participated in calls to the Island Administrators from the national EOC
(See Picture 4.1). On the morning of September 2nd, the following islands
confirmed that shelters had been opened or would be opening within the next few
hours: Inagua, Mayaguana, Acklins/Crooked Island/Long Cay, Long Island,
Exuma, San Salvador & Rum Cay, Cat Island, North, Central and South Andros,
Nassau, Chub Cay, Great Harbor Cay, Abaco, Grand Bahama, Bimini, Cat Cay,
Ocean Cay, and Walker’s Cay (See Picture 4.2). NEMA was able to quickly
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identify the need for shelters and coordinate the carrying-out of the shelter
function with few problems.

Picture 4.1 – National Emergency Operations Center in Response to Hurricane
Frances, September 2, 2004. Prime Minister Perry Christie, RBDF Personnel,
and Erin Hughey work to evaluate the status of shelters on the Family Islands.
(Source: Global Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action)

Picture 4.2 – Hurricane Frances Shelter, Island of New Providence. (Source:
Erin Hughey)
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Hurricane Frances Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)
All emergency medical care needs were coordinated by Emergency
Support Function (ESF) 8, Health and Medical Services (National Response
Plan, NEMA 2002). The Ministry of Health was the lead agency responsible for
coordinating emergency medical care, with strong support from the Hospital
Authority, Public Health Department, Department of Agriculture, and Mental
Health Services. Additional support came from the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO), which arrived in country in anticipation of Frances. Picture
4.3 below displays members of ESF 8 working to coordinate the national
response effort to Hurricane Frances.

Picture 4.3 – ESF 8 Health and Medical Service in support of Hurricane Frances
response efforts. (Source: NEMA)

There were two (2) deaths associated with Hurricane Frances (Bahamas Ministry
of Health, 2004). Minor medical issues were also reported, according to the
Ministry of Health, response to all health related issues were coordinated
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effectively by ESF 8 personnel. Rapid assessments of water supplies, waste
water, and solid waste management throughout the islands were carried out
soon after the passing of the storm (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2004). The
need for emergency medical care was recognized early and based on available
data the function was carried out with no notable problems.

Picture 4.4 – ESF 8 Health and Medical Service in support of Hurricane Frances
response efforts. (Source: NEMA)
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)
Search and Rescue operations were coordinated under ESF 10a Urban
Search and Rescue. The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for
coordinating search and rescue operations, with strong support from the Royal
Bahamas Police and Fire Departments, Ministry of Works and Utilities, Public
Hospital Authority, and the Department of Land and Survey (NEMA, 2004a;
Hughey, 2004b). Unofficial search and rescue operations were also conducted
by residents throughout the islands. ‘Search and Rescue’ operations were, for
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the first time in the history of emergency response within The Bahamas, an
official function (NEMA, 2002). The need for search and rescue was recognized
early through pre-planning and was carried out without too many problems. As a
result of the independent or unofficial search and rescue initiatives that did take
place after Hurricane Frances, NEMA has attempted to bring training to the
family island to establish community response unites. This ensures citizens who
are participating in the function of ‘search and rescue’ have the necessary skills
to be successful and prevent injury (Bethel, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b).
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)
Protection of Government property was carried out by The Bahamas
Ministry of Works and Transportation (2004a) as outlined in the National
Response Plan (NEMA, 2002). With responsibility for Government Buildings the
Ministry of Works secured government facilities by installing hurricane shutters
and utilizing plywood to protect windows. The Department of Meteorology
(2004a) reported that residents responded effectively to their recommendations
regarding the protection of homes in preparation for Hurricane Frances. Through
personal observation (Hughey, 2004b) residents and business owners of Nassau
secured windows, sandbagged doors and cleared debris from surrounding areas.
(See Pictures 4.5 and 4.6) The protection of private and government property
was recognized early and carried out with no notable problems.
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Picture 4.5 – The protection of property in preparation for Hurricane Frances
(2004) (Source: Erin Hughey)

Picture 4.6 – The protection of government property in preparation for Hurricane
Frances (2004). (Source: Erin Hughey)
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Hurricane Frances Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel
and Resources)
Relief supplies and distribution were coordinated under ESF 7 (NEMA,
2002). NEMA was the lead agency responsible for coordinating the mobilization
of emergency personnel and resources, with strong support from the RBDF,
Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals Authority, Ministry of Transportation and
Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, and the Department of Social Services
(NEMA, 2004a). On September 1, 2004, NEMA activated the National EOC in
response to Hurricane Frances. All agencies and organizations active in disaster
response were notified via fax, e-mail and/or phone that the EOC had been
activated and their designated EOC representatives were to report to the
Churchill Building in downtown Nassau. Many, although not all, support
agencies sent representatives to the EOC, an initial briefing by NEMA staff on
the situation took place the afternoon of September 1st (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA,
2004a).
EOC staff established lines of communication with their respective agency
as well as with their Family Island contacts (Hughey 2004b). This coordination
was intended to allow for the sharing of information throughout the EOC,
facilitating the matching of needs with available resources. Required personnel
and resources were identified well at the start of the crisis and the function was
soundly carried out for the first 12 hours (NEMA, 2004a). However, following
landfall, communication became difficult due to downed phone lines and power
outages hindering the coordination of resources (NEMA, 2004a). Difficulties with
communication resulted in delays, slowing the activation and movement of
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emergency materials. The need for the mobilization of emergency personnel and
resources was recognized early but not fully effectively carried out.

Picture 4.7 – National EOC, RBDF confirms the status of Frances with a
Meteorologist from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology. (Source: Erin
Hughey)

Picture 4.8 – Hurricane Frances National EOC (Source: Erin Hughey)
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Hurricane Frances Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)
Public Works and Engineering, ESF 3 was responsible for damage
assessment activities (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Works and Utilities was the
lead agency responsible for coordinating damage assessment with strong
support from The Bahamas Electricity Corporation, The Bahamas
Telecommunication Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST
Commission, and the Department of Environmental Health. For the first time in
the history of emergency response within the Bahamas, this team worked
together to assess damage on each of the islands. The teams then provided a
formal damage assessment report back to NEMA, from which response decision
could be based (NEMA, 2004a).
Additional international organizations such as USAID and the International
Red Cross also accompanied many of the damage assessment teams (Hughey,
2004b; NEMA 2004a). (See Pictures 4.9 and 4.10) This team effort provided a
comprehensive understanding of the damage to each of the islands and the
needed response. All damage assessments were completed within 72 hours of
the storm passing over Grand Bahama (Bahamas Ministry of Public Works &
Engineering, 2004). This coordinated effort allowed for a timely and appropriate
response. The need for damage assessment was recognized early, and the
function was executed with few problems.
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Picture 4.9 – Hurricane Frances Damage Assessment Team (Source: NEMA)

Picture 4.10 – Hurricane Frances, OFDA Damage Assessment Team (Source:
NEMA)
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management
Activities)
Hurricane Frances was the first response effort by the newly formed
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). Although problems with
information flow did arise, the activation of a national EOC allowed for
collaborative response efforts (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a). Through
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regularly scheduled briefings and situation reports, agencies were able to
coordinate activities (NEMA, 2004). This centralized sharing of information lead
to effective service delivery. The need for coordination was recognized early and
implemented with few problems.
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)
ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: Communication, and ESF 3: Public Works
and Engineering, were responsible for coordinating the restoration of essential
public services (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Transport and Aviation, The
Royal Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and Utilities were the
lead agencies responsible for coordinating the restoration of essential public
services (NEMA, 2002). The restoration of water, electricity and phone services
were quick to be restored in the south and central Islands of The Bahamas;
approximately 48 to 72 hours following the storm (BEC, 2004; BTC 2004). More
significant delays were reported on the Island of Grand Bahama due to flooding
that was later exacerbated by the impact of Hurricane Jeanne (NEMA, 2004a).
Immediately following the preliminary damage assessment reports the
three emergency support functions worked together to prioritize the restoration of
services. Of greatest concern was (1) damage to the fresh water wells in the
Northwestern Islands of The Bahamas, (2) restoration of transportation routs
(airports and ports), and (3) electrical and telecommunication services (NEMA,
2004). The restoration of essential public services was both recognized early
and carried-out with few problems.
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4.2.1.5

Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out
Generic Functions

Table 4.8 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they apply
to Hurricane Jeanne.

Hurricane Jeanne 2004
GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
Was the Need for the
function recognized
early? (Y/N)

Was the function
carried out without too
many problems? (Y/N)

1. Warning

Yes

Yes

2. Evacuations

Yes

No

3. Sheltering

Yes

Yes

4. Emergency Medical
Care

Yes

Yes

5. Search and Rescue

Yes

Yes

6. Protection of Property

Yes

Yes

7. Mobilization of
Emergency Personnel
and Resources

Yes

Yes

8. Assessing the
Damage

Yes

Yes

9. Coordinating
emergency
management
activities

Yes

Yes

10. Restoring essential
public services

Yes

Yes

FUNCTIONS

Table 4.8 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Jeanne
2004
As noted with Hurricane Frances, due to extensive planning the
identification of key functions were recognized early. The results shown in Table
4.8 and the discussion below illustrate that all of the generic functions were
recognized early. Evacuations were the only function that was not carried out
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effectively. Despite the improvements in recognition and implementation of all
ten generic functions as compared to the previous four hurricanes since yes can
not be answered to all questions in all categories Criterion One is classified as
not being effectively carried-out in response to Hurricane Jeanne.
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 1 (Warning)
Hurricane Jeanne was a meandering storm that began to approach The
Bahamas approximately ten days after the nation had been hit by Frances
(Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b). Jeanne’s development and path
were a challenge for forecasters and their models. The storm moved east and
away from The Bahamas before looping back and making landfall on the
northwestern islands. According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology
(2004b) fifty-eight (58) alerts were issued during the threat and passage of
Jeanne. The first news item was issued at 6:00pm on Monday, September 13
when a new tropical depression formed east of the Leeward Islands. Eighteen
hours later, while moving toward the west-northwest at 12 mph, the depression
was upgraded to tropical storm status and was named Jeanne (Bahamas
Department of Meteorology, 2004b).
At 6:00pm, Tuesday, September 14, tropical storm warnings were issued
for the Southeast Bahamas and a tropical storm watch was issued for the islands
of the Central Bahamas. All warnings were lifted at 6:00 am on Sunday,
September 19 when tropical storm Jeanne began to move away from the
Southeast Bahamas. The warnings, issued by the Department of Meteorology
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were communicated to the public through the Broadcasting Corporation of The
Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b; Hughey, 2004b).
The Department of Meteorology resumed alerts four days later at 6:00am
on Thursday, September 23 as Jeanne regained hurricane status and turned
back towards The Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b). At
this time the National EOC was still activated in response to Hurricane Frances
and in coordination with the Department of Meteorology, NEMA issued warnings
to residents during already scheduled media briefings (NEMA 2004a; NEMA
2004c). The need for warnings were recognized early and coordinated through
NEMA to ensure the public was prepared.
“Everyone was keeping their eye on Jeanne as we worked to recover from
Frances. Trevor [Trevor Basden, Meteorologist assigned to NEMA
during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne from The Bahamas
Department of Meteorology] continued to remind us that another storm
was out there. When is began to move East we thought we were out of the
woods” (Bethel, 2006)
Based on information gathered through NEMA documents, The Bahamas
Department of Meteorology, NEMA staff members and personal observation, the
need for warnings was clearly recognized early and carried out with no notable
problems.
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)
As discussed previously during discussion of Hurricane Frances, in 2004
there was no legal authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ evacuation
orders in response to Hurricane Jeanne. NEMA in coordination with the
Department of Meteorology notified the public that:
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“If you live in a coastal zone, or in a structure which might not be strong,
have an evacuation plan.

If you must evacuate, remember to shut of electricity and gas.

Take your survival kit, shelters do not provide food, water, bedding
or other essential items.

Provide for your pet, if necessary. Pets are not allowed in
shelters” (NEMA, 2004c).
Utilizing the regularly scheduled briefings that had been established during
Hurricane Frances, NEMA strongly encouraged residents to take appropriate
action. The need for evacuation in response to Hurricane Jeanne was
recognized and encouraged early. Many residents heeded the warnings and
took action early (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). However, since resources
were not made available to aid residents in an evacuation or facilitate an
evacuation location the function was not carried-out effectively.

Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)
Shelter Services, ESF 6 was responsible for all activities surrounding
shelter operations (NEMA, 2002). The RBDF was the lead agency responsible
for coordinating shelter openings with support from The Department of Social
Services, Ministry of Health, and The Bahamas Red Cross. Hurricane Frances
response and recovery operations were still underway as Jeanne threatened the
central and northwestern islands of The Bahamas (Hughey, 2004b). Many of the
same shelters that were serving as recovery shelters for Frances remained open
(RBDF, 2004a; NEMA, 2004b). Data confirms that the need for shelters was
recognized early and the function was well coordinated and carried out
effectively.
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Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)
With a strong emergency medical teams already assembled in response
to Hurricane Frances, assets were already in place to address Hurricane Jeanne
(NEMA, 2004b). Medical care continued to be coordinated by ESF 8, Health and
Medical Services (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Health was the lead agency
coordinating the operation, with aid provided by the Hospital Authority, Public
Health Department, Department of Agriculture, and Mental Health Services.
PAHO, already in country assisting with response and recovery to Frances
provided additional support to the ESF 8 team (NEMA, 2004b). There were no
deaths or serious injuries associated with Hurricane Jeanne. However, mental
health services were provided on the Islands of Abaco and Grand Bahama which
were seriously impacted by both storms (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2004b).
Applying Quarantelli’s criteria for evaluation indicates that the need for
emergency medical assistance was recognized early and carried out effectively
in response to Hurricane Jeanne.
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)
As with Hurricane Frances search and rescue operations in response to
Jeanne were coordinated under ESF 10a Urban Search and Rescue (NEMA,
2002). The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for coordinating search and
rescue operations, with support from the Royal Bahamas Police and Fire
Departments, Ministry of Works and Utilities, Public Hospital Authority, and the
Department of Land and Survey. Unofficial search and rescue operations were
also conducted by residents throughout the islands (RBDF, 2004). Many of the
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response teams were already in place as a result of Hurricane Frances and were
able to quickly jump back into action in response to Jeanne (RBDF, 2004). Data
indicates that the need for search and rescue was recognized early and carriedout with no notable problems.
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)
Protection of government property was carried out by the Ministry of
Works and Transportation in response to Hurricane Frances (NEMA 2002;
NEMA, 2004a). Many of the government buildings were still secured with
hurricane shutters or plywood when warnings were issued for Hurricane Jeanne.
NEMA in coordination with the Department of Meteorology urged residents in the
northwestern Bahamas to again secure their homes and take appropriate
precautions (NEMA, 2004c). Apply Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that
the protection of private and government property was recognized early and
carried out with no notable problems.
“Once residents installed shutters or plywood for Frances it didn’t come
down until after hurricane season” (Rigby, 2006).
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and
Resources)
Relief supplies and distribution were coordinated under ESF 7. NEMA
was the lead agency responsible for the mobilization of emergency personnel
and resources, with support from the RBDF, Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals
Authority, Ministry of Transportation and Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities,
and the Department of Social Services (NEMA 2002). The national EOC had
been fully operational since September 1st as a result of Hurricane Frances and
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remained functioning in response to Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA,
2004b). Already existing agency liaisons remained at the EOC to coordinate
response operations. EOC staff maintained lines of communication with their
respective agency as well as with their family island contacts. The coordination
with Family Island Administrators and the National EOC was critical to ensuring
that available resources appropriately matched emergency needs. With
depleting assets as a result of two hurricanes in three weeks information sharing
and strong coordination was critical (Hughey, 2004b).
Required personnel and resources were identified well and activated to
respond to Hurricane Jeanne. Communication issues that had plagued response
to Hurricane Frances were addressed through onsite training prior to landfall of
Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b).

Applying Quarantelli’s

evaluation criteria indicates that the need for the mobilization of emergency
personnel and resources was recognized early and carried out effectively.

Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)
Public Works and Engineering, ESF 3 was responsible for damage
assessment activities (NEMA, 2002). As with response to Frances, The Ministry
of Works and Utilities, took the lead in coordinating the effort with strong support
from The Bahamas Electricity Corporation, The Bahamas Telecommunication
Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST Commission, and the
Department of Environmental Health (Bahamas Ministry of Works, 2004b;
NEMA, 2004b). The same damage assessment teams established during
frances were again used to assess the damage to the Family Islands (Bahamas
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Ministry of Works, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). The teams worked well at
coordinating information and providing a picture of the situation on the ground.
This allowed for a quick response and effective matching of assets and needs
(NEMA, 2004c).
International organizations such as USAID and the International Red
Cross that had been in country to assist with response to Frances also
accompanied many of the Hurricane Jeanne damage assessment teams
(Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004c). All damage assessments were completed
within 48 hours of the storm passing over Grand Bahama. This coordinated
effort allowed for a timely and appropriate response. The need for damage
assessment was recognized early, and the function was executed with few
problems.
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management
Activities)
Emergency coordination activities related to Hurricane Jeanne benefited
from the impact of Hurricane Frances three weeks earlier. With the EOC in place
and activated, many of the ‘kinks’ related to information flow in response to
Frances had been worked out (Hughey, 2004b). The EOC was successfully
facilitating collaborative response efforts between numerous agencies and
organizations (NEMA, 2004c). Already established briefings and situation
reports continued in response to Jeanne and allowed for the centralized sharing
of information. Application of Quarnatelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that the
function was recognized early and implemented with few problems.
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“Jeanne was easier and harder. Because the EOC was activated for
Frances, we had all the right people together to quickly make decision
about Jeanne. However, we were all tired” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b).
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)
As with Hurricane Frances ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: Communication,
and ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, were responsible for coordinating the
restoration of essential public services (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Transport
and Aviation, The Royal Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and
Utilities were the lead agencies responsible for coordinating the restoration of
essential public services (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2004b). The main challenge to
restoration of services was flooding. Many of the essential services such as
water and electricity were delayed in the northwest Bahamas following Frances
do to extensive flooding (BEC, 2004b). Many of the hardest hit areas were also
impacted by Jeanne resulting in extended delays. Minor outages or interruptions
to services in the Central Bahamas were brought back on line within 48 hours of
the passage of Jeanne (BEC, 2004b).
Immediately following the completion of damage assessment reports the
three ESF’s worked together to prioritize the restoration of services. Of greatest
concern was (1) damage to the fresh water wells in the Northwestern Islands of
The Bahamas, and (2) the restoration of transportation routs (airports and ports)
(Bahamas Port Authority, 2004; Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation,
2004). The data suggests that the restoration of essential public services was
both recognized early and implemented without any major problems.

155

4.2.1.6

Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out
Generic Functions

Hurricane Wilma (2005) was the final storm that was examined in the
post-CEM phase. Table 4.9 provides a summary of the evaluation of the ten
generic functions. As with Hurricane Jeanne all ten functions were recognized
early however, general function two, evacuations were not carried-out effectively.
A discussion on each function is provided below.
Hurricane Wilma 2005
GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART
Was the Need for the
function recognized
early? (Y/N)

Was the function
carried out without too
many problems? (Y/N)

1. Warning

Yes

Yes

2. Evacuations

Yes

No

3. Sheltering

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5. Search and Rescue

Yes

Yes

6. Protection of Property

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

FUNCTIONS

4. Emergency Medical

Care

7. Mobilization of

Emergency Personnel
and Resources
8. Assessing the

Damage
9. Coordinating

emergency
management
activities
10. Restoring essential

public services

Table 4.9 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Wilma
2005
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Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 1 (Warning)
On Sunday, October 23, 2005 hurricane warnings were in effect for the
islands of the Northwest Bahamas including Grand Bahama, Abaco, Bimini,
Berry islands, Andros, Eleuthera, and New Providence (Bahamas Department of
Meteorology, 2005; NEMA, 2005). The Bahamas Department of Meteorology
tracked Wilma as it moved over the Yucatan Peninsula, Cuba, and Florida
always keeping NEMA up to date on the storms status. NEMA in coordination
with the Department of Meteorology, issued warnings to residents of the
northwest Bahamas and encouraged residents in costal areas to relocate to
shelters or more secure facilities (NEMA, 2005). The need for warnings were
recognized early and based on available data the function was carried out with
no problems. The northwestern islands had been significantly impacted by
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne the year before and residents took quick action
in response to the warnings.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)
As with the previous five storms examined there was still no legal avenue
for issuing mandatory evacuations in response to Wilma. NEMA (2005) in
coordination with the Department of Meteorology (2005) issued the now standard
public notification:
“If you live in a coastal zone, or in a structure which might not be strong,
have an evacuation plan.

If you must evacuate, remember to shut of electricity and gas.

Take your survival kit, shelters do not provide food, water, bedding
or other essential items.

Provide for your pet, if necessary. Pets are not allowed in
shelters” (NEMA, 2005).
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NEMA strongly encouraged residents to take appropriate action in response to
Wilma and to continue monitoring the storm (NEMA, 2005). Application of
Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria suggests that the need for evacuation in
response to Hurricane Wilma was recognized and encouraged early. What was
lacking was the effective execution of the function through aid to residents or the
establishment of evacuation centers or location points.

Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)
ESF 6 Shelter Services, coordinated all shelter operations in response to
Hurricane Wilma the same as had been done in response to Hurricanes Frances
and Jeanne (NEMA, 2002; NEMA 2005). The RBDF was the lead agency
responsible for shelter operations with strong support from The Ministry of Social
Services, The Ministry of Health, and The Bahamas Red Cross Society (RBDF,
2005). Emergency shelters were opened throughout the northwestern islands of
the Bahamas. NEMA provided coordination between ESF 6, Island
Administrators, and the public to inform them of the location and services
provided at the shelters (NEMA, 2005). The need for shelters was recognized
early and the function was well coordinated and carried out without any notable
problems.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)
Emergency medical care in response to Hurricane Wilma was coordinated
by ESF 8 Health and Medical Services (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Health
was the lead agency responsible for coordinating emergency medical care, with
support from the Hospital Authority, Public Health Department, Department of
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Agriculture, and Mental Health Services (NEMA 2002, NEMA 2005). There was
only one (1) death associated with Hurricane Wilma and was attributed to storm
surge inundation (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2005; NEMA, 2005). Rapid
assessments of water supplies, waste water, and solid waste management were
conducted by the ESF 8 team following the passage of Wilma (Bahamas Ministry
of Health, 2005). Application of Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that the
need for emergency medical care was recognized early and the function was
carried out with no problems.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)
Since 2002 and the implementation of a CEM system search and rescue
operations were addressed by ESF 10a Urban Search and Rescue (NEMA 2002;
NEMA 2005). The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for search and
rescue operations, with strong support from the Royal Bahamas Police and Fire
Departments, Ministry of Works and Utilities, Public Hospital Authority, and the
Department of Land and Survey (RBDF, 2005). The most extensive need for
search and rescue was reported on the Island of Grand Bahama (NEMA 2005).
As with many of the previous disaster operations unofficial search and rescue
operations were also conducted by residents. The Data indicates that the need
for search and rescue was recognized early and carried out without too many
problems.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)
The Ministry of Works and Transportation was responsible for the
protection of government property in preparation for Hurricane Wilma (NEMA,
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2002; Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005). With responsibility for
Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured government facilities
throughout the northwestern islands by installing hurricane shutters and plywood
(Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005; NEMA, 2005). NEMA reported that
residents responded effectively to recommendations regarding the protection of
homes (NEMA, 2005). The data suggests the protection of private and
government property was recognized early and carried out with no notable
problems in response to Hurricane Wilma.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and
Resources)
ESF 7 Relief Supplies and Distribution coordinated the mobilization of
emergency personnel and resources (NEMA, 2002). NEMA, with support from
the RBDF, Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals Authority, Ministry of
Transportation and Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, and the Department
of Social Services activated the National EOC to coordinate assets in an effort to
successfully respond to immediate emergency needs generated by Wilma
(NEMA, 2005). A partial activation of the national EOC occurred on the morning
of October 22nd and was fully staffed and operational in response to Wilma
twenty-four hours later (NEMA, 2005). All agencies and organizations were put
on alert the early morning of October 22nd and notified of the potential full
activation of the EOC. A few key players, such as the Department of
Meteorology and the RBDF were activated on the 22nd and staffed the EOC in
coordination with NEMA (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005; NEMA,
2005; RBDF, 2005).
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Once the EOC was fully activated agency liaisons reported to the Churchill
Building in Nassau and quickly established lines of communication with their
respective agency as well as with their Family Island contacts. This coordination
allowed for the sharing of information throughout the EOC, facilitating the
matching of needs with available resources (NEMA, 2005). NEMA effectively
mobilized emergency personnel and resources quickly assessing the need and
implementing procedures with no notable problems.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)
ESF 3, Public Works and Engineering coordinated all damage
assessment activities in response to Wilma (NEMA, 2005). The Ministry of
Works and Utilities was the lead agency responsible with strong support from
The Bahamas Electricity Corporation, The Bahamas Telecommunication
Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST Commission, and the
Department of Environmental Health (Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005).
The same damage assessment teams that had been established during
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were again utilized. The use of these teams
allowed for consistency in reporting and streamlined information flow (Bahamas
Ministry of Public Works, 2005; NEMA, 2005). The coordination of damage
assessment was very successful in providing a comprehensive representation of
the situation on the ground. It further allowed for a quick response and effective
matching of assets and needs.
International assistance was also provided by USAID and the International
Red Cross. All preliminary damage assessments were completed within 48
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hours of Wilma passing over Grand Bahama (NEMA, 2005). The coordinated
effort allowed for a timely and appropriate response. Thus, the need for damage
assessment was recognized early, and the function was executed with few
problems.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management
Activities)
Hurricane Wilma was the third national disaster response operation
coordinated by NEMA. Having fully implemented the CEM system and the
national response plan NEMA was well equipped and trained to coordinate
emergency management activities. The national EOC was successfully activated
with well established communication lines between NEMA and The Family
Islands (NEMA, 2005). Information flow was insured through regularly published
situation reports and media briefings (Bahamas Department of Meteorology;
NEMA, 2005). All of these activities facilitated centralized sharing of information
and coordinated service deliver. Thus the coordination of emergency
management activities in response to Hurricane Wilma was recognized early and
implemented with few problems.
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)
According to the National Response Plan, ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2:
Communication, and ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, were responsible for
coordinating the restoration of essential public services following Hurricane
Wilma (NEMA, 2005). The Ministry of Transport and Aviation, The Royal
Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and Utilities were the lead
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agencies coordinating this functional response (NEMA, 2005). The main
challenge to the restoration of services was flooding in Grand Bahama (Bahamas
Department of Meteorology, 2005). Essential services were delayed in areas
that experienced extreme flooding or suffered damage requiring the rebuilding of
infrastructure (BEC, 2005; BTC 2005).
Immediately following the completion of Hurricane Wilma preliminary
damage assessment reports ESF 1, 2, and 3 worked together to prioritize the
restoration of services (NEMA, 2005). Minor outages or interruptions to services
in the Central and Northwest Bahamas were brought back on line within 72 hours
of the passage of Wilma. The restoration of essential public services was both
recognized early and implemented without any major problems.
4.2.1.7

Criterion One Summary

Referring back to Table 4.3, a complete examination of each of the ten
generic functions as they apply to the six study hurricanes reveals an interesting
pattern. What emerges is a clear improvement in the early recognition of each of
the ten functions. Based on the data, this improvement can be associated with
the implementation of a CEM system in 2002. The development of a national
response plan that outlined responsibility and standard operating procedures
(SOPs) for each of the functions prior an event enabled The Bahamas to more
quickly identify critical functions and needs. The plan however, did not always
result in each function being carried-out effectively although there was a noted
improvement in post-cem response operations.
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Testing of Quarantelli’s methodology reveals a lack of detailed evaluation
criteria for the ten generic functions can allow for subjective interpretation. This
can also lead to difficulty when attempting to compare response operations. The
metric needs to be better refined to ensure consistent application to reduce
interpretation errors.
4.2.2 Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources
Similar to generic function seven, criterion two of Quarantelli’s
methodology is effectively7 mobilizing personnel and resources. Table 4.10
displays the results of criterion two as it was applied to the six study hurricanes.
A detailed description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.10 are
provided in Table 4.11 and sections 4.2.2.1 – 4.2.2.6.
Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Two
Pre-CEM

Effectively Mobilizing
Personnel and
Resources

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Table 4.10 - Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Two
4.2.2.1

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing
Personnel and Resources

In response to Hurricane Andrew effective mobilization of personnel and
resources did not occur. As highlighted previously during the review of the

7

“Effective means that a desired and intended result has been produced; this definition differs
from that of efficiency which requires that the results be obtained in the best possible way”
(Quarantelli, 1997a:43).
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generic functions, the response operation, commanded by the RBDF, did not
coordinate national assets to manage the disaster. A decentralized response to
disaster-generated needs lead to multiple agencies conducting simultaneous
operation in a disjointed manner. As a result needed personnel and resources
were not identified quickly or brought to bear accordingly (Office of the Prime
Minister, 1992, Bethel 2006).
Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources
Andrew
1992
Q1. Were the
Needed personnel
and resources
identified well in the
crisis?
Q2. Were they
located quickly and
brought to bear
correctly?
Q3. Were they
appropriate to the
problems generated
by the disaster

Pre-CEM
Floyd
Michelle
1999
2001

Post-CEM
Frances Jeanne
2004
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 4.11 – Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources
4.2.2.2

Hurricane Floyd Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel
and Resources

In response to Hurricane Floyd effective mobilization of personnel and
resources did not occur. Through discussions with NEMA staff members Gayle
Outten-Moncur (2007b) and Luke Bethel (2006) needed personnel and resources
were not identified quickly during the response period. Due to the decentralized
nature of the response, agencies and organizations responded without a clear
understanding of critical needs or available assets. Multiple damage
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assessments were conducted (Outten-Moncur 2006a) but without a mechanism
to share the information necessary resources and personnel could not be
brought to bear correctly.
To compound the issue, international donations were arriving at an
accelerated pace (Ingraham, 1999). Personnel and resources many times were
not well matched to the needs of the nation or logistically could not be delivered
to residents in need (Bethel, 2006). It took several weeks to establish a formal
flow of information that would allow residents to seek assistance and for The
Bahamas government to adequately move resources into the appropriate impact
areas (Glinton, 2006).
4.2.2.3

Hurricane Michelle Criterion Two: Mobilize Personnel and
Resources Effectively

As with Andrew and Floyd, effective mobilization of personnel and
resources in response to Hurricane Michelle did not occur. Michelle made
landfall on the Island of New Providence and the impact on the functioning of
government caused difficulty in mobilizing personnel and resources (Office of the
Prime Minister, 2001). Mobilization of personnel in response to Hurricane
Michelle was very difficult since many residents were responding to needs at
their own home (Davis, 2006). Also compounding problems with resources was
the decentralized emergency response by a variety of agencies and
organizations. A clear understanding of critical needs was not achieved. Without
this, resources were not able to be moved into the most critical areas.
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4.2.2.4

Hurricane Frances Criterion Two: Mobilize Personnel and
Resources Effectively

In response to Hurricane Frances, effective mobilization of personnel and
resources did not fully occur (NEMA, 2004a). Needed personnel and resources
were identified well during the first part of the crisis period. However, Hurricane
Frances impacted the entire archipelago leaving the nation under direct impact
from a category 4 hurricane for over 72 hours. NEMA served as the lead agency
responsible for coordinating the mobilization of emergency personnel and
resources under ESF 7 (NEMA, 2002).
The mobilization of personnel and the delivery of essential resources were
hindered significantly when communication between the islands failed (Hughey,
2004b; BTC 2004). RBDF personnel had been stationed throughout the family
islands with satellite telephones prior to Frances impact. Satellite phones had
also been provided to the Family Island Administrators to ensure communication
with NEMA. However, due to operator error and a lack of training, many of the
satellite phones were useless (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004). This resulted in
misappropriation of resources. A combinations of errors and issues prevented
resources from being brought to bear correctly and quickly (NEMA, 2004).
4.2.2.5

Hurricane Jeanne Criterion Two: Mobilize Personnel and
Resources Effectively

In response to Hurricane Jeanne, effective mobilization of personnel and
resources did occur, due in part to Hurricane Frances (Hughey, 2004b; OuttenMoncur, 2006b). The National EOC had been fully operational since September
1st and remained functioning in response to Hurricane Jeanne. Already existing
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agency liaisons remained at the EOC improving the movement of critical
personnel (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). Established lines of communication
between the National EOC, agency representative, and Family Island
Administrators were well established and functioning effectively (Hughey, 2004b;
NEMA, 2004b).
Resources had been inventoried during response to Frances and allowed
for the quick mobilization of assets. Communication issues that had plagued
response to Hurricane Frances were addressed through onsite training prior to
Jeanne’s landfall (NEMA, 2004b).
“I traveled to many of the Family Islands and trained them on the use of
Satellite Phones (Rigby, 2006).”
Additionally assets such as food and water were staged in Grand Bahama in
anticipation of Jeanne (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). Application of the
evaluation criteria insinuates that the need for the mobilization of emergency
personnel and resources was recognized early and carried out effectively in
response to Hurricane Jeanne.
4.2.2.6

Hurricane Wilma Criterion Two: Mobilize Personnel and Resources
Effectively

Effective mobilization of personnel and resources did occur in response to
Hurricane Wilma. Needed personnel and resources were identified well during
the first part of the crisis period when an alert was issued to all agencies and
organizations active in disaster response (NEMA, 2005). NEMA served as the
lead agency responsible for coordinating the mobilization of emergency
personnel and resources under ESF 7 (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2005).
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Through the activation of the National EOC the mobilization of personnel
and resources was achieved (NEMA 2005). Communication issues that had
created problems in response to previous hurricanes were addressed through
coordination with the RBDF, The Bahamas Telecommunication Company, and
NEMA. The coordination between agencies allowed for the successful
mobilization of personnel and resources in response to Hurricane Wilma.
“By the time Wilma impacted us, everyone know what to do and the
response ran smoothly” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b).
4.2.2.7

Criterion Two Summary

As previously displayed in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 an improvement in the
effective mobilization of personnel and resources occurred following the
implementation of a CEM system. As with criterion one, an association with the
improvement in the function and the development of a national emergency
response plan is noted. The development of a response plan outlined activities
and procedures that facilitated the government’s ability to locate and bring to
bear the correct personnel and resources in an appropriate way. It is also
important to note that the association between CEM and improvements in
criterion two do not rule out the potential impact or importance that experience
may have played in noted improvements to response operations.
4.2.3 Criterion Three: Allow The Adequate Processing of Information
This criterion focuses less on the technology utilized to ensure
communication but rather places the emphasis on the content of what, when and
to whom the information was made available. Tables 4.12 displays the research
findings for criterion three as they apply to the six study hurricanes. An
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improvement in information processing is noted after the implementation of CEM.
A detailed description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.12 are
provided in Table 4.13 and sections 4.2.3.1 – 4.2.3.6.

Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations
to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Three
Pre-CEM

Adequately
processing
information

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 4.12 - Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Three
Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information
Allowed for the
adequate processing
of information…
Q1. within every
responding
organization
Q2. between
organization
Q3. From citizens to
organizations
Q4. from
organizations to
citizens

Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

___

___

___

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

___

___

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 4.13 – Application of Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of
Information
4.2.3.1

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate
Processing of Information

Table 4.14 displays the research findings for criterion three as they apply
to Hurricane Andrew. Not enough data existed to determine if adequate
processing of information was occurring within every responding organization.
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According to interviews with NEMA staff and informal discussions with members
of the RBDF, there was very little information sharing between organizations
during the response phase.
“During Andrew we [Ministry of Social Services] were not aware of what
other ministries’ were doing” (Glinton, 2006)
The status of information processing from citizens and organizations was not
able to be determined. During the response phase of Hurricane Andrew a formal
line of communication between citizens and response organizations was not
identified. Emergency police and fire phone numbers did exist, however,
telephone lines in the central and northwestern islands were down. Additionally,
no direct communication lines were established to address exclusively hurricane
generated needs.
The Department of Meteorology had a strong line of communication
established with citizens through The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas.
ZNS provided regular information to the public regarding hurricane warnings.
Archival research showed that newspaper articles notified residents of shelter
locations, however the articles appeared after Andrew made landfall. Therefore,
applying the evaluation process developed by Quarantelli (1997a) it becomes
apparent that processing of information in response to Hurricane Andrew was not
adequate.
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Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew
Information Processing
Allow the adequate processing of
information…

Yes/No

Within every responding organization

---

Between organizations

No

From citizens to organizations

---

From organizations to citizens
Yes
Table 4.14 – Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew Information Processing
4.2.3.2

Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate
Processing of Information

According to interviews with NEMA staff, informal discussion with
members of the RBDF as well as information obtained through after-action
documents, adequate information sharing between organizations did not occur
(Water and Sewerage Corporation 1999; Lightbourne and Dean, 1999; Bethel,
2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b).
“Ensuring quick access to information through improved communication
is a priority for the government and something that is being address”
(Ingraham, 1999:92).
“In response to Hurricane Floyd, as with Andrew, we [Ministry of Social
Services] were not made aware of how other ministries’ were responding”
(Glinton, 2006)
Data were not available to determine if there was adequate processing of
information within every organization responding to Hurricane Floyd. Limited
data relating to the status of information processing from citizens to
organizations. During the response phase of Hurricane Floyd a formal line of
communication between citizens and response organizations was not identified.
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Emergency police and fire phone numbers as with Andrew existed but with
damage to phone lines down in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane
communication was limited. Additionally, no direct communication lines were
established to address exclusively hurricane generated needs (Rigby, 2006).
A strong line of communication between the response organizations and
the citizens of The Bahamas existed through The Broadcasting Corporation of
The Bahamas. ZNS provided regular information to the public regarding
hurricane warnings and shelter locations. As with Hurricane Andrew,
Meteorologist Basil Dean provided regular updates on the status of the storm
broadcast on ZNS radio and television (Dean and Rolle, 1999).
Applying the available data to Quarantelli’s methodology (Table 4.15)
indicates that the adequate processing of information did not take place during
response to Hurricane Floyd in 1999.
Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd
Information Processing
Allow the adequate processing of
information..

Yes/No

Within every responding organization

---

Between organizations

No

From citizens to organizations

---

From organizations to citizens

Yes

Table 4.15 – Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd Information Processing
4.2.3.3

Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate
Processing of Information

This researcher was unable to determine based available data the status
of information flow within every responding organizations. Interview data suggest
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that processing of information between agencies did not take place. The
Hurricane Michelle report issued by the office of the Prime Minister (2001) also
supports challenges associated with information flow between agencies. Service
deliver was delayed as a result of inadequate communication between
organizations.
As with the previous two storms formal lines of communication between
citizens and response organizations were not identified. Emergency police and
fire phone numbers were available however, telephone lines were down in the
immediate aftermath rendering communication non-existent. Additionally, no
direct communication lines were established to address exclusively hurricane
generated needs.
Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle
Information Processing
Allow the adequate processing of
information..

Yes/No

Within every responding organization

---

Between organizations

No

From citizens to organizations

No

From organizations to citizens
Yes
Table 4.16 – Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle Information Processing
A strong line of communication between the response organizations and
the citizens of The Bahamas was made available through ZNS. ZNS provided
regular information to the public regarding hurricane warnings, shelter
information and public safety concerns.
Based on the results displayed in Table 4.16, and applying the evaluation
process developed by Quarantelli (1997a) as discussed in the methodology
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(chapter 3) of this document it is clear that adequate processing of information
did not take place during response to Hurricane Michelle.
4.2.3.4

Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate
Processing of Information

Hurricane Frances was the first hurricane to impact The Bahamas
following the implementation of CEM. Data obtained from Official NEMA
situation reports, interviews with NEMA staff members, and personal
observations indicate that organizations were adequately processing information
internally. A strong communication line had been established between the EOC
to each of the agencies and organizations active in disaster response (Hughey,
2004b). The respective agencies had EOC liaisons which provided a link
allowing for the sharing of information (NEMA, 2004a). Based on the response
activities generated, it appears that the organizations were able to adequately
process information in an effort to meet immediate emergency needs.
The activation of the national EOC and the presence of EOC
agency/organization representatives allowed for the sharing of information
between groups. A centralized location, regularly scheduled briefings, and
detailed situation reports allowed for the coordination of resources between
organizations to meet the needs of residents (NEMA, 2004a).
A line of communication between citizens to the national EOC was also
established through an EOC phone number (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a).
The lines were manned and requests for assistance were coordinated from the
national office to the local island administrator. Strong lines of communication
also existed between NEMA and the citizens through the media with regularly
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scheduled briefings. NEMA established a media briefing room and provided
updates to the public four times a daily. The media briefings were very
successful in educating the public on the impact of Hurricane Frances and how
most effectively to seek assistance if needed (NEMA, 2004a). (See Pictures 4.11
and 4.12)
Based on the results displayed in Table 4.17, adequate processing of
information did take place during response to Hurricane Frances in 2004.
Evaluation of Hurricane Frances
Information Processing
Allow the adequate processing of
information..

Yes/No

Within every responding organization

Yes

Between organizations

Yes

From citizens to organizations

Yes

From organizations to citizens

Yes

Table 4.17 – Evaluation of Hurricane Frances Information Processing
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Picture 4.11 – Hurricane Frances Regularly Scheduled Media Briefings, Mr. Carl
Smith, Director of The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency.
(Source: Erin Hughey)

Picture 4.12 – Hurricane Frances Regularly Scheduled Media Briefings,
Department of Meteorology and the Port Authority. (Source: Erin Hughey)
4.2.3.5

Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate
Processing of Information

Data from official NEMA situation reports, interviews with NEMA staff
members, and personal observations indicate that organizations were adequately
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processing information internally. Communication between ministries and
organizations responding to Jeanne and the National EOC were well functioning.
Agency liaisons were present in the EOC and provided an avenue to share
information (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). During shift changes and internal
EOC briefings each organization provided reports on key shared information as it
related to organizational operations. Based on the response activities generated
it appears that the organizations were able to adequately process information in
an effort to meet immediate emergency needs (Hughey, 2004b).
A line of communication between citizens to the national EOC was also
established through an EOC hotline (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004c). The lines
were manned and requests for assistance were coordinated from the national
office to the local Island Administrator. Strong lines of communication also
existed between NEMA and the citizens through the media with regularly
scheduled briefings (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA 2004c). Based on the results in
Table 4.18 which display the results of the evaluation process as discussed in
Chapter 3 of this document, it suggests that adequate processing of information
did take place during response to Hurricane Jeanne 2004.
Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne
Information Processing
Allow the adequate processing of
information..

Yes/No

Within every responding organization

Yes

Between organizations

Yes

From citizens to organizations

Yes

From organizations to citizens
Yes
Table 4.18 – Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne Information Processing
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4.2.3.6

Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Three:
Processing of Information

Allow the Adequate

Data from Hurricane Wilma situation reports issued by NEMA (2005) as
well as data obtained through interviews with NEMA staff, showed that
organizations adequately processed information internally. A strong
communication line was established between NEMA and support agencies
through the national EOC (NEMA, 2005). These lines were first established with
the implementation of CEm and later tested during response to Hurricanes
Frances and Jeanne. NEMA also held regularly schedule briefings before and
after shift changes as well as provided up-dated situation reports to facilitate
information flow (NEMA, 2005). Response agencies had EOC liaisons available
to allow for information sharing. Based on the response activities generated,
organizations were able to adequately process information in an effort to meet
immediate emergency needs.
Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma
Information Processing
Allow the adequate processing of
information..

Yes/No

Within every responding organization

Yes

Between organizations

Yes

From citizens to organizations

Yes

From organizations to citizens
Yes
Table 4.19 – Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma Information Processing
A communication hotline for citizens was established at the national EOC
(NEMA, 2005). The phone line was manned by NEMA support staff and
volunteers and allowed citizens the opportunity to both report and obtain critical
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emergency information. Strong lines of communication also existed between
NEMA and the citizens through the media with regularly scheduled briefings. As
with response to Frances and Jeanne, NEMA established a media briefing room
to provide information and updates to the public four times a day. The media
briefings were very successful in educating the public on the impact of Hurricane
Wilma as well as provide critical information regarding how best to seek
assistance if needed. Based on the results displayed in Table 4.19, adequate
processing of information took place in response to Hurricane Wilma 2005.
4.2.3.7

Criterion Three Summary

Referring back to Table 4.13, a consistent pattern of improvement in the
processing of information following the implementation of CEM is noted.
Planning to develop clear lines of communication between citizens, the
government, and response agencies allowed for faster and more accurate
processing of information and improved response operations. Experience and
improved recording keeping may also be associated with the improvement in
information flow and should not be discarded as a contributing factor to the
improvement in the processing of information in all four categories.
4.2.4 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making
As outlined in chapter three, the problems associated with decisionmaking are usually associated with four key areas:
5.
6.
7.

8.

Loss of higher-echelon personnel because of overwork.
Conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks.
Clashes over organizational domains between established and
emergent groups.
Surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences.
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Table 4.20 displays the research findings for criterion four as they apply to the six
study hurricanes. An improvement in exercising decision-making is noted in
response to Hurricane Wilma. A detailed description and supporting data for the
responses in Table 4.20 can be found in sections 4.2.4.1 - 4.2.4.6.

Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Four
Pre-CEM

Permit the Properly
Exercising DecisionMaking;

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Table 4.20 - Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Four
4.2.4.1

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise
of Decision-Making

During Hurricane Andrew the usual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning. Direct lines of communication to the
Office of the Prime Minister existed between The RBDF and Government
Ministers. The problem with exercising proper decision-making resided not with
the line of communication, but the format and timing of information with which
high-echelon personnel could make decisions. During the examination of
criterion one generic functions, it was noted that Ministry specific damage
assessment reports were conducted independently and utilized a variety of
different criteria for classification. This created confusion about the extent of
damage and slowed the critical response and recovery decision-making process.
Furthermore, regularly scheduled reporting was not required at the time of
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Andrew preventing timely decision-making and delayed service delivery. The
Data do not suggest any conflicts over responsibility for new disaster tasks or
clashes over organizational domains existed in response to Hurricane Andrew.
The decentralized response did result in delays associated with information flow,
slowing the decision-making process.
4.2.4.2

Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise of
Decision-Making

As with Andrew, during Floyd the usual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning. The RBDF and the Government
Ministers had direct lines of communication to the Office of the Prime Minister
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1999). The problem with exercising proper
decision-making resided not with the line of communication but the format and
timing of information on which high-echelon personnel could make decisions.
Conflicting damage assessment reports that utilized different criteria prevented
decision-makers from having a clear understanding of the situation on the ground
(Bethel, 2006). According to informal discussions with members of the police
and Defence Force regularly scheduled reporting was not required and
prevented timely decision making and delayed the delivery of response services.
“We [RBDF] were in the field distributing supplies where needed. At no
time am I aware of reporting out to anyone other than our officer in
charge. As I mentioned earlier, there were many different central points
of control, I was always trying to determine the line of authority” (Bethel,
2006).
No formal records of conflict over response phase responsibilities were
found during this research. However, based on informal discussions with island
administrators and officials from a variety of government agencies it appears that
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uncertainty regarding fiscal responsibility was of major concern. In an effort to
preserve agency budgets many organizational leaders were hesitant to spend
their scarce funds. Uncertainty regarding potential reimbursement or fear of
misusing government funds also caused delays. Application of Quarantelli’s
criteria indicates that at the very least proper decision-making was delayed by
inadequate processing of information.
4.2.4.3

Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise
of Decision-Making

During Hurricane Michelle as in the previous two hurricanes examined the
usual chain-of-command and lines-of-authority were in place and functioning.
The RBDF and the Government Ministers had direct lines of communication to
the Office of the Prime Minister (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). The problem
with exercising proper decision-making resided not with the line of
communication but the format and timing of information on which high-echelon
personnel could make decisions (Smith, 2006).
The same challenges associated with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd were
identified in the response to Hurricane Michelle. Conflicting damage assessment
reports and changing criteria for evaluation prevented decision-makers from
having a clear understanding of the situation on the ground (Office of the Prime
Minister, 2001). Additionally, regularly scheduled reporting did not take place
preventing timely decision-making. Also important to note is the impact Michelle
had on the Island of New Providence and government offices. Most businesses
and government offices were closed for several days adding to delays and
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difficulties in processing information. Based on the data it appears that proper
decision-making was prevented by inadequate processing of information.
4.2.4.4

Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise
of Decision-Making

During Hurricane Frances the usual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning as outlined in the national response plan.
With the introduction of a national emergency management agency and a
national disaster response plan, the direct lines of communication were clearly
spelled out (NEMA 2002). However, as pointed out by Quarantelli (1997a) the
problems associated with decision-making are usually not because of a
breakdown in communication but rather problems associated with the following
four key areas: (1) loss of high-echelon personnel because of overwork; (2)
conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks; (3) clashes over organizational
domains between established and emergent groups; (4) surfacing of
organizational jurisdictional differences.
The response to Hurricane Frances experienced a significant level of highechelon personnel who were overworked and unable to make decisions
(Hughey, 2004b). Because Frances impacted the Bahamas for over 72 hours,
EOC staff members worked around the clock with little or no breaks. Due to
limited staffing, shifts could not be established which lead to persons being over
worked, leading to irritability, arguments, and poor decision making (NEMA,
2004a).
Compounded by lack of sleep and a very stressful working environment,
internal conflict over responsibilities did take place among EOC staff members
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(Hughey, 2004b). All conflicts were eventually resolved but did impact decision
making for a period of time. In response to Hurricane Frances clashes over
organizational domains between established and emergent groups did not occur.
Due to the small population within the Bahamas and the remoteness of many of
the islands, new emergent groups did not develop. The surfacing of
organizational jurisdictional differences also did not occur in response to
Hurricane Frances (NEMA, 2004a). The data suggests that proper decisionmaking was impacted most significantly by the loss of high-echelon personnel
because of overwork.
4.2.4.5

Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise
of Decision-Making

During Hurricane Jeanne, as with the previous four hurricanes that have
been evaluated, the usual chain-of-command and lines-of-authority were in place
and functioning. However, with two hurricanes impacting the nation within three
weeks the response to Hurricane Jeanne experienced a significant level of highechelon personnel who were overworked and unable to make decisions
(Hughey, 2004b). Due to exhaustion and stress, both poor decision making
occurred as well as conflicts over responsibilities took place.
“You are exhausted and it makes it difficult to be effective, you need to go
home and take break, that is what happened in 2004 with Frances and
Jeanne” (Otten-Moncur, 2006b).
There were no reported clashes over organizational domains between
established and emergent groups in response to Jeanne. The surfacing of
organizational jurisdictional differences also did not occur in response to
Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b). Proper decision-making was impacted most
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significantly by the loss of high-echelon personnel because of stress and
exhaustion (Hughey, 2004b). Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria suggest that proper
decision making did not occur in response to Hurricane Jeanne. The same or
similar problems experienced during response to Hurricane Frances were also
experienced during Jeanne.
4.2.4.6

Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise
of Decision-Making

During Hurricane Wilma the usual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning. To avoid the same problems that had
been experience during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne, NEMA
required 12-hour shifts to help reduce exhaustion and down or overworked
personnel (NEMA, 2005).
The very stressful working environment, did create some internal conflicts
but they were quickly resolved and according to NEMA staff did not impact their
ability to make decision effectively (Glinton, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2007a). There
were no clashes over organizational domains nor were there any jurisdiction
disputes (Outten-Moncur, 2007a). Thus, during response to Hurricane Wilma,
the National EOC was able to effectively exercise proper decision-making.
4.2.4.7

Criterion Four Summary

Referring back to Table 4.20, no pattern of improvement is noted following
the implementation of CEM. Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and
Jeanne experienced the same problems that pre-CEM response experienced.
Improvements in the proper exercising of decision-making noted in response to
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Hurricane Wilma appear to be associated with experience rather then a change
in the fundamental management strategy of disaster response.
4.2.5 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination
Criterion five focuses on the critical function of coordination. Table 4.21
displays the research findings for criterion five as they apply to the six study
hurricanes. A marked improvement in overall response coordination is seen after
the implementation of CEM. A detailed description and supporting data for the
responses in Table 4.21 can be found in sections 4.2.5.1 – 4.2.5.6.
Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Five
Pre-CEM

Focus on the
Development of
Overall Coordination

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 4.21 – Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Five
4.2.5.1

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development
of Overall Coordination

A military response was generated to address Hurricane Andrew needs.
With no official agency responsible for emergency management the RBDF
established ‘command’ and provided assistance. This structure produced a
disjointed operation that did not allow for a coordinated civil / military response.
An operation center was established by the Defence Force to coordinate the
logistics of their response. The operation center did not facilitate the coming
together of all agencies and organizations active in disaster response. As a
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result the facilitation of information and the synchronization of critical functions
did not occur.
“2003 [in preparation for Hurricane Isabel] was the first time a national
EOC was activated. Prior to that the Police and Defence Force would
coordination their own activities independent of one another” (OuttenMoncur, 2006a).
4.2.5.2

Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development of
Overall Coordination

Official Hurricane Floyd disaster response operations were managed by
the RBDF. As with Andrew a ‘command and control’ style response was
implemented which did not facilitate a cooperative or comprehensive
arrangement for all agencies needed to respond to a major disaster such as
Floyd. A national emergency operations center was established at the Office of
The Prime Minister led by Commander Steven Russell, however it lacked the
contributions of other national and international organizations responding
(Ingraham, 1999). To compound this issue, no family island EOC’s were opened
to facilitate the movement of emergency response information (Bethel, 2006).
The disjointed response operation prevented the synchronization of critical
functions that required a variety of organizations. For example, the movement of
water required the RBDF ships to transport goods, but the port department and
ministry of works also were needed to coordinate delivery to areas that could
receive the ships due to damage to infrastructure. Once the goods arrive the
movement from the port to a distribution center again required coordination with
the Bahamas Red Cross and the Ministry of Social Services in an effort to
provide the goods to residents that were in need. Without a clear avenue to
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communicate with all of these agencies severe delays in the delivery of services
occurred (Outten-Moncur, 2006b).
“…the Police and Defence Force would coordination their own activities
independent of one another” (Outten-Moncur, 2006a).
The data as it was applied to Quaranteilli’s (1997a) methodology indicates that
overall response coordination and the synchronization of critical functions did not
occur
4.2.5.3

Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development
of Overall Coordination

As with Andrew and Floyd, Hurricane Michelle disaster response
operations were ‘commanded’ by the RBDF. Again the command and control
structure did not facilitate a cooperative or comprehensive arrangement for all
agencies responding. An EOC was established at the Cabinet Office but was
staffed by only Defence Force personnel (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).
The lack of interaction between all agencies required to respond prevented
successful coordination and synchronization of critical functions that required a
variety of organizations (Bethel, 2006, Outten-Moncur, 2006b). Further
preventing the development of overall coordination was a missing avenue of
communication to share information or request assistance (Smith, 2007a).
4.2.5.4

Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development
of Overall Coordination

Hurricane Frances disaster response operations were managed by NEMA
(NEMA, 2004a). The national EOC was established in Nassau with Family
Island EOC established in corresponding jurisdictions (NEMA, 2002). This
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cooperative and comprehensive arrangement allowed agencies and
organizations to come together in a structured and coordinated way to provide
necessary emergency response services.
As a result of the new coordination as outlined in the emergency response
plan (2002), critical services such as the movement of food and water to
impacted areas occurred effectively. For example, the national EOC facilitated
the coordination between ESF 11: Food and ESF 1: Transportation (NEMA,
2004a). This type of coordination did not occur in response to the other three
hurricanes. NEMA was able to locate national resources and coordinate with the
necessary ministries ensuring the movement of assets to the affected Family
Islands (NEMA, 2004). Once assets arrived on the family islands, local EOC
personal were prepared to coordinate the deliver of goods to those in need.
NEMA was able to successfully ensure that immediate emergency needs were
met through effective coordination of services (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004a).
4.2.5.5

Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development
of Overall Coordination

Hurricane Jeanne response operations were also coordinated out of the
National EOC, managed by NEMA and situated in Nassau (Hughey, 2004b;
NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). Response operations to Jeanne benefited from
Hurricane Frances with regards to coordination. Despite depleted resources and
tired staff, overall coordination was in place and functioning when the nation was
impacted by Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b).
Coordination and response followed the guidelines as established in the
national comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) (NEMA, 2002).
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The established coordination system allowed for the coming together of response
agencies to manage the deliver of services to residents. As a result, critical
service and immediate emergency needs were met. Application of Quarantelli’s
evaluation criteria indicate that overall coordination in response to Hurricane
Jeanne was effective.
4.2.5.6

Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development
of Overall Coordination

Hurricane Wilma response operations were managed by NEMA through
the national EOC (NEMA, 2005). All agencies active in disaster were
represented at the national EOC. Family Island Administrators in the
Northwestern Bahamas established corresponding jurisdictional EOC’s to
coordinate response efforts.
“The establishment of sub-NEMA’s on the Family Islands made it very
easy to direct and coordinate the response” (Bethel, 2006).
This cooperative and comprehensive arrangement between the national and
island EOC’s facilitated the sharing of information and allowed for effective
synchronization of response efforts (NEMA, 2005). NEMA was able to
successfully ensure that immediate emergency needs were met through planning
and coordination of services.
4.2.5.7

Criterion Five Summary

Referring back to Table 4.21, a marked improvement in overall response
coordination is seen after the implementation of CEM. The key reason for this
improvement is the development of a national response plan that required multiagency coordination over a two-year period prior to the impact of Frances. This
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coordination helped to facilitate a strong working relationship between ministries
and established a successful environment for coordination when a disaster
struck.
4.2.6 Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences Between Response and
Agent-Generated Demands
Criterion six focuses on the importance of correctly recognizing the
differences between response and agent-generated demands.
Evaluation of Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences Between
Response and Agent-Generated Demands
Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

2. Effectively
mobilizing
personnel and
resources;

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

3. Adequately
processing
information;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

4. Properly
exercising
decision-making;

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

5. Developing
overall
coordination;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

6. Correctly
recognizing
differences
between
response and
agentgenerated
demands;

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Table 4.22 - Evaluation of Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences
Between Response and Agent-Generated Demands
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Quarantelli (1997a) asserts, as outlined in chapter three that the correct
recognition between agent- and response-generated demands can be
determined if criteria two through five we answered in a positive way.
Examination of Table 4.22, which summarizes criteria 2-5 indicates that only
during response to Hurricane Wilma did emergency management officials
correctly recognize the difference between response- and agent-generated
demands.
4.2.7 Criterion Seven:
Provide the Mass Communication System with
Appropriate and Accurate Information
Criterion seven focuses on providing the mass communication system
with appropriate and accurate information. Table 4.23 shows the research
findings as they apply to the six study hurricanes. A clear pattern of
improvement is shown during post-CEM response operations. A detailed
description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.23 can be found in
sections 4.2.7.1 – 4.2.7.6.

Evaluation of Criterion Seven: Provide the Mass Communication System with
Appropriate and Accurate Information
Pre-CEM

Provide Appropriate
and Accurate
Reports for the
News Media

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 4.23 - Evaluation of Criterion Seven: Provide the Mass Communication
System with Appropriate and Accurate Information
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4.2.7.1

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and
Accurate Reports for the News Media

A cooperative interaction between the Department of Meteorology and the
media existed during response to Hurricane Andrew. The Broadcasting
Corporation of The Bahamas and the Department of Meteorology worked in
close coordination to provided regular updates and warnings. Meteorologist
Basil Dean, remained on the air throughout the storm broadcasting over ZNS
radio and television stations providing The Bahamas with hurricane updates
(Dean and Rolle, 1992). What was lacking was the interaction between all
agencies active in disaster response and the media. In 1992 there was no
mechanism in place to facilitate regularly scheduled disaster briefings. As a
result limited information was being released to the public regarding response
efforts.
The citizen’s belief and trust in the local media was not able to be
determined by the available data. The lack of information provided to the media
for dissemination indicated that mass communication system were not provided
with appropriate and accurate information.
4.2.7.2

Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and
Accurate Reports for the News Media

A cooperative interaction between organizational and community officials
and media, seems to have existed during response to Hurricane Floyd. The
Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas, in close coordination with The
Department of Meteorology, provided regular updates and warnings regarding

194

Hurricane Floyd (Department of Meteorology, 1999). As with Andrew, what were
missing were regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the
media. There is no record of briefings being provided to the media through the
emergency operation center or by the RBDF.
After reviewing newspaper archives there appears to be information from
political representatives to the media regarding their support for recovery but little
if any indication that response organizations were feeding the media critical
response information. The citizens’ belief and trust in the local media was not
able to be determined with available data. However, the lack of information
being provided to the media for dissemination to the public indicates that mass
communication system were not provided with the appropriate and accurate
information related to the Hurricane Floyd response efforts.
4.2.7.3

Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and
Accurate Reports for the News Media

A cooperative interaction between organizational and community officials
and media, seems to have existed during response to Hurricane Michelle. The
Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas in close coordination with The
Department of Meteorology (2001) provided regular updates and warnings
regarding the status of Michelle. As with the two previous response operations,
there were no regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the
media. There is no record of briefings being provided to the media through the
EOC or by the RBDF.
After reviewing newspaper archives there appears to be information
directly related to the physical components of the storm as provided by the
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Department of Meteorology (2001) but information on response information was
lacking. The citizen’s belief and trust in the local media was not able to be
determined with available data. However, the lack of information being provided
to the media for dissemination to the public indicates that mass communication
system were not provided with the appropriate and accurate information related
to the Hurricane Michelle response efforts.
4.2.7.4

Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and
Accurate Reports for the News Media

NEMA provided appropriate and accurate information to the news media
using a structured and standardized approach(Hughey, 2004b). ESF 5 Planning
and Information, instituted regularly scheduled briefings as well as established
the official position of public information officer (PIO) (NEMA, 2002; NEMA
2004a). The PIO was a skilled member of the Bahamas Information System
trained to provide information to the media on the daily activities of government
(Hughey; 2004b). Working closely with the NEMA director, Mr. Carl Smith and
top EOC management the PIO established briefings at 8:00am, 11:30am,
5:00pm and 9:00pm (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004a). The briefings were held
daily while the EOC was fully operational. The times selected were just prior to
the local news broadcasts allowing news agencies the opportunity to have the
most updated information for residents. The news media was notified by phone
and fax of the scheduled briefings and were encouraged to attend. The PIO
additionally coordinated representatives from a variety of agencies to ensure
accurate information was provided directly from the agencies to the news media
(Hughey, 2004b). This facilitated information flow from NEMA to the residents of
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the Bahamas. The PIO also addressed and provided information to international
news outlets such as the BBC, NBC, CBS, and CNN upon request (Hughey,
2004b; NEMA, 2004a).
The established briefings cemented NEMA as the national agency
responsible for emergency management. It was through cooperative interaction
with media representatives that NEMA was able to ensure accurate information
was being publicized. Residents consistently received information on response
and recovery efforts directly from NEMA (Hughey, 2004b). As a result of this
structured approach the mass communication systems were provided with the
appropriate and accurate information related to the Hurricane Frances response
efforts.
4.2.7.5

Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and
Accurate Reports for the News Media

Response to Jeanne utilized the same approach employed during
response to Frances. Through the use of a PIO, ESF 5 Planning and
Information, instituted regularly scheduled briefings. Through close coordination
with the NEMA director and support agency liaisons the PIO held open briefings
for the media at 8:00am, 11:30am, 5:00pm and 9:00pm (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA,
2002; NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). These daily briefings, which had been
established during response to Hurricane Frances, provided the media with an
opportunity to ask questions and provide the most updated information to
residents. As a result mass communication systems were provided with the
appropriate and accurate information related to the Hurricane Jeanne response
efforts (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). Quarentelli’s evaluation criteria suggest
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that the mass communication system was effectively provided with appropriate
and accurate information with regards to Hurricane Jeanne. Data was not
available to determine the citizens trust in the local media.
4.2.7.6

Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and
Accurate Reports for the News Media

Through the use of a PIO, ESF 5 Planning and Information, instituted
regularly scheduled briefings (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2005). NEMA provided
appropriate and accurate information to the media using a structured and
standardized approach in response to Hurricane Wilma. This same approach
was used in response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. Through close
coordination with the NEMA director and support agency liaisons the PIO held
open briefings for the media at 8:00am, 11:30am, 5:00pm and 9:00pm. These
daily briefings, which had been established a year earlier during response to
Hurricane Frances, provided the media with an opportunity to ask questions and
provide the most updated information to residents (NEMA, 2005).
4.2.7.7

Criterion Seven Summary

Referring back to Table 4.23, a clear pattern of improvement is shown
during post-CEM response operations. The improvement can be associated with
the implementation of the national response plan (2002), which outlined
responsibilities and operating procedures to ensure accurate and timely
information regarding disasters is delivered to the public.
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4.2.8 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center
(EOC)
Criterion eight examines the functioning of the EOC during each of the six
study hurricanes. Table 4.24 displays the results of Quarnatelli’s (1997a)
methodology for evaluating the functioning of an EOC. Evident is the fact that
none of the six study hurricanes had a ‘well-functioning emergency operation
center’. A detailed description and supporting data for the responses in Table
4.24 can be found in sections 4.2.8.1 – 4.2.8.6

Evaluation of Criterion Eight: Having a well-functioning emergency operations
center (EOC)
Pre-CEM

Have a WellFunctioning
Emergency
Operations Center
(EOC)

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

No

No

No

No

No

No

Table 4.24 - Evaluation of Criterion Eight: Having a well-functioning emergency
operations center (EOC)
4.2.8.1

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

An operation center was activated by the RBDF in response to Hurricane
Andrew. However no multi-agency national EOC was established. The RBDF
EOC was indented only to coordinate internal activities associated with response.
The EOC did not facilitate the effective implementation of all required response
activities for two key reasons. First, the EOC did not house all agencies
responding (only the RBDF were present in the EOC) limiting information flow
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and preventing the coordination or assets. Secondly, the EOC was housed in a
conference room at the cabinet office, and did not meet the necessary physical
requirements as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a).
Table 4.25 displays the physical requirements for the EOC as outlined by
in the methodology chapter of this document. It is clear to see that the physical
requirements were not met. The EOC was located close to the water without
easy access to key transportation routes or key facilities. The small conference
room did not provide adequate work space for all agencies responding to
Hurricane Andrew nor were there adequate sleeping and bathing facilities. The
EOC had telephone landlines but the northwestern islands, most significantly
impacted by the storm lost telecommunication capabilities and communication
between the islands did not exist (Office of The Prime Minister, 1992). The lack
of communication was further confirmed by Tellis Symonette, Vice President of
The Bahamas Telecommunication Company during an informal conversation on
January 26, 2007. Computers were not available in the EOC and all reporting
was done by hand resulting in information dissemination delays. Additionally,
detailed maps and comprehensive lists of available resources were not on hand.
This was validated through personal observation of the EOC facility utilized in
response to Andrew as well as informal discussion with RBDF personnel.
Applying the data to Quarantelli’s criteria it appears that a well-functioning EOC
did not exist in The Bahamas in response to Hurricane Andrew.
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Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew
EOC Physical Requirements
The National EOC was/had…

Yes/No

1. Located in a safe area in close
proximity to key transportation
routes;

No

2. Sufficient work space;

No

3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities;

No

4. Adequate communication
provisions;

No

5. Computers and necessary supplies;

No

6. Maps and equipment inventories

No

Table 4.25 – Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew EOC Physical Requirements
4.2.8.2

Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

An EOC was activated at the Office of The Prime Minister by the RBDF.
However, to be identified as ‘well-functioning,’ an EOC must be more that just a
common location. An EOC is intended to facilitate the effective implementation
of all required response activities and should be seen as a function not just a
structure. The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Floyd did not house all
responding organization nor did it facilitate the coordination between public,
private, local, regional, and international agencies. Manned exclusively by the
Defence Force, the EOC lacked knowledgeable liaison personnel.
Furthermore, as displayed in Table 4.26, the physical requirements for the
EOC were not met. The EOC was located within 100 yards of the water and only
2.3 feet above sea level. Additionally the location does not have easy access to
transportation routes or key facilities such as the airport or disaster warehouse.
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There would have been adequate work space for organizations and agencies
responding to Floyd but only the Defence Force was present in the EOC. There
were no sleeping facilities located in the EOC and although there were
bathrooms, they were not equipped with showers; hence they did not adequately
accommodate for long term response operations with any shower facilities.
Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd
EOC Physical Requirements
The National EOC was/had…

Yes/No

1. Located in a safe area in close

proximity to key transportation
routes;

No

2. Sufficient work space;

Yes

3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities;

No

4. Adequate communication

No

provisions;
5. Computers and necessary supplies;

No

6. Maps and equipment inventories

No

Table 4.26 – Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd EOC Physical Requirements
The EOC, located in the cabinet office, had telephone landlines as well as
satellite phones that were provided by the RBDF (Bethel, 2006). However,
following Floyd telecommunication lines were down throughout the islands
(Bahamas Telecommunication Company, 1999). The satellite phones were
reliable but operator error resulted in a limited success in reaching
representatives on the family islands (Rigby, 2006). Computers and necessary
supplies were not available. Records and reports were written by hand resulting
in delays in the dissemination of information. Additionally, detailed maps of the
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Family Islands were not available which limited response planning initiatives.
Additionally comprehensive lists of available resources did not exist. Based on
all of this information it is clear that during the response operations to Hurricane
Floyd the eighth criterion for good disaster management, A well-functioning
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not achieved.
4.2.8.3

Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

As with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd an EOC was activated by the RBDF
(Office of The Prime Minister, 2001; RBDF, 2001). However, to be identified as
‘well-functioning,’ an EOC must be more that just a common location. The EOC
activated in response to Hurricane Michelle did not house all responding
organization nor did it facilitate the coordination between public, private, local,
regional, and international agencies (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).
Manned exclusively by the Defence Force, the EOC lacked knowledgeable
liaison personnel.
The same location for the EOC was selected for Hurricane Michelle as
was used for Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd. Located within 100 yards of the
water and only 2.3 feet above sea level the location was not adequate (Hughey,
2004a). Table 4.27 further examines the physical requirement of the EOC.
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Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle
EOC Physical Requirements
The National EOC was/had…

Yes/No

1. Located in a safe area in close

proximity to key transportation
routes;

No

2. Sufficient work space;

Yes

3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities;

No

4. Adequate communication

No

provisions;
5. Computers and necessary supplies;

No

6. Maps and equipment inventories

No

Table 4.27– Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle EOC Physical Requirements
The location of the EOC was away from key transportation routes and facilities
such as the airport or disaster warehouse. The location did provide for large
work spaces for all response agencies but there were no sleeping facilities
located in the EOC and although there were bathrooms they did not have shower
facilities, making them inadequate for long-term response operations. The EOC
had telephone landlines and the Defence Force was equipped with satellite
phones (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). Damage to the telecommunication
system (BTC, 2001) prevented the use of landlines. Additionally, the satellite
phones did not successfully meet the communication needs because only the
RBDF personnel had access to them. Computers and necessary supplies were
not available and all records and reports were written by hand. This resulted in
delays in information dissemination. Furthermore, detailed maps of the Family
Islands were not available which limited response planning initiatives. Also
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notable, comprehensive lists of available resources did not exist. Applying the
data to Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that a well-functioning EOC was
not achieved.
4.2.8.4

Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

As with Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd and Michelle, an EOC was activated.
In response to Hurricane Frances NEMA activated the national EOC in the
Churchill Building at NEMA’s national headquarters. This building is the same
physical location that was used to respond to the three previous hurricanes. As
identified in prior response efforts, to be identified as ‘well-functioning,’ an EOC
must be more that just a common location.
The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Frances housed a variety of
response organization and effectively coordinated efforts between public, private,
local, regional, and international agencies (NEMA 2004a). The same physical
location of the EOC as with Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle was 100
yards from the water and only 2.3 feet above sea level (Hughey, 2004a; Hughey,
2004b). Part of the Churchill Building had also been condemned due to
structural damage. Table 4.28 further examines the physical requirement of the
EOC.
The location was away from key transportation routes and facilities such
as the airport or disaster warehouse (Hughey, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a). The
location did provide for large workspaces for all response agencies. Hurricane
Frances directly impacted the nation for over 72 hours, the lack of sleeping or

205

bathing facilities did not adequately accommodate the long term response
operation that was required.
Evaluation of Hurricane Frances
EOC Physical Requirements
The National EOC was/had…

Yes/No

1. Located in a safe area in close
proximity to key transportation
routes;

No

2. Sufficient work space;

Yes

3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities;

No

4. Adequate communication
provisions;

No

5. Computers and necessary supplies;

No

6. Maps and equipment inventories

No

Table 4.28 – Evaluation of Hurricane Frances EOC Physical Requirements
The EOC was equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone
provided by the RBDF. The Defence Force also provided satellite phones to
Family Island Administrators. Following Hurricane Frances many of the family
islands experienced telecommunication problems (BTC, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b)
NEMA, 2004a). The pre-placed satellite phones were ineffective due to lack of
training and operator error (Hughey 2004B). Ham radios operated by many of
the police forces were used to relay information back to NEMA and the national
EOC (RBPF, 2004). Computers and necessary supplies were not available
during the response to Frances (Hughey, 2004b). Initially, Records and reports
were written by hand resulting in delays in the dissemination of information. Two
laptop computers were ultimately located and used to track response activities
(Hughey, 2004b). Additionally, detailed maps of the family islands were not
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available which limited response planning initiatives. Based on all of this
information it is clear that during the response operations to Hurricane Frances
the eighth criterion for good disaster management, a well-functioning Emergency
Operations Center (EOC), was not achieved. (See Picture 4.13)

Picture 4.13 – Hurricane Frances 2004 National EOC, Nassau Bahamas. RBDF
Personnel. (Source: Erin Hughey)

4.2.8.5

Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

The National EOC that had been activated in response to Hurricane
Frances remained open to coordination activities related to Jeanne (Hughey,
2004b; NEMA, 2004b). The EOC continued to be located at the Churchill
Building in downtown Nassau. As identified in prior response efforts, to be
identified as ‘well-functioning,’ an EOC must be more that just a common
location.
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The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Jeanne housed a variety of
response organizations and effectively coordinated efforts between public,
private, local, regional, and international agencies. However, it was the physical
location and requirements that made the EOC ineffective. The same EOC
location that was used for the four previous hurricanes was also used in
response to Hurricane Jeanne.
The EOC is located away from key transportation routes and facilities
such as the airport and disaster warehouse. Although the EOC provided for
large work spaces for all response organizations, the lack of sleeping and
bathing facilities made the location inadequate to handle long-term response
operations. The EOC was equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone
provided by the RBDF. The Defence Force also provided satellite phones to
Family Island Administrators. During Hurricane Frances response operations, it
became evident that many island administrators did not know how to utilize the
satellite phones so in addition to providing the equipment instructions were was
provided. Computers and necessary supplies were not available during the
response to Jeanne, and initial record and reporting was written by hand
resulting in delays. Detailed maps of the family islands were not available at the
EOC and hindered response planning initiatives. (See Table 4.29) Thus, a wellfunctioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not achieved during
Hurricane Jeanne.
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Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne
EOC Physical Requirements
The National EOC was/had…

Yes/No

1. Located in a safe area in close
proximity to key transportation
routes;

No

2. Sufficient work space;

Yes

3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities;

No

4. Adequate communication
provisions;

No

5. Computers and necessary supplies;

No

6. Maps and equipment inventories

No

Table 4.29 – Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne EOC Physical Requirements
4.2.8.6

Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Eight:
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Have a Well-Functioning

The National EOC, located at the Churchill Building in downtown Nassau
is not a well-functioning facility. As displayed in Table 4.30 below, the minimum
physical requirements as established by Quarantelli (1997a) were not met. The
EOC activated in response to Hurricane Wilma housed a variety of response
organization and effectively coordinated efforts between the different levels of
government. However, it was the physical location and requirements that made
the EOC ineffective.
Located 100 yards from the water and 2.3 feet above sea level the EOC
was not well positioned. Additionally, the EOC was located away from key
transportation routs and facilities such as the airport and disaster warehouse.
Although the EOC provided for large workspaces for all response organizations,
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the lack of sleeping and bathing facilities made the location inadequate to handle
long-term response operations.
Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma
EOC Physical Requirements
The National EOC was/had…

Yes/No

1. Located in a safe area in close
proximity to key transportation
routes;

No

2. Sufficient work space;

Yes

3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities;

No

4. Adequate communication
provisions;

Yes

5. Computers and necessary supplies;

No

6. Maps and equipment inventories

No

Table 4.30 – Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma EOC Physical Requirements
The EOC was well equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone
provided by Bahamas Telecommunication Company and the RBDF (BTC, 2005;
RBDF, 2005; NEMA, 2005). The Defence Force also provided satellite phones
to Family Island Administrators (RBDF, 2005). Computers and necessary
supplies were not available during the response to Wilma, and initial record and
reporting were again written by hand resulting in delays. Detailed maps of the
Family Islands were also not available and hindered response planning
initiatives. Thus, a well-functioning EOC was not operational during response to
Hurricane Wilma.
4.2.8.7

Criterion Eight Summary

Referring back to Table 4.24, shows that none of the six response
operations had a ‘well-functioning emergency operations center’. Table 4.31
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further identifies the key physical requirements that need to be addressed to
ensure a well-functioning EOC is operational to respond to the next disaster to
impact The Bahamas.
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Evaluation of EOC Physical Requirements
Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Post-CEM
Jeanne
2004

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3. Bathroom and
sleeping facilities;

No

No

No

No

No

No

4. Adequate
communication
provisions;

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

5. Computers and
necessary supplies;

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

The National EOC
was/had… (Yes/No)

Andrew
1992

1. Located in a safe
area in close
proximity to key
transportation routes;

No

2. Sufficient work
space;

Pre-CEM
Floyd
1999

6. Maps and equipment
No
No
No
No
inventories
Table 4.31 – Evaluation of the EOC Physical Requirements for the Six Study Hurricanes
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Wilma
2005

4.3

Chapter Summary and Discussion
Chapter four examined Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluating

disaster response as they apply to the six study hurricanes to determine if:


Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of
disaster response could be operationalized.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to determine if the
implementation of a CEM system improved disaster response
operations in The Bahamas.

Table 4.32 displays the eight evaluation criteria as they apply to the six study
Hurricanes. Criterion One, adequately carrying out generic functions, appears
not to have been affected by the implementation of CEM. However, upon closer
examination what emerged was a clear improvement in the early recognition of
each of the ten generic functions, which are encompassed within the first
criterion. The data displayed improvements that can be associated with the
implementation of a CEM system in 2002 (see table 4.3) and the development of
a national response plan that outlined responsibility and SOP’s for each of the
functions. This pre-planning allowed The Bahamas to more quickly identify
critical functions and needs.



Criterion One of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to be
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system.
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Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations
to the Six Study Hurricanes
Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Andrew
1992

Floyd
1999

Michelle
2001

Frances
2004

Jeanne
2004

Wilma
2005

1. Adequately
carrying out
generic
functions;

No

No

No

No

No

No

2. Effectively
mobilizing
personnel and
resources;

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

3. Adequately
processing
information;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

4. Properly
exercising
decision-making;

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

5. Developing
overall
coordination;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

6. Correctly
recognizing
differences
between
response and
agent-generated
demands;

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

7. Providing
appropriate and
accurate reports
for the news
media;

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

8. Having a wellfunctioning
emergency
operations
center;

No

No

No

No

No

No

Table 4.32 - Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response
Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes
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Criterion Two, effectively mobilizing personnel and resources, showed
improvements following the implementation of the CEM system. An association
with the improvement in the function and the development of a national
emergency response plan was noted. It is critical to identify however that the
improvements associated to the CEM system does not rule out and take away
from the impact that experience may have played in improvements to response
operations. It is hypothesized that the implementation of the CEM and continued
response experience both contributed to the improvement.



Criterion Two of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to be
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system.



Experience was also noted as a contributing factor to the improvement
of response.

Criterion Three, adequately processing information, displayed a pattern of
improvement following the implementation of the CEM system. The
implementation of a national response plan helped to develop clear lines of
communication between citizens, the government, and response agencies that
allowed for more accurate processing of information and improved response
operations. Also associated with the improvement are experience and improved
recording keeping.

215



Criterion Three of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to be
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system.



Experience and improved record keeping was identified as a potential
contributing factor to the improvement in response post-CEM.

Criterion Four, the properly exercising decision-making, showed no
pattern or association of improvement following the implementation of CEM.
Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne experienced the same
problems with decision-making as the pre-CEM response operations.
Improvements were noted in response to Hurricane Wilma but the data indicate
that the improvement is associated with experience rather then a change in the
fundamental management strategy of disaster response.



Criterion Four of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology can be
operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology did not note any improvements to
the exercising of decision-making as a result of the implementation of a
CEM system.



Data indicated improvements in the proper exercising of decisionmaking was associated with experience.
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Criterion Five, developing overall coordination, showed a marked
improvement after the implementation of the CEM system. Data indicates
improvements are associated with the development of a nation response plan
that required multi-agency coordination over a two-year period prior to the impact
of Hurricane Frances. The process of developing coordination helped to facilitate
a strong working relationship between ministries and agencies active in response
allowing for a successful environment for coordination.



Criterion Five of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology can be
operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system and the
development of a national response plan that required multi-agency
coordination.

Criterion Six, Correctly recognizing differences between response and
agent-generated demands, was dependent of the success of criteria 2 through 5.
The data did not identify an association between criterion six and the
implementation of a CEM system.



Criterion Six of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was dependent on
the success of criteria 2-5. As a result, criterion six was
operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology did not identified an association
between the identification of response- and agent-generated demands
following the implementation of a CEM system.

217

Criterion Seven, providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news
media, showed a clear pattern of improvement during the post-CEM response
operations. The data showed the improvement was associated with the
implementation of the national response plan (2002).



Criterion Seven of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified an association between
improved reporting to the news media and the implementation of a
CEM system.

Criterion eight, a well-functioning emergency operations center, showed
no improvement associated to the implementation of a CEM system. Challenges
to the physical requirements outlined by Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology
indicated the EOC facilities utilized in response to each of the six study
hurricanes were insufficient.



Criterion Eight of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes.



Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified no association between
the functioning of the EOC and the implementation of a CEM system.

Quarentelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of
disaster response operations was able to be operationalized and applied to all six
of the study hurricanes. It is recommended however that the methodology be
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refined for ease of application and to ensure consistency in use. A more detailed
and structured application guideline is also recommended to prevent subjective
employment of the tool. The use of benchmarks would also provide emergency
managers with the necessary apparatus to establish response goals and provide
a metric to rate the overall improvement to response within a jurisdiction.
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Chapter Five
Results: Surveys & Interviews

“Emergency Management is the process of coordinating available
resources to deal with emergencies effectively, thereby saving lives,
avoiding injury, and minimizing economic loss” (FEMA, 2003b: ).

5.1

Introduction
The following chapter provides the research findings associated with data

collected from the structured surveys and the semi-structured interviews. The
results are presented in tabular form using numerical and percentage totals when
appropriate. The data in this chapter are formatted to answer the following
research question.


5.2

Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response?

Survey Findings
As discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, the structured surveys

were self administered and intended to gauge the Family Island Administrators
perception of disaster response pre- and post-CEM. (See Appendix A) There
were a total of twenty (20) Family Island Administrators responsible for serving
as the NEMA representative for each of their respective jurisdictions. With a
100% return rate on the surveys, the entire identified population data was
obtained.
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Questions 1-3 on the survey gauged the respondents’ emergency
management training background, as well as provided an opportunity for training
recommendations. It is important to understand the respondents training and
experience because both will inform the respondents perception of response
operations. Questions 4 and 5 focused on planning and information. These two
question help to provide additional context to the respondents’ perceptions of the
national response to the six study hurricanes. If an Island Administrator had an
emergency plan in place, and had open lines of communication with the national
government they may have different response expectations then those who did
not have a plan or were not in communication. Questions 6-9 were focused on
the response operation to the six study hurricanes. It is important to note that
although there were six study hurricanes respondents were asked to rate four
response operations. Family Island Administrators were not asked to rate
response to Hurricane Michelle 2001, because the family islands were not
significantly impacted by the storm. Also noteworthy, is the fact that Hurricanes
Frances and Jeanne 2004 were rated as one response operation. Because the
two storms occurred within three weeks of one another it was difficult to
differentiate between response operations. The remaining six questions on the
survey provided additional contextual information on experience and challenges
to effective emergency response.
5.2.1 Emergency Management Training
Table 5.1 below displays the results of question one; has your island
received disaster training from the NEMA office? As the results show only 40%
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of the Island Administrators report having received disaster training for their
jurisdiction.
Q1: Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office?

Yes

No

No Response

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

8

40%

12

60%

0

0%

20

100%

Has your island
received disaster
training from the
NEMA office?
Table 5.1 – Survey Question One, Has your island received disaster training from
the NEMA office.
Of the 8 Family Island Administrators who reported that their island had received
disaster training the following training courses were identified as being
conducted.


Communications Training



SUMA Training – (Humanitarian Supply Management Training
Course offered by the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO) in coordination with NEMA. SUMA is a tool for the
management of humanitarian relief supplies, from the time
pledges are made by donors, to their entry into the disaster area
and their storage and distribution)



Damage Assessment Training



Shelter Management Training was reported by three island
administrators



Community Response



General Disaster Management Training was reported by two
island administrators
222



Hurricane Management



Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) was
reported by two island administrators.



Disaster Assessment



Annual Conference

Island Administrators were asked what type of emergency management
training they would like to see offered by NEMA their responses are provided
below. The data illustrates the need for a comprehensive training curriculum.
Q2 – What type of training would you like to see offered by NEMA?


“Shelter management & disaster communications”



“I.T. and disaster management”



“More shelter management, supplies management & distribution
system implementation.”



“CERT” [community emergency response team]



“More First Aid and Emergency response training. Also more
information about shelter management”



“Mass-Casualty Incident Management”



“Additional training in shelter, community response and general
disaster management as well as search and rescue and
environmental and demographics. “



“Shelter Management & Disaster Communications”



“Before, during and after a disaster”



“Proper damage assessment, first responders courses for
persons to deal with medical emergencies, proper distribution
after a disaster.”



“Disaster preparedness, operational procedures for command
centre, search and rescue, training in first aid.”



“Working secessions with the disaster preparedness committee”



“Hurricane preparedness and disaster management”



“Shelter Management and Damage Assessment”
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Six of the twenty Island Administrators chose not to provide training
recommendations while the remaining fourteen respondents showed the need for
a wide range of training.
Question three asked respondents if they or a representative from their
agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, or 2006. Table
5.2, shows that 75% of the respondents attended or had a representative
attended one or more of the NEMA Conferences. What is alarming however, is
that 25% of the administrators indicated that they had not participated.
Q3: Did you or a representative from your agency attend any of the NEMA
Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006?

Yes

No

No Response

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

15

75%

5

25%

0

0%

20

100%

Did you or a
representative
from your agency
attend any of the
NEMA
Conferences
held in 2004,
2005, and 2006?
Table 5.2 – Survey Question Three, Did you or a representative from your
agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006?
224

As a sub section to question three, respondents who responded yes to the
question were asked if they found the conference to be useful; explain why or
why not?


”The Conference was very useful because it teaches how to
prevent the possible loss of life but it does not follow up with the
needs in order to survive afterwards.”



“It opened my eyes to a number of issues that have to do with
disaster management”



“Very Useful”



“Yes – informative but very detailed therefore training should be
held in Family Island.”



“Very Useful, good information”



“Provided Good Information”



“Very useful. Final report from Conference would be helpful as
reference material.”



“Yes, because as a result were able to make plans more
practical and meaningful.”



“Interaction with other Island Representatives and Sharing of
Information and Strategies for Preparation was useful”



“Yes, we learned about what does and does not belong in a
shelter. This was August 2005”



“It helped in Organizing N-G-O and other volunteers for
disaster.”



“It was very helpful – should be extended to FI [Family Island]
communities or invite more FI [Family Island] first responders.”



“Very useful”




“Useful. Good Information, Good Networking.”
“Conferences were very useful”
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5.2.2

Planning and Information
Question four, displayed in Table 5.3, intended to determine if Island

Administrators had a disaster preparedness and response plan for their
respective jurisdiction. Eighty-five percent (85%) of respondents reported that
they did have a disaster plan in place.

Q4: Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan?

Yes

No

No Response

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

17

85%

3

15%

0

0%

20

100%

Does your island
have a disaster
preparedness
and

response

plan?
Table 5.3 – Survey Question Four, Does your island have a disaster
preparedness and response plan?
Of the 17 respondents who reported having an emergency response plan,
over 64% stated that their plan had been updated within the last two years. (See
Table 5.4) Seventeen percent (17%) reported that their plan was updated in the
last three years, while another seventeen percent (17%) did not respond. This
reveals that 11 of the 20 Island Administrators (or 55%) have a disaster plan in
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place that has been reviewed within the last two years. More importantly 45% of
the Island Administrators do not have updated emergency response plan.

Q4a: When was the last time the disaster plan was reviewed and
updated?

2006

2005

No Response

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

11

64.7%

3

17.6%

3

17.6%

17

100%

If yes, when was
the last time it
was reviewed
and updated?
Table 5.4 – Survey Question Four(a), When was the last time the disaster plan
was reviewed and updated?
Survey question five asked Family Island Administrators to rate on a scale
of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) NEMA’s efforts to inform the
public of its role in disaster planning and response? Table 5.6 shows that the
mean ranking was 3.45 with a standard deviation of 0.759. This indicates that
the majority of respondents felt that NEMA was doing a good job at informing the
public of their role in disaster planning and response. Fifty percent (50%) of the
administrators rated the efforts by NEMA to inform the public of its role in disaster
planning and response at a 4 or 5.

227

Q5 – How would you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of its Role in
Disaster Planning and Response?

N
How would you rate
NEMA’s efforts to inform
the public of their role in
Disaster planning and
Response?

20

Valid N

20

Minimum Maximum

.00

5.00

Mean

Std.
Deviation

3.4500

0.75915

Table 5.5 – Survey Question Five, How would you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform
the public of their role in disaster planning and response?
5.2.3 Response Operation
Questions 6-9 on the survey focused on the national response to the six
study hurricanes. As stated previously, Island Administrators were asked to rate
the national response to four operations: Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Frances and
Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005. Omitted from the survey was response to
Hurricane Michelle 2001, because the Family Islands were not significantly
impacted by the storm. As discussed in detail in Appendix B of this dissertation,
Michelle made landfall on the Island of New Providence impacting the capital city
of Nassau. Also important to note is the grouping of Hurricanes Frances and
Jeanne. Because the two storms occurred within three weeks of one another
and due to overlap in response initiatives Island Administrators were asked to
evaluate the response as one event.
A scale of 1-5 was utilized for this research, 1 being not successful and 5
being fully successful.


1 represented not successful,



2 represented weak success,



3 represented good success,



4 represented very good success



5 represented fully successful.

Because the study population is so small (20 Island Administrators) it is important
for this research to examine the number of respondents in each category as well
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as the mean rating. By utilizing the mean, a rating for each response was
established allowing for comparative evaluation.
Question six, aimed to gauge the Island Administrators perception of the
national response to Hurricane Andrew Respondents were asked, to rate the
response on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not successful and 5 being fully
successful). As shown in Table 5.6 the mean ranking was 2.25 with a standard
deviation of 1.48. Based on the mean, the national response to Hurricane
Andrew was weak.
Table 5.7 provides the number of responses per ranking. The table
however represents only 85% of the total responses. Not displayed in the table
are the 3 responses (or 15%) that rated the national response to Hurricane
Andrew at zero, displaying great dissatisfaction. The mean as well as the raw
numbers show that the Island Administrators did not perceive the national
response to Hurricane Andrew to be fully successful.
Q6- How would you rate the success of the national response to Hurricane
Andrew (1992)?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Andrew
1992

20

.00

5.00

2.2500

3.0000

3.00

1.48235

Valid N

20

Table 5.6 – Survey Question Six, How would you rate the National Governments
Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Descriptive Statistics)
Q6- On a scale of 1 to 5 how successful was the national response to
Hurricane Andrew (1992)?
Not
Week
Successful Success
(1)
(2)
Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Good
Very Good
Success Success
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

5

0

9

2

1

25%

0%

45%

10%

5%

Table 5.7 – Survey Question Six, How would you rate the National Governments
Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown)
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Survey question seven, was intended to gauge the Island Administrators
perception of the national response to Hurricane Floyd. Table 5.8, displays the
mean rating of 2.55 with a standard deviation of 0.933. The mean ranking
indicates the Island Administrators perceived the national response to Floyd to
have weak to good success. The mean score for Floyd was only slightly higher
than that of Hurricane Andrew however the decrease in the standard deviation
indicates greater agreement among the administrators.
Q7 - How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to
Hurricane Floyd?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Floyd
1999

20

1.00

4.00

2.55

3.0000

3.00

0.93330

Valid N

20

Table 5.8 – Survey Question Seven, How would you rate the success of the
National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics)

Table 5.9 provides the number of responses per ranking. The table
represents 100% of the total responses and indicates that the majority of Island
Administrators perceived the national response to Hurricane Floyd to have weak
to good success. Forty-five percent (45%) perceived the response to be good,
this was also the case for Hurricane Andrew.
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Q7- How would you rate the National Governments Response to
Hurricane Floyd?
Not
Week
Successful Success
(1)
(2)
Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Good
Very Good
Success Success
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

4

4

9

3

0

20%

20%

45%

15%

0%

Table 5.9 – Survey Question Seven, How would you rate the success of the
National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown)
Survey question eight, evaluated the national response to Hurricanes
Frances and Jeanne. Because the two hurricanes occurred within three weeks
of one another and many of the response and recovery initiatives overlapped
they were grouped together. Respondents were again asked, to rate the
success of the national response on a scale of 1 to 5. As displayed in Table
5.10, the mean score was 3.95 with a standard deviation of 0.686. This score is
a marked increase from that of Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd and show strong
agreement among the Island Administrators.
Q8 - How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to
Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricanes Frances
& Jeanne 2004

20

.00

5.00

3.9500

4.0000

4.00

0.68633

Valid N

20

Table 5.10 – Survey Question Eight, How would you rate the success of the
National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne?
(Descriptive Statistics)
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Q8- How would you rate the success of the National
Governments Response to Hurricane Frances & Jeanne?
Not
Week
Successful Success
(1)
(2)
Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Good
Very Good
Success Success
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

0

0

5

11

4

0%

0%

25%

55%

20%

Table 5.11 – Survey Question Eight, How would you rate the success of the
National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne?
(Response Breakdown)
Table 5.11 provides the number of responses per ranking for question
eight of the survey. The table represents 100% of the total responses and
indicates that the majority of Island Administrators perceived the national
response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne to have a very good success rate.
Seventy-five percent (75%) of the respondents identified the national response to
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne to be very to fully successful.
As displayed in Table 5.12, the means score provided by the Family Island
Administrators was 4.05 with a standard deviation of .604. The success of the
national response was perceived to be very successful. The standard deviation
again shows strong agreement among the island administrators.
Q9 - How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to
Hurricane Wilma?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Wilma
2005

20

3.00

5.00

4.0500

4.0000

4.00

0.60481

Valid N

20

Table 5.12 – Survey Question Nine, How would you rate the National
Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics)
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Table 5.13 provides the number of responses per ranking for question
nine of the survey. The table represents 100% of the total responses and
indicates that the majority of Island Administrators perceived the national
response to Hurricanes Wilma to have a very good success rate. Eighty-five
percent (85%) of the respondents identified the national response to Hurricane
Wilma to be very to fully successful. Displayed is a perceived improvement in
the national governments response to Hurricane Wilma when compared to
Andrew and Floyd. What is not clearly revealed with this data is if the perceived
improvements in the national response are due to the implementation of CEM or
experience.
Q9- How would you rate the success of the National
Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma?
Not
Week
Successful Success
(1)
(2)
Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Good
Very Good
Success Success
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

0

0

3

13

4

0%

0%

15%

65%

20%

Table 5.13 – Survey Question Nine, How would you rate the success of the
National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown)

5.2.4 Experience and Challenges Associated with Effective Emergency
Response
Table 5.14 displays the results of survey question ten, which asked the
Island Administrators’ if they were aware that The Bahamas has been working
since 2002 to develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disaster
planning and response activities. An awareness of CEM and the national efforts
exists among island administrators with 60% reporting yes.
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Q10 – Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to
develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disaster planning and
response activities?
Yes

Were you aware
that The Bahamas
has been working
since
2002
to
develop a CEM
structure?

No

No Response

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

12

60%

8

40%

0

0%

20

100%

Table 5.14 – Survey Question Ten, Were you aware that The Bahamas has been
working since 2002 to develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disaster
planning and response activities?
Survey question eleven asked Family Island Administrators to identify
what they saw as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and response
on their respective islands. As outlined below, there were a variety of different
challenges identified by each administrator.
Q11: What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and
response on your island?


“Hurricane Shelters”



“Finances and Informing the Public; Emergency
Communications; Management of Personnel and Equipment.”



“Geographical layout. Communication in and between local
government, districts and their cays.”



“Evacuation efforts. People taking the hurricane seriously and
also them listening to the warnings and orders from officials and
responding to them appropriately.”



“Geography”



“Lack of interest. Where interest exists, it is personal & Selfish.”



“The harmonizing of the various administrative districts.
Response plans in the absence of a line of authority among the
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administrators, and an approved NEMA representative on the
island.”


“Shelters”



“(1) Establishing good communication (inter-island &
international). (2) Shelter management & support personnel. (3)
Identifying adequate shelters. (4) Maintaining inventory of
emergency supplies. (5) Establishing a budget for NEMA’s
operations on the islands.



“The potential for a major hurricane to hit New Providence.”



“Better cooperation by The Public”



“Suitable Shelters and Supplies.”



“To have in place up to date worth while hurricane shelters with
good communication and other supplies in place.”



“Lack of training”



“Insufficient hurricane shelters and the need for more training in
disaster preparedness management.”



“Lack of funding to prepared for and in the aftermath of disaster
mobilization of human and technical resources.”



“Geography of The Bahamas”

Family Island Administrators were asked in survey question twelve to
identify what they saw as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and
response for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas.
Q 12 – What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and
response for The Bahamas


“Geographical layout”



“To much red tape and not enough action. People not realizing
the dangers of a hurricane and not knowing how serious this
matter is.”



“The scattered nature of the geography of The Bahamas makes
it difficult to mobilize resources and the urgency in Eleuthera the
lack of one central hurricane stretches limited and [illegible]
resources.”



“The absence of an appointed NEMA representative on multiadministrative districts causes coordination problems because
each administrator is responsible.”
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“Distribution of Resources, Planning & co-ordinating community
preparedness efforts, communications.”



“Developing and maintaining a satisfactory communication
network for all Islands and inhabited cays.”



“Hurricane Shelters and Communication.”



“Geographical make-up of the country and scarce resources”



“Finances & manpower, emergency communication, and
medical personnel and equipment.”



“The biggest challenge as it relates to disaster preparedness
and response would be inadequate hurricane shelters, and
persons who are reluctant to evacuate when asked to do so.
Proper vehicles to be used in severe cases of flooding and
voluntary manpower.”



“Training & educating the general public. Institutionalizing a
national awareness campaign.”



“Providing suitable shelters and equipment.”



“Better cooperation by the public.”



“If New Providence is hit by a hurricane”

Survey question thirteen asked Family Island Administrators to identify
ways national disaster preparedness and response can be improved. Continued
coordination between the islands and NEMA is a main theme throughout. Also
identified was the strengthening of institutional resources to ensure emergency
needs are effectively met. This question identifies support for government action
as well as pinpoints areas for enhancement that the Island Administrators feel
will improve response within the nation.
Q13: How do you think national disaster preparedness and response can be
improved?


“By visiting each island and having neighboring islands
equipped rather than waiting on New Providence (e.g. Southern
Islands).”



“Cutting through the red tape and responding to the peoples
needs as soon as possible.”
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“See #12” [“Training & Education General Public. Instituting a
national awareness campaign.”]



“By supplying No 12” [“Providing suitable shelters and
equipment”]



“By better equipping family islands.”



“National disaster preparedness response can be improved by
frequently upgrading the level of training in New Providence and
specifically the family islands.”



“Government should provide more funds and employ more
persons to be trained and work full time with that particular
area.”



“More input and pooling of resources from private sector.”



“Put proper shelters in place, upgrade the telecommunication
system, train personnel that are serious about disaster.”



“It can be improved by utilizing the Defence Force rather than
volunteer personnel for disaster preparedness in most areas
volunteers exist only on paper in event of crises attendance of
volunteers is not guaranteed.”



“The National Disaster Team needs to visit each district for onthe-ground evaluation and training.”

Table 5.15 below displays the results for survey question fourteen. Island
Administrators were asked if they thought that the passage of the National
Disaster Preparedness and Response Act would improve disaster response
within The Bahamas. (Why or why not) As the results show 100% of the Island
Administrators believe that the legislation will improve disaster response. This is
an overwhelming response that indicates there is awareness among the
respondents that the government needs the legal authority to act in response to a
national disaster.
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Q14 – Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and
Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas?
Yes

Do you think the
passage of the
National Disaster
Preparedness and
Response Act will
improve disaster
response within
The Bahamas?

No

No Response

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

20

100%

0

0%

0

0%

20

100%

Table 5.15 – Survey Question Fourteen, Do you think the passage of the
National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act will improve disaster
response within The Bahamas?
Respondents were also asked to provide additional information on why
they felt the legislation would improve disaster response within The Bahamas.
The majority of island administrators identified the legislation as providing the
legal authority for the government to act.

Q.14a: Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and
Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas? Why or Why
not.


“Because it establishes the scope of authority for the
government and its representatives.”



“Yes, however an act in and of itself will not improve or mitigate
disasters - implementation does which includes resources.”



“Because more persons would be educated to act in case of
emergency or disaster, because of the training received.”



“Equipment will be available.”




“Efforts will be more co-ordinated within a legal framework.”
“Bring about greater awareness of rules and responsibilities to
all stakeholders and the general community.”
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“It will allow authorities to make mandatory evacuations thus
saving the lives of some people who did not want to leave their
houses.”



“Provides a legal framework”



“To a certain extent. There is not sufficient teeth in the act.”



“Provided it is presented and discussed in an island to island
campaign.”



“Yes, because people tend to obey the laws.”



“It would be officially law and we would have to place more
focus and attention towards this situation.”



“Once the policies and procedures are implemented there
should be an improvement.”



“Because all the right agencies will be involved.”



“Everyone would know their roles. Funding and equipment will
be made available.”

Survey question fifteen asked Family Island Administrators what they
thought other island nations in the Caribbean could learn from The Bahamas with
regards to disaster preparedness and response. A theme of coordination and
self-reliance comes through in the comments provided.
Q15 - What do you think other island nations in the Caribbean can learn from
The Bahamas with regards to disaster preparedness and response.


“That we have a dynamic plan that is consultive based with local
residents and districts.”



“Multi-island strategies.”



“Making all houses strong enough to withstand hurricane force
winds.”



“Excellent weather and communication reporting via ZNS
network. ZNS and the met department are models for the
region.”



“How to effectively coordinate mitigation measures, from many
areas.”



“Multi-island planning strategies, communications &
transportation strategies.”
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“Not to depend on churches and lodges for hurricane shelters.”



“Do not procrastinate or react, be proactive.”



“That in order for it to be a success, we must all join together
and help our neighbors.”



“By educating the public to act quickly in case of disaster.”



“A coordinated effort to meet and share ideas.”



“That good management can result in minimum property
damage and loss of lives.”



“Good planning can reduce losses.”



“The Bahamas ability to garner international support and to
guide and direct its people during the disaster and respond
quickly to their needs after the disaster.”

Respondents were also provided with the opportunity to offer any general
comments related to emergency management within the Bahamas. The
responses provided as well as the answers to questions 10-15 illustrate
understanding among the Family Island Administrators of the importance of
disaster planning and coordination as a means for improving disaster response
and reducing losses.
Family Island Administrators General Comments


“The concept of Hurricane Preparedness must be taken
seriously and the after actions must be declassified out of
Nassau thus bringing the administrators more authority and
flexibility to act speedily when required.”



“More attention should be given before a disaster strikes.
Teams should be sent to each island to verify if the island was
prepared for the pending disaster.”



“Arrangements for travel to affected Islands need to be
coordinated - i.e. - separate flights for politicians and
assessment teams.”



“Funding ought to be provided in an effort to be properly
prepared.”
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“NEMA is doing an excellent job in helping to educate
Bahamians and the persons living in this country about the
importance of disaster preparedness and how to deal with
National disasters.”



“More resources needed to put theory into practice.”



“Disaster preparedness should be an on going process.”



“NEMA is to be congratulated for its proactive approach to
mitigate disasters, however, visits to every family island is
encouraged. The technical and human resources of Mr. Luke
Bethel is user friendly.”



“Disaster Preparedness requires resource to plan properly. A
designated head & item amount should be budgeted to assist
with Disaster Preparations. At the end of the Season, if funds
are not utilized they could be diverted to other national events,
e.g. Independence, etc. Proper coastal mapping for potential
flooding areas are essential. Islands in the Southern & Central
Bahamas needs to be given more attention for Disaster
Training. A co-ordinated effort is needed to construct at leas
one multi-purpose building in each District that can be used as a
Shelter and as a Youth Development Center.”



“Generally pleased with efforts of NEMA. Keep up the good
work.”



“The appointment of a NEMA representative and the
establishment of a clear line of authority island wide among the
administrators.”

Eleven (11) of the 20 Island Administrators chose to provide
general comments. A clear desire for better communication, planning and
coordination to ensure that they [Island Administrators] are an active part
of emergency management was expressed. Increases in available
funding and improvements in asset coordination were also articulated.
NEMA was given praise for its proactive approach to emergency
management within the nation. It is through the implementation of a CEM
system that NEMA was established and the Island Administrators took an
active role in the emergency management process. As stated in the
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literature (Quarantelli, 1997a, FEMA 2003a) coordination and planning
prior to a disaster helps to facilitate more effective emergency response.
The structured survey concluded by obtaining data on experience
by asking respondents the number of years they had served as an Island
Administrator. Table 5.16 shows the average years served was 9.45
years with a standard deviation of 8.1. This identifies variability in
experience levels of the island administrators. It is this difference in
experience and years in office that may account for differences in
responses. Despite the fact that some Island Administrators may not have
been in office at the time of each response operations, they were all
impacted by the study hurricanes.
Q - How many years have you served as an Island Administrator?
N
Years Served

20

Minimum Maximum
1

33

Mean

Std.
Deviation

9.45

8.121

Valid N (listwise)
20
Table 5.16 – Number of years served as an Island Administrator.
To examine more closely the relationship between years of experience
and hurricane response rankings Figures 5.1 – 5.4 illustrate the value response
of Island Administrators by number of years served. Figure 5.1 shows that Island
Administers who have served 5-8 years rated response to Hurricane Andrew
(’92) lower then Administrators who served less then 5 years or more then 8
years. A very similar result is also noted in Figure 5.2 in response to Hurricane
Floyd (’99).
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Figure 5.1 – Hurricane Andrew Value Response of Island Administrators by
Number of Years Served.
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Figure 5.2 – Hurricane Floyd Value Response of Island Administrators by
Number of Years Served.

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show little difference in response rating to Hurricanes
Frances, Jeanne and Wilma with regards to numbers of years served. An overall
improvement in the administrators perception of response is noted.
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Figure 5.4 – Hurricane Frances and Jeanne Value Response of Island
Administrators by Number of Years Served.
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Figure 5.4 – Hurricane Wilma Value Response of Island Administrators by
Number of Years Served.
5.2.5 Summary: Survey Results
The structured surveys were distributed to the Family Island
Administrators to gauge their perception of emergency management at the
national level. The survey was divided into three sections: Planning and
Information, Response Operations, and Experience and Challenges. The data
revealed the following key findings:


Sixty percent (60%) of the Island Administrators reported that their
respective jurisdiction had not received disaster management training
from NEMA.
246



Seventy-five percent (75%) of Island Administrators reported that they
or a representative had attended a NEMA conference.



Just over half (55% or 11 respondents) reported that their island had a
disaster plan in place that had been reviewed within the last two years.

This data reveal that although NEMA has been working to provide training
throughout the nation a more targeted approach needs to take place. Having
40% of your island administrators without proper training and 45% without an
updated emergency response plan is cause for concern. If these issues are not
addressed effective emergency response will be difficult to achieve.
The structured surveys were also intended to provide data to determine if
the CEM system improved disaster response. Based on the data displayed in
Tables 5.17 and 5.18 it is apparent that improved ratings exist for response
operations to post-CEM events. The data indicate a noticeable jump in the mean
between Hurricane Floyd (1999) and Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne (2004).
Keeping in mind that the CEM system was first implemented in 2002, can the
improved rating be attributed to CEM? The answer is no. Although the Island
Administrators rated the post-CEM response operations higher than the pre-CEM
response, experience can not be ruled out as the trigger for the improved score.
It is hypothesized, based on the literature (Quarantelli, 1997a; FEMA 2003a; and
Hughey 2003) that the improvement in the mean score is a combination of the
implementation of CEM and experience. This question is further examined in
section 5.3 as well as Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
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Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Hurricane

Island
Administrators
Mean Ranking

Andrew

2.25

Floyd

2.55

Michelle

---

Frances &
Jeanne

3.95

Wilma

4.05

Table 5.17 – Summary Table, the success of the National Governments
Response to the study hurricanes as determined by the Island Administrators
rankings.

Summary Table: Survey Questions 6-9,
Not
Week
Good
Very Good
Successful Success Success Success
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

Andrew 1992

25%

0%

45%

10%

5%

Floyd 1999
Frances & Jeanne
2004

20%

20%

45%

15%

0%

0%

0%

25%

55%

20%

Wilma 2005

0%

0%

15%

65%

20%

Table 5.18 – Summary Table: Survey Questions 6-9. The table represents the
percent of Island Administrators that rated each storm by category. (Response
Breakdown)
5.3

Semi-Structured Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all staff members of The

Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). This semistructured approach to interviewing allowed flexibility in questioning and
facilitated the gathering of information that may not have come through in a more
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controlled survey or interview. Interview results are provided below in section
5.3.1, as well as applied to section 5.4 of this document, ‘Evaluating the
Management of Disaster Response to the Six Study Hurricanes’.
All NEMA staff members were active participants in the national response
to Hurricanes Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004), and Wilma (2005). Since the
development of NEMA is a direct result of the implementation of a CEM system
not all staff members actively participated in a formal capacity to the national
response to Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Floyd (1999), and Michelle (2001). All
interviewees however were directly or indirectly impacted by all six hurricanes
and were well versed on strategies and techniques utilized by the national
government prior to 2002.
5.3.1 Semi-Structure Interview Results
During my interviews NEMA staff was asked to evaluate the response
efforts of each of the six study hurricanes. Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were
grouped together because the two storms occurred within three weeks of one
another. Difficulty separating the two response operations required that they be
evaluated as one event. A scale of 1-5 was utilized for this research, 1 being not
successful and 5 being fully successful. A half (½) point scale was not provided
as an option to interviewees yet some of the respondents independently chose to
select a rating that utilized the scale. This was an independent decision of the
part of the participants and is noted in the evaluation tables below.


1 represented not successful,



2 represented weak success,
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3 represented good success,



4 represented very good success



5 represented fully successful.

Because the study population is so small (6 NEMA Staff Members) it is important
for this research to examine the number of respondents in each category as well
as the mean rating. By utilizing the mean, a rating for each response was
established allowing for comparative evaluation.
As shown in Table 5.19, staff members were asked to rate the success of
the national governments response to Hurricane Andrew. The mean score for
response to Hurricane Andrew was 2.58 with a standard deviation of 0.376. This
shows strong agreement among NEMA staff members that the national response
effort to Hurricane Andrew had weak to good success. Additionally, Table 5.20
displays the number and percentage of responses in each category. Fifty
percent (50% or 3 respondents) rated the success of Hurricane Andrew at 2.5.

NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments
response to Hurricane Andrew?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Andrew
1992

6

2.0

3.0

2.5833

2.500

2.5

0.37639

Valid N

6

Table 5.19 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the National
Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Descriptive Statistics)
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NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments
response to Hurricane Andrew?

Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Not
Successful
(1)

Week
Success
(2)

2.5

Good
Very Good
Success Success
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

0

1

3

2

0

0

0%

16.6%

50%

33.3%

0%

0%

Table 5.20 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the National Governments
Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown)
NEMA staff was asked to score the success of the national response
efforts to Hurricane Floyd. Table 5.21 shows a slight improvement over the
response to Andrew with a mean score of 2.83 and a standard deviation of
0.258. The extremely low standard deviation indicates strong agreement among
NEMA staff that the national response effort to Hurricane Floyd had weak to
good success. Table 5.22 shows 66.6% (or 4 respondents) believe the national
governments response to Hurricane Floyd had good success.

NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments
response to Hurricane Floyd?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Floyd
1999

6

2.5

3.0

2.8333

3.0000

3.0

0.25820

Valid N

6

Table 5.21 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics)
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NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Floyd?

Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Not
Successful
(1)

Week
Success
(2)

2.5

Good
Very Good
Success Success
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

0

0

2

4

0

0

0%

0%

33.3%

66.6%

0%

0%

Table 5.22 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown)
Hurricane Michelle was the last storm to impact the nation in the pre-CEM
phase. Respondents’ were asked to rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Michelle. It is important to note that Michelle
was the only study hurricane to make landfall on the Island of New Providence
and the capital city of Nassau. Table 5.23 shows the mean rating at 2.66 with a
standard deviation of 0.408. The mean is lower than that of Hurricane Floyd and
also showed slightly less agreement among respondents with an increase in the
standard deviation. The lower mean score could be attributed to the impact
Michelle had on the national government. As discussed in Appendix B Hurricane
Michelle prevented the daily functioning of government business. Banks and
national government offices remained closed days after landfall bringing the
nation to a halt. The impact of Michelle on the national government caused
delays in emergency services and may have contributed to respondents’ lower
rating. Table 5.24 indicates that 50% of respondents’ rated the national
response to be good. However due to the small number of respondents’ this can
be misleading and should be cautiously applied.
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NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments
response to Hurricane Michelle?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Michelle
2001

6

2.0

3.0

2.66

2.7500

3.0

0.40825

Valid N

6

Table 5.23 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Michelle? (Descriptive Statistics)
NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Michelle?

Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Not
Successful
(1)

Week
Success
(2)

2.5

Good
Very Good
Success Success
(3)
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

0

1

2

3

0

0

0%

16.6%

33.6%

50%

0%

0%

Table 5.24 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Michelle? (Response Breakdown)

The year 2002 marked the birth of CEM in The Bahamas and the early
establishment of NEMA. Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were the first response
operations coordinated under the CEM system and occurred within three weeks
of one another in the fall of 2004. Respondents were asked to score the success
of the national response on the 1 to 5 scale. Table 5.25 displays a marked
improvement over previous response operations with a mean score of 3.5 and a
standard deviation of 0.447. NEMA staff rated the national response to have had
good to very good success. Table 5.26 shows that responses were evenly
distributed between the following ratings: (3) good success, (3.5) good to very
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good success, and (4) very good success. The improvement in the mean score
suggests that the national response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were
managed better then those that were previously evaluated. However, what is not
clear is if the perceived improvement is due to CEM, personal involvement, or
perhaps experience.
NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments
response to Hurricane Frances & Jeanne?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Frances
& Jeanne 2004

6

3.0

4.0

3.500

3.500

3.5

0.44721

Valid N

6

Table 5.25 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the
national governments response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Descriptive
Statistics)

NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne?

Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Not
Successful
(1)

Week
Success
(2)

Good
Success
(3)

3.5

Very Good
Success
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

0

0

2

2

2

0

0%

0%

33.3%

33.3%

33.3%

0%

Table 5.26 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Response
Breakdown)
Hurricane Wilma, the final study hurricane, occurred in the fall of 2005, a
year following Frances and Jeanne. As shown in Table 5.27, respondents again
scored the national response high with a mean score of 3.66 and a standard
deviation of 0.408. Responses were again tightly grouped with 3 of the six
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respondents indicating that the national response to Hurricane Wilma was very
successful. (Table 5.28) Although there continues to be an improved mean
rating of the national response, it can not be determined with current data if the
improvement in is due to the implementation of CEM, personal involvement, or
perhaps experience.
NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments
response to Hurricane Wilma?
N

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Mode

Std.
Deviation

Response to
Hurricane Wilma
2005

6

3.0

4.0

3.66

3.7500

4.0

0.40825

Valid N

6

Table 5.27 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the
national governments response to Hurricane Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics)
NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Wilma?

Number of
Respondents
Percentage

Not
Successful
(1)

Week
Success
(2)

Good
Success
(3)

3.5

Very Good
Success
(4)

Fully
Successful
(5)

0

0

1

2

3

0

0%

0%

16.6%

33.3%

50%

0%

Table 5.28 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national
governments response to Hurricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown)
How would you rate the national governments response to the
following study hurricanes?

Mean score
Valid N

Andrew

Floyd

Michelle

Frances &
Jeanne

Wilma

2.58

2.83

2.66

3.5

3.66

6

6

6

6

6

Table 5.29 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the National
Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Mean)
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In addition to interviewing NEMA respondents about the effectiveness of
response operations to the six study hurricanes, they were also asked to identify
the biggest challenges to response within The Bahamas and their opinions on
what needed to be done to ensure successful response and recovery in the
future. Outlined below are the biggest challenges to emergency response, as
identified by respondents.
NEMA Interviews: What do you see as the biggest challenges to
successful emergency response?


“Logistics! As well as accountability through documentation,
there needs to be accurate relaying of information to confirm the
movement of assets.”



“Coordination between NEMA and the island sub-NEMAs.”



“Coordination between all the ministries. Holding of information
can not occur, successful emergency management requires
information is coordinated through NEMA to ensure proper
decision making.”



“Training and communication at all levels.”



“Lack of funding for critical assets.”



“Training! Not everyone on the Family Islands has received
emergency management training.”

Training and coordination are two issues that were recognized as challenges to
effective emergency response by the NEMA staff; these two key items were also
identified by the Family Island Administrators.
NEMA staff members were asked to identify what needed to be
accomplished to ensure successful response and recovery in the future. The
responses are outlined below; training and coordination were identified as key
issues.
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NEMA Interviews: What needs to be done to ensure successful response
and recovery to future disasters?


“Coordination from NEMA with the island sub-NEMAs is
required. Inter-Island coordination is needed and we are going
to be establishing sub-NEMA’s throughout the Family Islands.
Since 2003 we have had the Family Island Administrators
working as the NEMA representatives. We hope to be able to
have a full-time NEMA representative that works as the disaster
coordinator on the islands.”



“National EOC. With the construction of the new EOC we will
be better equipped to manage response operations.”



“All information needs to come through the central NEMA
office.”



“Training! Training! Training! All ministries should be well
trained in emergency management procedures. Through our
annual Emergency Management conference we are providing
training to Family Island Representatives. We have also been
able to provide CERT and shelter training on many of the family
islands.”



“NEMA needs to be able to better coordinate the ESFs and
more people need to become involved in the emergency
management process.”



“Funding for emergency management within the Bahamas
needs to be addressed. Limited assets and resources make it
difficult to meet needs.”

5.3.2 Summary: Semi-Structured Interview Results
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with NEMA staff to gauge
their perception of emergency management and response at the national level.
The interviews as detailed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, took place on several
occasions. The data discussed in this section focused on the response to the six
study hurricanes and intended to provide data to determine if the CEM system
improved disaster response.
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Table 5.29 provides a summary of mean scores for the study hurricanes
and Table 5.30 provides a summary of the percentage of NEMA staff that rated
each storm by category. An increase in mean score is evident between the preCEM and post-CEM response. However, there are not enough data to support
CEM being the impetus for the improvement in response. Although the data
indicates a noticeable jump in the mean rating between Hurricane Michelle
(2001) and Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne (2004) suggesting that post-CEM
response operations were handled more successfully than those that occurred
pre-CEM experience can not be ruled out as a contributing factor.

Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Hurricane

NEMA Staff
Mean Ranking

Andrew

2.58

Floyd

2.83

Michelle

2.66

Frances &
Jeanne

3.5

Wilma

3.66

Table 5.30 – Summary Table, the success of the national governments response
to the study hurricanes as determined by the NEMA staff rankings.
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Summary Table: The Percent of NEMA staff that rated each storm by category.
Very
Not
Week
Good
Fully
Good
2.5
3.5
Successful Success
Success
Successful
Success
(1)
(2)
(3)
(5)
(4)
Andrew 1992

0%

16.6%

50%

33.3%

0%

0%

0%

Floyd 1999

0%

0%

33.3%

66.6%

0%

0%

0%

Michelle 2001

0%

16.6%

33.6%

50%

0%

0%

0%

Frances &
Jeanne 2004

0%

0%

0%

33.3%

33.3%

33.3%

0%

Wilma 2005

0%

0%

0%

16.6%

33.3%

50%

0%

Table 5.31 – Summary Table: The percent of NEMA staff that rated each storm
by category.
5.4

Summary: Survey & Interview Results
The data in this chapter were formulated to determine if the respondents

perceived an improvement in response as a result of the implementation of a
CEM system. The structured surveys identified that although the Island
Administrators rated the post-CEM response operations higher than the pre-CEM
response, experience cannot be ruled out as the trigger for the improved score.
The semi-structured interviews with NEMA staff members also examined
response to the six study hurricanes. As with the survey results, NEMA staff
rated the post-CEM response operations higher. Table 5.31 provides a
comparison between the success ratings provided by the Island Administrators
and NEMA Staff. An increase in the mean is evident throughout with the
exception of Michelle. However, a larger increase in the mean is noted after the
implementation of CEM. Despite this, there are still not enough data to support
CEM as the impetus for the improvement in response. Experience could not be
ruled out as a variable responsible for the improvement in national response. It
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is hypothesized, based on the literature (Quarantelli, 1997a; FEMA 2003a; and
Hughey 2003) that the improvement in the mean score is a combination of the
implementation of CEM and experience.

Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Hurricane

Island
Administrators

NEMA

Andrew

2.27

2.58

Floyd

2.44

2.83

Michelle

---

2.66

Frances &
Jeanne

3.66

3.5

Wilma

4.05

3.66

Table 5.32 – Summary Table: The success of the national governments
response to six study hurricanes as determined by the structured surveys and
semi-structured interviews. (Mean Rating)
Additionally provided in this chapter is an understanding of the status of
the CEM program as it relates to disaster training and planning. According to the
structured surveys with the Island Administrators, since the implementation of the
CEM system, 60% reported that their respective jurisdiction had not received
disaster management training from NEMA. Furthermore, 45% of the Island
Administrators reported that their island did not have a disaster plan in place that
had been reviewed within the last two years. An outdated or non-existent
response plan, combined with a lack of training indicates that there are gaps
within the emergency management structure that need to be addressed.
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The interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie demonstrated
awareness by the national government to the importance of a well structured
emergency management system. A strong commitment to improving emergency
response within the nation and protect and maintain the economic, political and
social structure was evident. Through financial and legislative measures the
national government has established a strong position in support of a well
coordinated national emergency management structure.
The scoring of each of the six national response operations provides us
with an understanding of NEMA’s perception as compared those of the Family
Island Administrators. Data discussed in this chapter helped to identify areas
where new initiatives should be developed in an effort to better prepare for and
respond to disasters. Additionally, the data provide the necessary foundation
and direction for further analysis as this longitudinal research moves forward.
Although the improvement in response could not be directly tied to CEM the data
provides a baseline for continued examination.
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Chapter Six:
Results: Application of the Theoretical Model
6.1

Introduction
This chapter addresses the application of the theoretical model discussed

in chapter three of this dissertation and depicted below in Figure 6.1. The model
was applied in two phases, (1) the pre-CEM phase, which provides the
contextual framework necessary to understand Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and
Michelle, and (2) the post-CEM phase, that frames Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne,
and Wilma. By exploring emergency response in these two periods, it allows for
the exploration of the wider political, economic and cultural forces affecting
response to the six study hurricanes. Application of this model places each
response operations into the larger comprehensive setting and provided a more
complete understanding of the mechanisms that improved or hindered response.
6.2

Pre-CEM Model Application
The Model of Community Response to Disasters was applied to the pre-

CEM period of this research. A review of each of the key components as
outlined below is discussed in detail.


Good leadership by professionally trained officials



A foundation of supportive values for government action



Legal authority to act



An advocacy supporting action



Necessary institutional resources
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6.2.1

Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials
The keystone to the theoretical model as illustrated in Figure 6.1 is ‘good

leadership by professionally trained officials’. During the Pre-CEM phase,
leadership and direction came from the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF)
(Office of The Prime Minister, 1992; Ingraham, 1999). The command and control
response style provided by the RBDF was efficient at executing military type
tasks but lacked the ability to manage emergency response that required civilmilitary coordination. Additionally problematic was the lack of training received
by RBDF Personnel. No formal emergency management training program
existed or was made available (Bethel, 2006).
A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action
A foundation of supportive values for local government action enables
concepts to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the
backing to spend monies in an effort to build resources (Wolensky and
Wolensky, 1990). During the Pre-CEM period there was no foundation of
support within The Bahamas to encourage or require the development of
emergency response policy. The Bahamas, a small nation with a limited
economic base, faced a variety of complex issues during this time. Despite the
impacts of Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, both category four storms, it took
Hurricane Michelle impacting the nation’s capital and interrupting government
activity to spark support.
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Figure 6.1 – Model of Community Response to Disasters (Source: Amended
Hughey, 2003)

6.2.3

Legal Authority to Act
The legal framework within which disaster operations occur can have a

significant impact on all four phases of disaster management. During the PreCEM phase there was no local or national emergency management policy in
place. As a direct result of Hurricane Floyd, the Emergency Relief Guarantee
Fund Act, 1999 (Act No. 44 of 1999) was enacted to address financial support for
recovery.
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Following Hurricane Floyd there was no formal way for the Government of
The Bahamas to release funds to assist communities in the rebuilding process or
to manage and distribute monetary relief aid received. Act No. 44 of 1999
established an Emergency Relief Guarantee Fund that allowed the Government
to “guarantee loans for the relief of persons who have suffered hardship and loss
as a result of a disaster and for purposes connected thereto” (Government of The
Bahamas Act No. 44, 1999: Chapter 35).
Under this act, persons over the age of eighteen (18) were able to borrow
funding to repair or replace occupied residential property, furnishings and
appliances damaged or destroyed by the Hurricane or to replace or repair
businesses damaged by it. This included rental accommodations, fishing boats,
engines, farm buildings, farm equipment, citrus or fruit trees, vegetable crop,
livestock, restaurant, processing plants and other commercial enterprises. All
money provided to individuals through this act required that the money borrowed
be repaid.
The Emergency Relief Guarantee Fund formally established a role for the
Government of The Bahamas in disaster management. It also identified the
Prime Minister as having the formal role of appointing The Minister responsible
for disaster preparedness. Although the act placed the Government of The
Bahamas in a reactive role and one of financial backer, the act triggered the
development of a loosely coordinated group of representatives from various
government ministries that slowly began the process of planning for hurricanes.
This informal group was known as ‘The Bahamas National Disaster
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Preparedness Committee’. Four years following the impact of Floyd, this group
became a formalized committee under the coordination of the National
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) at the direction of Prime Minister Perry
Christie.

6.2.4

An Advocacy Supporting Action
The backing of political leaders is not always enough to ensure that

hazard polices come to fruition; strong community support is also required.
Hazards research has shown (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1976) that following an
event, community support for action is high. This was the case in The Bahamas
following response to The Bay Street Fire (2001) and Hurricane Michelle (2001).
Despite clear problems with disaster response in 1970’s, 1980’s and
1990’s an advocacy supporting action did not exist until a fire broke out in the
port area of Nassau destroying two city blocks and adversely affected the tourism
industry. The ‘Bay Street Straw Market Fire’ was not included in the research
study because it only required the response of two national agencies and was
confined to a very small area. However, the impact of the fire in combination with
the shock of Hurricane Michelle triggered a national policy change and created
the necessary advocacy seeking action.
The impact of these two events on the island of New Providence
highlighted the critical need for a coordinated and centralized response. Strong
citizen support was energized by the local media, which documented both
disaster events, making sure to identify the negative impacts to the nation. It was
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the support generated as a result that helped to push forward the implementation
of a comprehensive emergency management structure within the nation. A
strong advocacy seeking action did not exist following Andrew or Floyd. It was
this lack of support that allowed previous attempts at hazard policies to fail.
Necessary Institutional Resources
When evaluating the institutional resources component of the Model of
Community Response to Disaster (Figure 8.1) it is important to view this in two
parts. First, does an accurate assessment of available resources exist within the
Bahamas and second, are the necessary institutional resources accessible.
During the pre-CEM phase response resources such as necessary
communication equipment and supplies of fresh water existed within The
Bahamas. However, the assets were distributed between a variety of different
agencies and organizations. The lack of coordination during this time prevented
the mobilization of available assets. It was this lack of coordination that lead to
decentralized responses during the pre-CEM phase resulting in unmet disaster
needs.
Discussion of the Pre-CEM Application of the Model
The application of the model to the Pre-CEM phase of this research
identifies gaps in emergency management capabilities. Lacking were good
professionally trained officials, as RBDF were not trained emergency managers
(Office of The Prime Minister, 1992). Not having the leadership and skills to
effectively coordinate the necessary activities associated with a national disaster,
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in combination with no legal authority to act, or advocacy seeking action may
have contributed to the decentralized and ineffective emergency management
structure identified with the application of Quarantelli’s (1997a).
Post-CEM Model Application
For research and discussion purposes activities within The Bahamas have
been delineated as pre- and post-CEM. However, in practice the line in the sand
is not as clear. As discussed previously, it was the impact of the Bay Street Fire
and Hurricane Michelle on the City of Nassau and the Island of New Providence
that triggered hazard awareness and action among policy makers and residents.
This change in attitude and development of support for action began in 2001 and
is still working today in hopes of fully achieving a nationally coordinated
emergency management structure.
6.3.1

Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials
Emergency management training for NEMA staff members and

Government Ministries began in March 2002 with the introduction of three
training courses: Emergency Management 101, Emergency Operations Center
(EOC) Training, and Emergency Manager: An Orientation to The Position.
These three courses, provided by the Global Center for Disaster Management
and Humanitarian Action at the University of South Florida, provided the basics in
CEM (Hughey, 2004a).
In combination with training NEMA staff, under the leadership of Carl F.
Smith, began the process of developing a comprehensive emergency
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management plan (CEMP) (Hughey, 2004a). As identified by Quarantelli (1998)
the ‘process’ of developing a national disaster plan is more important then the
actual written document. The ‘process’ is considered by many emergency
management professionals as more important than the finished document
because the process requires the coordination of information between many
different ministries and organizations. It is through this process that personal and
agency relationships are developed. It is believed that the interaction between
ministries in a low stress environment allows for better coordination when a
disaster does occur.
The CEMP utilized an Emergency Support Function (ESF) format. The
ESF format details the missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of each
government ministry for coordinating resources and programmatic support to
NEMA and Family Island Administrators during incidents of national significance.
Furthermore, the ESF structure identified primary and support agencies clearly
for each core function, preventing confusion over responsibilities during response
and recovery. The Bahamas National CEMP has thirteen (13) ESF listed below
in Table 6.1 (Hughey, 2004a).
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ESF 1
ESF 2
ESF 3
ESF 4
ESF 5
ESF 6
ESF 7
ESF 8
ESF 9a
ESF 9b
ESF 10a
ESF 10b
ESF 11
ESF 12
ESF 13

Transportation
Communication
Public Works & Engineering
International Assistance
Planning and Information
Shelter Services
Relief Supplies & Distribution
Health & Medical Services
Urban Search & Rescue
Marine Search & Rescue
Hazardous Material Land
Hazardous Material Marine
Food
Tourism
Volunteers

Table 6.1 - Commonwealth of The Bahamas National Emergency Support
Functions (Data Source: NEMA)

The implementation of national disaster management training and the
writing of the CEMP provided a solid foundation on which to build a CEM system.
These activities illustrate the leadership and training provided within the
Bahamas during the post-CEM phase.
6.3.2 A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action
A foundation of supportive values for local government action enables
concepts to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the
backing to spend money in an effort to build resources. During this Post-CEM
phase of the research a strong foundation of support exists within The Bahamas.
For example despite a limited economic base, with strong support from residents,
The Bahamas Government has matched a $650,000 donation from the United
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States Southern Command to build a new national EOC. To date the EOC has
not been constructed but the money has been earmarked, architectural drawings
have been developed and the land on which it is to be built has been acquired.
The support from residents is high and the local media is hopeful that the EOC
will be functioning before the next hurricane season.
Another example of the strong support that exists within the Bahamas are
the numerous volunteer organizations, many of which are associated with local
churches, that have become certified as ESF 13 support agencies. This active
participation by residents in the emergency management process provides for a
united and well coordinated environment.

6.3.3 Legal Authority to Act
The legal framework within which disaster operations occur can have a
significant impact on all four phases of disaster management. During the PostCEM phase and in response to the three study hurricanes examined no strong
legal or regulatory framework existed. As discussed previously The Emergency
Relief Guarantee Fund Act, 1999 (Act No. 44 of 1999) addressed issues
associated with the availability of financial support for recovery activities.
However, no policies were in place to address the management responsibilities
associated with national disasters examined in this study.
Following the impact of Hurricane Wilma in 2005 legislation addressing
emergency management within the nation was passed. The ‘Act To Provide For
a More Effective Organization of The Mitigation of, Preparedness For, Response
271

To and Recovery From Emergencies and Disasters’ also known as the ‘Disaster
Preparedness and Response Act of February, 2006’ stipulated the elements of a
National Disaster Organization which includes NEMA as the driver for disaster
risk management in The Bahamas. Arranged into eight sections this new legal
authority to act provides the necessary foundation for the full implementation of
CEM within the nation. Outlined below are the eight section of the legislation.
Part I deals with definitions while Part II speaks to the establishment of a
National Emergency management Agency (NEMA) as a Department of
Government charged with responsibility for relief management, as well as
coordination and implementation of government policies for disaster risk
management. NEMA is to be headed by a Director, and the Act addresses the
role and function of the Director, appointment of public officers to relevant posts,
and to the establishment of NEMA representation on the Family Islands. A
Disaster Consultative Committee is to be appointed by each Family Island, and
the Committee will be responsible for assisting the Director to discharge the
functions of NEMA as appropriate.
Part III deals with the National Emergency Management Advisory
Committee, (NEMAC) review of the Disaster Preparedness and Response
Policy, and the National Disaster Response Plan. Part IV addresses the
requirements and functioning of emergency operation centers and physical and
social requirements for shelter operations. Address in Part V of the Act are the
obligations of other Public Officers, including liaison functions, environmental
Impact Assessments and annual reports to and consultations with the NEMA
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Director. Part VI outlines procedures with respect to especially vulnerable areas
and precautionary and/or mitigation plans.
Disaster Alerts and Emergencies are addressed in Part VII of the Act.
Part VIII, entitled Miscellaneous, addresses disaster management items not dealt
with in the preceding sections of the Act.
Subsidiary legislation is currently being considered to support the Disaster
Preparedness and Response Act. The Attorney General’s Office is examining
the following priority components not addressed by previous legislation:






Forecasting and the Meteorological Services
Evacuations
Emergency Communications
Agency/Ministry Disaster Plans
Disaster Management and Planning for ‘Specially Vulnerable Areas’

6.3.4 An Advocacy Supporting Action
The backing of political leaders is not always enough to ensure that
hazard polices come to fruition, strong community support is also required.
Surveys of Family Island Administrators, informal discussion with residents, and
interviews with NEMA staff revealed a strong support from residents for
Government action. Of particular interest was the legalization of mandatory
evacuation orders that would require residents to leave their homes. This issue
is currently being debated and requires careful consideration of the balance
between individual and government rights.
Mandatory evacuation orders are but one example of the dynamic issues
surrounding CEM within The Bahamas. The impact of two very active hurricane
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seasons may have triggered an advocacy supporting action but it has been
through strong community education that NEMA has been able to keep and
strengthen support.
6.3.5

Necessary Institutional Resources
As with the evaluation of the pre-CEM phase, institutional resources are

examined in two parts. First, does an accurate assessment of available
resources exist within the Bahamas and second, are the necessary institutional
resources accessible. During the post-CEM phase, a comprehensive inventory
of NEMA assets housed at the disaster warehouse in New Providence, was
assembled. Utilizing the SUpply MAnagement (SUMA) System established by
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), NEMA assets were well
documented. The SUMA system provided a central logistics data system to
manage disaster response assets.
Lacking were detailed assessments of available resources provided by all
ministries active in disaster response. During the response phase of a disaster it
is critical to match emergency needs and assets accordingly. If resources are
not accessible emergency needs can go unmet or at the very least delay the
delivery of services. The lack of multiple agencies inventories means that
resources that may be available can not effectively be utilized or coordinated.
6.3.6

Discussion of the Post-CEM Application of the Model
The application of the model to the post-CEM phase of this research

identified both strengths and weaknesses within the emergency management
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structure of The Bahamas. Leadership as compared to the pre-CEM phase was
good. NEMA staff and members of government ministries were provided with
training to help establish an emergency management system. A response plan
was also written to provide guidance during response to a national disaster.
A foundation for supportive values for government action was and
continues to be strong in the post-CEM phase. Individual Bahamians as well as
established organizations are lending support to the Government in an effort to
build a well coordinated emergency management structure.
During the time of response to all three post-CEM events, no legal
authority to act existed. Since that time however, ‘The Disaster Preparedness
and Response Act, 2006’ was established. Additional regulatory legislation is
also being considered at this time with strong support from the Bahamian people.
Surveys of Family Island Administrators, informal discussion with
residents, and interviews with NEMA staff revealed strong support from residents
for Government action. Community education programs implemented by NEMA
have helped to sustain support and increase awareness of the hazards in The
Bahamas. Institutional resources during the post-CEM phase show improvement
when compared to pre-CEM. However, the lack of multiple agency inventories
limited NEMA’s ability to coordinate assets.
6.4

Summary
The structured surveys, semi-structured interviews, as well the application

of Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria for evaluating the management of response
operations provide a foundation for evaluating CEM. What is missing however is
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a full understanding of the dynamic political, social, and economic environment
within The Bahamas before and after the implementation of CEM. The
application of The Model of Community Response to Disasters (Figure 8.1)
allows for an expanded understanding of emergency response within The
Bahamas during both periods.
The application of the amended Model of Community Response to
Disasters (Figure 6.1) was easily and effectively applied to the Bahamas. The
model helped to identify strengths and weaknesses in the emergency
management structure in both the pre- and post-CEM phase. Furthermore, it
placed the response to the six study hurricanes in the large comprehensive
setting allowing for a more complete understanding of the mechanisms impacting
disaster response.
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Chapter Seven
Summary, Conclusions, And Contributions

7.1

Introduction

This research sought to answer the following three research questions:
1. Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of
disaster response be operationalized?
2. Can CEM, a United States emergency management strategy, be an
effective strategy for The Bahamas, an archipelagic nation?
3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response within
The Bahamas?
This final chapter provides a summary and discussion of results
associated with each of the research questions and places the findings within the
current literature on hazards. A set of general conclusions and suggestions for
future research are also provided.
7.2

Study Summary
Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of

people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004).
Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human
interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development
practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and
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wealth. In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental
impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and
implementing mitigation measures is a high priority in hazards research.
However despite our best efforts disasters have and will continue to negatively
impact communities resulting in loss of life and property. To that end nations
must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the needs of all
residents potentially at harm.
This study examined the establishment of a comprehensive emergency
management (CEM) system in the nation of The Bahamas. This exploratory
research utilized a longitudinal study design to examine the six study hurricanes
(Andrew ‘92, Floyd ‘99, Michelle ‘01, Frances ‘04, Jeanne ‘04, and Wilma ’05).
The goal of this research was two fold; first, to document the development of a
comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and
second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations
prior to its implementation.
7.3

Overview of Methods
This study was designed to determine the impact of CEM on emergency

response in The Bahamas. Being a relatively uncharted area of hazards
research, this study took an exploratory approach that utilized a longitudinal
study design, that allowed for the repeated observation of national response
operations. Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data. Data for the
study were collected over a six year period from 2001-2007. The following data
collection techniques were employed for this study: (1) archival research, (2)
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structured surveys, (3) semi-structured interviews, and (4) participant
observation.
Data collected through the above mentioned four methods were analyzed
in several ways. First, the surveys and closed-ended questions associated with
the interviews were analyzed using standard statistical techniques. The data
was then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria for measuring the management of national
disaster response operations as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a). Finally, data
were applied to the Model of Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003).
7.4

Key Research Findings
Research Question One: Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for

evaluating the management of disaster response be operationalized?
Quarentelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster
response operations was successfully operationalized and applied to the six
study hurricanes. Each of the eight research criteria were well applied and the
results are outlined below.


Criterion One, adequately carrying out generic functions, appears not
to have been impacted by the implementation of CEM. However, upon
closer examination what emerged was a clear improvement in the
early recognition of each of the ten generic functions, which are
encompassed within the first criterion. The data displayed
improvements that can be associated with the implementation of a
CEM system in 2002 (see table 4.3) and the development of a national
response plan that outlined responsibility and SOP’s for each of the
functions.



Criterion Two, effectively mobilizing personnel and resources, showed
improvements following the implementation of the CEM system. An
association with the improvement in the function and the development
of a national emergency response plan was noted. It is critical to
identify however that the improvements associated to the CEM system
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did not rule out or take away from the impact that experience may have
played in improvements to response operations.


Criterion Three, adequately processing information, displayed a pattern
of improvement following the implementation of the CEM system. The
implementation of a national response plan helped to develop clear
lines of communication between citizens, the government, and
response agencies that allowed for more accurate processing of
information and improved response operations. Also associated with
the improvement are experience and improved recording keeping.



Criterion Four, the properly exercising decision-making, showed no
pattern or association of improvement following the implementation of
CEM. Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne
experienced the same problems with decision-making as the pre-CEM
response operations.



Criterion Five, developing overall coordination, showed a marked
improvement after the implementation of the CEM system. Data
indicates improvements are associated with the development of a
nation response plan that required multi-agency coordination over a
two-year period prior to the impact of Hurricane Frances.



Criterion Six, Correctly recognizing differences between response and
agent-generated demands, was dependent of the success of criteria 2
through 5. The data did not identify an association between criterion
six and the implementation of a CEM system.



Criterion Seven, providing appropriate and accurate reports for the
news media, showed a clear pattern of improvement during the postCEM response operations. The data showed the improvement was
associated with the implementation of the national response plan
(2002).



Criterion eight, a well-functioning emergency operations center,
showed no improvement associated to the implementation of a CEM
system. Challenges to the physical requirements outlined by
Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology indicated the EOC facilities utilized
in response to each of the six study hurricanes were insufficient.

Although Quarantelli’s methodology was operationalized some application
difficulties do existed. The subjective nature of Quarantelli’s criteria for evaluating
the management of emergency response operations, limits its utility as a
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practical tool. It is recommended that the methodology be refined for ease of
application and to ensure consistency in use. A more detailed and structured
application guideline is succesged to prevent subjective employment of the tool.
The use of benchmarks would also provide emergency managers with the
necessary apparatus to establish response goals and provide a metric to rate the
overall improvement to response within a jurisdiction.
Research Question Two: Can CEM, a United States emergency
management strategy, be an effective strategy for The Bahamas, an archipelagic
nation? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to identify areas where the
implementation of a CEM system improved disaster response operations in The
Bahamas.


Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the
management of disaster response was able to identify area
where the implementation of CEM improved the national
management of disaster response. The research data indicated
improvements associated with the implementation of a CEM
system, in the following five criteria.
o
o
o
o
o



Adequately carrying out generic functions;
Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources;
Adequately processing information;
Developing overall coordination;
Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news
media;

The amended Model of Community Response to Disasters was
easily and effectively applied to the Bahamas, identifying
strengths and weaknesses in the emergency management
structure in both the pre- and post-CEM phases.

This research hypothesized that the implementation of CEM would
improve all areas of disaster response within the nation of the Bahamas. Based
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on Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluation improvements were noted in
the following six areas following the implementation of CEM.


Adequately carrying out generic functions;



Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources;



Adequately processing information;



Properly exercising decision making;



Developing Overall Coordination;



Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news media

Despite the improvement in these areas, there was not enough evidence to
support the claim that the impetus for improvement in The Bahamas emergency
response was the implementation of CEM. Furthermore, the subjective nature of
the evaluation criteria limits its utility as a practical tool.
It was further hypothesized that CEM would be an effective and successful
emergency management strategy for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas. To
that end, based on anecdotal evidence from observation and interviews with
NEMA staff CEM is a successful strategy for the management of disasters but
continues to need work.
“To continue to improve we need to improve overall coordination as well
as inter-island coordination. The island administrators are too be
working in the capacity of disaster coordinator at the local level (SubNEMA) and there plans need to be in position and taken to operational
mode, then it can come to the national level that is where it can be
confusing. We have come along way but we still have a ways to go but it
is going to workout…workout in time” (Bethel, 2006)
“Comprehensive emergency management provides a connection between
all the components of disaster management. The training has really
helped. We all know who to call and who has what job. Information
comes through the national EOC and it allows for better coordination.
We still have glitches and we are continuing to work on them, but the new
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system and the passage of the disaster legislation has legitimized NEMA
and provided us with recognition” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b)
Additionally, the data indicated an increase in mean score when asked to
evaluate response operations on a 1 to 5 scale. An increasing mean score is
identified between the pre-CEM and post-CEM response phases by both the
Island Administrators and NEMA staff. (See Table 7.1) This further supports the
the anecdotal evidence that CEM has improved response operations within The
Bahamas. However, the data are not strong enough to identify CEM as the
exclusive reason for improvement. Variables such as experience cannot be
ruled out as the trigger for improvement in national response operations.

Pre-CEM

Post-CEM

Hurricane

Island
Administrators

NEMA

Andrew

2.27

2.58

Floyd

2.44

2.83

Michelle

---

2.66

Frances &
Jeanne

3.66

3.5

Wilma

4.05

3.66

Table 7.1 – Comparison between the perceptions of Island Administrators and
NEMA Staff with regards to the national response to the six study hurricanes.

The amended Model of Community Response to Disasters (Figure 7.1)
was easily and effectively applied to this research study. The model was able to
identify strengths and weaknesses in the emergency management structure in
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both the pre- and post-CEM phases. The application of the model assisted in
placing each of the six response operation in the appropriate context.
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Figure 7.1 – Model of Community Response to Disasters (Source: Amended
Hughey, 2003)

7.5

Contributions to Geography
This study provides one of the first longitudinal hazards research studies

conducted by a Geographer. A criticism of the hazards literature has been that
many researchers take only a snapshot of disaster events omitting the temporal
component in turn preventing the necessary examination of the dynamic and
intertwined relationships that impact all four phases of the emergency
management cycle. Furthermore, this research provides the hazards literature
284

with an application and test of Quarantelli’s criteria for evaluating the
management of emergency response operations. The application of this
methodology identified a need for a more concrete metric that does not allow for
subjectivity in application.
This research additionally provides to the hazards research a theoretical
model for evaluating community response to disasters. This model was
previously tested at the local level in Falmouth, Kentucky and has now been
successfully tested at the national level in The Bahamas. This model provides
emergency managers and hazards researchers with a tool for exploring
questions surrounding the four phases of emergency management.
7.6

Recommendations & Future Research

7.6.1 Recommendations
It is recommended that a metric be developed based on a time scale for
key emergency response functions. For example, if general functions are carried
out effectively all preliminary damage assessment report should be completed
within forty-eight (48) hours of the impact area being designated safe for
response personnel. Well established criteria would allow for the evaluation and
comparison of response operations. This type of metric would also help to
establish a concrete timeline of events which could be used to improve response
operations within a jurisdiction.
It is also recommend that more longitudinal research studies be conducted
in an effort to more thoroughly understand the dynamic nature of emergency
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response. Necessary evaluation of the dynamic and intertwined relationships
that exist. This study needs to be developed which does not allow for the
7.6.2 Future Research
This research, which began in 2001, continues today documenting and
evaluating the development of the CEM system for the Commonwealth of The
Bahamas. In June of 2008, at the annual NEMA conference in Nassau,
additional surveys will be conducted with Family Island Administrators to gauge
the effectiveness of the national response to Tropical Storm Noel. Noel
significantly impacted the southeastern and central islands of The Bahamas in
November of 2007 causing extensive flooding and requiring a full activation of
the nation EOC. Mechanisms for evaluation and coordination with NEMA and
the Government of The Bahamas continues to ensure future response operations
can be evaluated and more data obtained in an effort to improve emergency
response.
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Glossary Of Acronyms
BEC

Bahamas Electric Corporation

BTC

Bahamas Telecommunication Company

CDERA

Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency

CDM

Comprehensive Disaster Management

CEM

Comprehensive Emergency Management

CEMP

Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

CERT

Community Emergency Response Team

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

EOC

Emergency Operations Center

ICS

Incident Command System

NGA

National Governors’ Association

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

ODPEM

Office for Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management

OFDA

Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

PAHO

Pan American Health Organization

PDA

Preliminary Damage Assessment

RBDF

Royal Bahamas Defence Force

SUMA

SUpply MAnagement System

W&SC

Water and Sewerage Corporation

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
ZNS

The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas
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Appendix A: Family Island Administrators Structured Survey
Family Island Administrator
Disaster Management Survey
The following questions focus on Disaster Training, Planning and Response
efforts within The Bahamas. Family Island Administrators are asked to please
complete the following survey and fax or e-mail responses back to the National
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) Office at (242) 326-5456 or at
NEMA@Bahamas.gov.bs by Wednesday, January 31, 2007. Thank you in
advance for you assistance in this matter.
DISASTER TRAINING:
1. Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office?
Yes___
No____
a. If yes, what type of training? ______________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
2. What type of training would you like to see offered by NEMA? _________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
3. Did you or a representative from your office attend any of the NEMA
Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006?
Yes ___
No ___
a. If yes, did you find the conference useful; why or why not? ______
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
DISASTER PLANNING & INFORMATION
4. Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan?
Yes___
No___
a. If yes, when was the last time it was reviewed and updated? _____
5. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how would
you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of their role in disaster
planning and response? 1
2
3
4
5

DISASTER RESPONSE:
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6. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how
successful do you think the national response to 1992’s Hurricane Andrew
was?
1

2

3

4

5

7. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how
successful do you think the national response to 1999’s Hurricane Floyd
was?
1

2

3

4

5

8. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how
successful do you think the national response to 2004’s Hurricanes
Frances and Jeanne was?
1

2

3

4

5

9. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how
successful do you think the national response to 2005’s Hurricane Wilma
was?
1

2

3

4

5

10. Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to
develop a comprehensive emergency management structure in an effort
to coordinate disaster planning and response activities? Yes___ No___
11. What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and
response on your island?_______________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
12. What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and
response for The Bahamas?____________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
13. How do you think national disaster preparedness and response can be
improved?__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
14. Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and
Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas.
Yes ___ No ___
a. Why or why not: _____________________________________
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
15. What do you think other island nations in the Caribbean can learn from
The Bahamas with regards to disaster preparedness and response? ____
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
RESPONDENT INFORMATION:
Island(s) Represented: ____________________________________________
How many years have you served as an Island Administrator? _____________
General Comments: _______________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Appendix B: Understanding The Hazard - The Development and Impact of the
Six Study Hurricanes

B.1 Introduction
Appendix B examines the development and impact of Hurricanes Andrew,
Floyd, Michelle, Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma on the Commonwealth of The
Bahamas. Provided is an overview of the development and physical parameters
of each storm based on data gathered through official reports issued by The
Bahamas Department of Meteorology, archival research, and personal
correspondence with Meteorologist Trevor Basden.
Included in this chapter are the development characteristics of each storm
and the impact to the Islands of The Bahamas. Maps are provided to display the
historic path of each storm as it passed through the archipelago. Understanding
the development of each hurricane is critical to examining the disaster response
activities that resulted. Disaster response decisions regarding evacuations,
sheltering, and movement of resources and supplies are directly linked to
information obtained by officials. This chapter will provide the information that
was available to decision makers at the time of each storm event as well as
provide personal accounts of the impact of each storm on residents. A detailed
discussion of the national response to each of the study hurricanes begins in
Chapter 5 of this dissertation.
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B.2 Hurricane Andrew 1992
Hurricane Andrew became the first named storm of the 1992 season and
very quickly became the first major hurricane (category 3 or higher) to impact
The Bahamas since Hurricane Betsy in 1965. As Andrew slammed into the
Central Islands of The Bahamas, it caused major damage and destruction before
continuing on to South Florida and South Central Louisiana. Map B.1 illustrates
the historic path that Andrew took through The Bahamas.
B.2.1 Hurricane Andrew Storm Development
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology on August 14,
1992 satellite photos indicated a strong tropical wave off the African coast in the
area of the Cape Verde Islands. Two days later (Sunday, August 16th) the
satellite images indicated a tropical depression had formed and was located midway between Africa and the Lesser Antilles. Early reports on Monday, August
17th indicated that the depression was moving west at 21 mph and was located
near 11.6N and 40.4 W. Within 24 hours the depression strengthened to
become the first tropical storm of the 1992 season and was named Andrew. At
this time, The Bahamas Department of Meteorology was reporting that Andrew
had sustained winds of 40mph and was approximately 1,175 miles east of the
Lesser Antilles.
Andrew moved west-northwest at 25 miles per hour with storm
development alternating between periods of weakening and strengthening. For
the next 30 hours (11pm on the 19th to 5am on the 21st) Andrew moved on a
northwest course at 14 miles per hour. According to the August 21, 1992
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11:00am report from The Department of Meteorology, Andrew was becoming
better organized and was predicted to strengthen to hurricane force within the
next 12 to 24 hours. Maximum sustained winds at the time of the report were
measured at 60mph and the storm had shifted to a west-northwest course at 10
miles per hour.
Information gathered by the United States Air Force Reserve Unit Aircraft
on Saturday August 22nd at 5am confirmed that Andrew had reached hurricane
intensity. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology reported that the center of
the storm was located near latitude 25.8 N and longitude 67.5 W. At this time
Andrew was approximately 610 miles slightly north and east of Nassau,
Bahamas and was still on a west-northwest course moving at 10 mph with
sustained winds of 75mph. The 11am report placed the islands of the Northwest
Bahamas under a hurricane warning until Monday August 24th at 7am.
On Sunday August 23rd official reports from The Bahamas Department of
Meteorology noticed strengthening of the hurricane. By early morning Andrew
reached category four strength with sustained winds of 135 mph. The storm
was approximately 100 miles east of Harbour Island, Eleuthera and 160 miles
east of Nassau. The course of the hurricane had shifted and Andrew was
moving due west at 16 mph projected to cross northern Eleuthera, north of
Nassau, through the Berry Islands, South of Bimini and south of Miami, Florida.
According to reports from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology
Hurricane Andrew’s central pressure fell steadily as it passed through the islands
reaching a minimum of 922mb at about 2pm on Sunday, August 23rd
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approximately 60 miles east of the Island of Eleuthera. The eye of Andrew
moved over Harbour Island about 5pm the same day, with a central pressure of
935mb. (See Picture B.1)

Picture B.1 – Hurricane Andrew as it passes over The Bahamas. (Source:
NOAA, 1992)
Hurricane Andrew officially moved through the Islands of The Bahamas as
a category 4 hurricane. However damage to monitoring equipment limited data
collection. After passing through the Bahamas Hurricane Andrew moved across
Southern Florida where the National Hurricane Center (NHC) recorded gusts of
164 mph before the main radar at the NHC was destroyed. Hurricane Andrew
crossed the State of Florida with sustained winds of 125 mph and a forward
speed of 18 mph. Andrew then moved into the Gulf of Mexico and into Louisiana
where it subsequently merged with a frontal trough and died.

310

B.2.1.1

Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Andrew

Figure B.1 below shows the related wind speed and central pressure
associated with Hurricane Andrew. The data illustrate the relationship between
the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed. Hurricane Andrew
impacted the Islands of The Bahamas on August 23rd when its winds were at
their peak.

Figure B.1 – Hurricane Andrew Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source:
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).
B.2.2 Hurricane Andrew Impact
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (1992), Hurricane
Andrew generated hurricane force winds outward as far as 30 miles from the eye
and gale force winds for 105 miles. The Current and Lower Bogue, both
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settlements of North Eleuthera, reported storm surges of 25 feet and 16 feet
respectively. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology also reported numerous
tornadoes were spawned from “thunderclouds associated with Hurricane
Andrew” (The Bahamas Department of Meteorlogy, 1992:3).
Hurricane Andrew passed over Eleuthera, the Berry Islands and South
Bimini on the 23rd of August, 1992. Flooding and property damage were
reported on all of the respective islands and four (4) deaths were officially
reported. Below are comments from Hurricane Andrew preliminary damage
assessment reports (The Bahamas Department of Meteorlogy, 1992). (see
pictures B.2 - B.4)


The settlements of James Cistern, Gregory Town, Alice Town and
Palmetto Point on the Island of Eleuthera suffered minor damages.
Coastal roads were damaged by high seas, and docks throughout the
island had been extensively damaged. Minor damage was also
reported in The Bluff and Lower Bogue.



The Current and Current Island were extensively damaged as a result
of Hurricane Andrew. Twenty-four of the thirty homes on Current
Island where destroyed. Government buildings were destroyed and
docks were unusable. The islands were devastated and in need of
immediate emergency assistance.



On Spanish Wells, the bridge that joined Russell Island to Spanish
Wells was destroyed while many other fishing boats were lost to the
high seas. The two main food stores on the island were also
completely destroyed, while others were seriously damaged.
Movement throughout the island was impaired due to debris and
damage to roadways.



The Government Dock on Harbour Island was the only dock on the
island left standing as a result of Hurricane Andrew. All buildings on
the island suffered considerable damages and the main tourist
destination, The Pink Sands Hotel, was destroyed.
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B.2.3 Hurricane Andrew Discussion
When Andrew swept through The Bahamas it was the first major storm to
impact the Commonwealth in twenty-seven (27) years. The storm cost the nation
an estimated $250 million dollars, left 1,500 homeless, and killed four (4)
residents (Caribbean Disaster Advisory Subcommittee, 1994). Also, during this
period The Bahamas was adjusting to a new government. Just weeks before
Hurricane Andrew made landfall, the Free National Movement lead by Hubert
Ingraham won general elections, ending Prime Minister Lynden Pindling’s 25
year rule. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force took the lead role in responding to
Hurricane Andrew with strong support from Social Services. Additional agencies
and organizations provided support in response operations but no centralized
emergency management structure existed in 1992. These are important social
and political components that influenced the national governments response
capabilities. Hazards literature (Tobin and Montz, 1997) has shown that hazards
experience can change perception and response and were examined as part of
this research.
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Picture B.2 – Hurricane Andrew Damage on the Island of Abaco, The
Bahamas. (Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely
2006)

Picture B.3 – Hurricane Andrew Damage on the Island of Eleuthera.
(Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 2006)
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Picture B.4 – Hurricane Andrew Damage on the Island of Eleuthera.
(Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 2006)
B.3

Hurricane Floyd 1999
Hurricane Floyd was a powerful Cape Verde hurricane that impacted The

Bahamas during the 1999 hurricane Season. Floyd pounded the Central and
Northwest Bahamas particularly Cat Island, San Salvador, Eleuthera, New
Providence, Abaco and Eastern Grand Bahama. Floyd was a category four
hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Scale and was the most intense and destructive
hurricane on record to impact the Bahamas. Map B.2 illustrates the historic path
that Floyd took through The Bahamas.
B.3.1 Hurricane Floyd Storm Development
According to reports from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, on
Tuesday September 7th, 1999 tropical depression number eight formed
approximately 1000 miles east of The Lesser Antilles, moving west at 14 mph.
The following day the tropical depression was upgraded to a tropical storm and
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given the name Floyd. As Floyd moved west northwest at 10-16 mph it began to
slowly strengthen. The Friday, September 10th 8pm report from The Bahamas
Department of Meteorology indicated that the United States Air Force Reserve
reconnaissance aircraft confirmed that Floyd had strengthened to hurricane
status with maximum sustained winds of 80 mph (70 knots) and a central
pressure of 989mb.
The storm continued to intensify over the next day and by the 5am report
on Saturday, September 11th Floyd had developed into a category two.
Sustained winds were recorded at 105mph moving in a northwest direction at
10mph. In the very early morning hours of September 12th The Bahamas
Department of Meteorology noted a rising mid- to upper-level tropospheric
heights to the north of Floyd was forcing the storm to turn west. This westward
turn marked the start of a major period of strengthening for the storm.
The 8am report on Monday, September 13th indicated that Floyd, had
continued to strengthen and was currently a category three storm. By the 5pm
report on the same day Floyd had again strengthened to a category-four storm
with maximum sustained winds of over 131 mph. At this time Floyd was located
350 miles east-southeast of San Salvador, 580 miles east-southeast of Nassau,
and 225 miles northeast of the Turks and Caicos Islands. A tropical storm
warning was issued for the Southeast Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos
Islands. A Hurricane Watch was also posted for the Central Bahamas. Floyd
moved within 425 miles east-northeast of the Island of Mayaguana on a track
that was taking it due west at 14 mph. Floyd continued to strengthen and before
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the 13th came to an end Hurricane Floyd was packing sustained winds of 155
mph, the upper end of a category four hurricane. The Bahamas Department of
Meteorology attributed the explosive strengthening of Hurricane Floyd to the very
warm shallow ocean waters east of the archipelago.
Floyd was in position to strike the central Bahamas when it began moving
towards the west-northwest and moved some 20-30 miles north of San Salvador
around midnight on Tuesday, September 14th. As the storm continued to move
west-northwest it weakened slightly in intensity as it moved within 25 miles of
Orange Creek and Arthur’s Town, Cat Island.
Tuesday, September 14th Hurricane Floyd was moving at 14 mph in a
west-northwest track parallel to Eleuthera. The eye of the storm was
approximately 10 miles east of South and Central Eleuthera; with the western
eye-wall of the hurricane crossing Central and North Eleuthera. The eye of Floyd
made landfall near Alice Town, Eleuthera around 8am. In this position it passed
some 65 miles northeast of New Providence by 11am.
After traveling across North Eleuthera and turning towards the northwest,
Floyd struck Abaco making landfall around 2pm near Cherokee Sound, Abaco.
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, Floyd had weakened
very slightly before hitting Abaco and was still a category four hurricane when it
made landfall. The eye of the storm traversed Abaco moving south to north,
pummeling the island with maximum sustained winds of 115 mph. The Bahamas
Department of Meteorology reported downdrafts and tornadoes on Abaco as a
result of Floyd. The eye of the storm crossed over Crossing Rock, Mastic Point,
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Woolen Dean Cay, and Cooper’s Town, Abaco. After three hours, the eye of
Hurricane Floyd emerged over waters north of Cedar Harbour, Abaco, around
5pm on the 14th.
During the evening hours Floyd passed 30 miles northeast of Eastern
Grand Bahama bringing with it 75 mph winds with gusts of 94 mph. Wednesday
September 15th, Floyd left the waters of the Bahamas as it established a
northwest and then a north-northwest course around 5am. Floyd followed the
coast of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina before making landfall in the
United States on September 16th near Wilmington, North Carolina. (See Picture
B.5)

Picture B.5 – Hurricane Floyd Satellite Image as it passes over The Bahamas.
(Source: NOAA, 1999)
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B.3.1.1

Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Floyd

Figure B.2 below shows the related wind speed and central pressure
associated with Hurricane Floyd. The data illustrates the relationship between
the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed. Hurricane Floyd
impacted the Islands of The Bahamas on September 13th and 14th when the
winds were at their peak.

Figure B.2 – Hurricane Floyd 1999 Wind Speed and Barometric Pressure (Data
Source: The Bahamas Department of Meteorology)
B.3.2 Impact of Hurricane Floyd on the Islands
With sustained winds of 155 mph, torrential rains, and over a 20 foot storm
surge Floyd devastated the islands. Many coastal communities suffered from
severe flooding and widespread damage. Toppled power and telephone lines
throughout the islands disrupted electricity and communications. Initial damage
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assessment reports estimated that around 27,000 persons living in the Family
Islands were affected and were urgently in need of water, temporary shelter and
food. The islands most significantly impacted included: Abaco, Eleuthera, Grand
Bahama, The Berry Islands, Cat Island, San Salvador and New Providence.
Provided below are brief overviews of the damage assessments made
immediately following the passage of Hurricane Floyd.

B.3.2.1

New Providence (Nassau)

Experiencing less damage than the Family Islands, New Providence
reported sustained wind of 80mph. Minor damage to buildings such as windows
and roofs were reported, while landscaping throughout the island was badly
impacted with hundreds of downed trees. Movement around the island was very
difficult due to blocked roadways. The storm surge caused damage to marinas
and ports on the island, and many small boats were beached or sunk in the
Nassau Harbour. Two barges were also reported washed ashore. Over 2000
tourists weathered the storm in the capital city of Nassau. However, no deaths
were reported on the Island of New Providence as a result of Hurricane Floyd.
B.3.2.2

The Abacos

Hurricane Floyd left over 2,000 people homeless in the Abacos.
Approximately ten percent of the islands homes were destroyed and forty percent
were severely damaged. Mud Town, a settlement of Haitian immigrants was
destroyed. Settlements on the northern and southern extremes of the Abaco’s
suffered catastrophic damages with most, if not all, homes destroyed.
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“Parliamentarian Mr. Robert Sweeting estimated that damage in Abaco alone
was in the range of over $750 million dollars” (Neely, 2006:130). Government
reports indicated that seventy-five percent of the Moores Island’s homes were
completely destroyed or uninhabitable. In Marsh Harbour many large buildings
were completely destroyed and much of the area suffered considerable flooding.
Storm surge caused widespread beach erosion throughout the Abaco’s.
In Hope Town, homes which sat on the ocean’s edge were completely
submerged under water. Both airports (Treasure Cay and Marsh Harbour)
sustained major damage from flooding and were forced to close for several days
following the storm. The connecting road between Marsh Harbour (South
Central Abaco) and Treasure Cay was impassable and areas of Perimeter Road
ceased to exist. Agriculture in the area was also significantly impacted with the
citrus harvest, an estimated 3,000 acres, loosing the entire 1999 crop. Hurricane
Floyd was so great that it changed the size and shape of many of the cays that
make up the Abaco’s.
B.3.2.3

Grand Bahamas

On Grand Bahama, the storm produced extensive flooding and caused the
closure of the Airport for several days. Flooding on the western end of the island
stranded residents cutting off roads. Agriculture was significantly impacted with
thirty percent of the broiler production for the nation destroyed and extreme
reductions in the citrus crops reduced from 1,500 acres to 150 acres. Minor
damage to homes throughout the island were also reported.
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B.3.2.4

Eleuthera

Approximately 25% of Homes on the Island of Eleuthera sustained
damage as a result of Hurricane Floyd, with 1% of the homes classified as
destroyed. Major damage was assessed to all mail-boat docks as well as the
Rock Sound Airport. Government structures such as the docks and customs
warehouse located at The Bluff were seriously damaged. The dock at Jean’s
Bay was destroyed as were many of the roadways on the islands. The Spanish
Wells fishing fleet was devastated, many of the vessels having been breached
and others having sunk in the harbour. Of greatest concern following the
passage of Hurricane Floyd was clean drinking water. Eleuthera, which is
normally supplied with potable water by boat, could not receive water due to
damage to the ports. Additionally, storm surge associated with the storm had
severely impacted the water well fields, causing salt water intrusion making the
water undrinkable.
B.3.2.5

San Salvador

The eye of Hurricane Floyd passed just north of the island of San
Salvador. The island sustained damage to most structures including tourist
facilities, the Bahamian Field Station (BFS), Club Med Columbus Isle Resort, and
the Riding Rock Inn. No injuries were reported on the island as a result of the
storm. The island was without power and telecommunication systems for several
weeks after the storm passed. Like in many of the other islands, damage to
roadways and key transportation components such as airports and docks were
also reported. San Salvador suffered significant beach alteration changing the
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shape and size of the island. The main concern for residents of San Salvador
immediately following the storm was drinking water.
B.3.2.6

Cat Island

With A total population of 1,700 residents, Cat Island suffered significant
damage to homes and government facilities, although no injuries were reported.
However the two medical facilities on the island lost their roofs. Beach erosion,
flooding and damage to roadways were considerable.

Picture B.6 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on Arawak Cay, The Bahamas (Source:
Neely 2006)
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Picture B.7 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on the Island of New Providence, The
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006)

Picture B.8 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on the Island of New Providence, The
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006)
B.3.3 Hurricane Floyd Discussion
Hurricane Floyd devastated the central and northern islands of The
Bahamas. The key concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emergency
needs of food and clean water to all areas impacted. Damage to well fields, and
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transportation routs (airports, ports, and roadways) prevented the movement of
emergency goods between islands as well as on the island.
The Royal Bahamas Defence Force led by Commander Steven Russell,
activated an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) based at the Cabinet Office in
Nassau. Although the response and eventual recovery of Hurricane Floyd
required multiple ministries, agencies, and organizations the coordination of
assets was not centralized.
B.4

Hurricane Michelle 2001
Hurricane Michelle was the first hurricane in over 35 years directly to

impact the Island of New Providence. New Providence is not only the most
densely populated island in the archipelago it is also home to the City of Nassau,
the nation’s capital. Interruption in government operations would devastate the
economy of the nation and Hurricane Michelle served as a reminder to many
residents of New Providence that the island is very much at risk to the impact of
hurricanes. Map B.3 illustrates the historic path that Michelle took as she passed
through The Bahamas.
B.4.1 Hurricane Michelle Storm Development
Tropical depression number 15 of the 2001 season, developed on Monday
October 29th near the coast of Nicaragua. The depression remained virtually
stationary until the very early morning hours of Wednesday, October 31st.
According to reports by The Bahamas Department of Meteorology on the
morning of October 31st, the depression began to move slowly towards the north
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at 6mph, with no change in strength. Reports from Thursday, November 1st
indicated a drop in the central pressure to 997 with a corresponding increase in
the winds to 60mph. This resulted in the fourteenth tropical storm for the season
and was given the name of Michelle. At this time Michelle was not of particular
concern as the tropical storm continued to move north-northwest at 5 mph.
Morning reports on November 2nd showed Michelle had begun to slow to 3
mph as it intensified to hurricane strength. The maximum sustained winds were
measured at 75 mph, and a central pressure of 980 millibars. By the next
morning Hurricane Michelle, which was somewhat erratic, began to intensify
rapidly becoming a category four hurricane, with sustained winds of 135 mph.
Near the end of the day on November 3rd Hurricane Michelle slowly picked up
forward speed with a shift in track towards the north-northeast. A hurricane
watch was posted at 11pm on the 3rd for the Northwest and Central Bahamas to
include: Bimini, Grand Bahama, Abaco, The Berry Islands, Andros, New
Providence, Eleuthera, Exuma, Cat Island, Ragged Island, Long Island, Rum
Cay and San Salvador. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology “urged
residents in the Northwest and Central Bahamas to monitor the progress of
Michelle closely and be prepared to take quick action” (Dean & Rolle, 2001:3).
The afternoon report on Sunday November 4th noted that Hurricane
Michelle’s forwards speed had accelerated to 13 mph. While over Cuba late
around 7pm, Michelle began to lose strength and her maximum sustained winds
decreased to 125mph. By 10 pm that night reports indicated that the weakening
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trend was continuing and Michelle’s sustained wind speed decreased to 110
mph.
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology at around 1am on
Monday, November 5th the leading edge of Michelle began to impact the island of
Andros. While still on the northern shore of Central Cuba, about 175 miles
southwest of Red Bays Andros, tropical storm force winds began to batter the
island of Andros. Approximately an hour later the first tropical storm force winds
were recorded on the Island of New Providence. By 7am that morning, the eye
of Michelle was over the island of Andros. Maximum sustained winds outside of
the eye were around 80-85 mph with higher gusts and very heavy rain showers.
Michelle continued tracking northeast at 19 mph and by 9:30am the eye of the
hurricane moved over the island of New Providence. According to Reports from
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, “the passage of the eye over the
island caused some persons to believe that the hurricane had passed” (Dean &
Rolle, 2001:3). Just before 11am the second assault began with winds shifting
northwest to north and increasing from 16 mph to sustained winds of 46 mph
sustained with peak winds up to 103 mph.
By 4pm on the 5th Hurricane Michelle passed over North Eleuthera, as the
storms track shifted towards the east-northeast at 21 mph. The Bahamas
Department of Meteorology reported that by 10pm on November 5th all warnings
were dropped as Michelle moved away from The Bahamas and back into the
open ocean. (See Picture B.9)
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Picture B.9 - Hurricane Michelle Satellite Image as it approaches The Bahamas.
(Source: NOAA, 2001)
B.4.1.1

Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Michelle

Figure B.3 shows the related wind speed and central pressure associated
with Hurricane Michelle. The data illustrate the relationship between the drop in
central pressure and the increase in wind speed. On October 29th Michelle, a
tropical depression at the time had a central pressure of 1005 mb. Michelle’s
pressure slowly began to fall reaching a low of 933 mb on November 3rd. At this
time Michelle was a category four hurricane and was moving towards Cuba and
The Islands of The Bahamas. The storm impacted The Bahamas on the 4th and
5th of November as the wind speed began to diminish.
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Figure B.3: Hurricane Michelle Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source:
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).
B.4.2 Impact of Hurricane Michelle on the Islands
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2001), Hurricane
Michelle produced a 10 foot storm surge. Many of the islands suffered moderate
to severe coastal flooding as a result. Washed out roads on the islands of New
Providence, Andros, Eleuthera, Cat Island, Exuma and Abaco were reported.
Damage to roofs throughout the islands were also noted in preliminary damage
assessment reports. Government buildings reported minor to major damage,
with missing roofs and broken windows. Damage to communication equipment
and broadcast towers were severe with many radio stations being put out of
commission as a result of the storm.
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There was no loss of life in The Bahamas associated with Hurricane
Michelle. The storm caused extensive flooding throughout the islands dumping
more then thirteen (13) inches of rain in some areas. As with Andrew and Floyd
the well fields, located in low-lying areas, suffered extensive flooding. Saltwater
intrusion occurred and contaminated the main supply of fresh water.
Reports from the Bahamas Electric Company (BEC) indicated that two
days following landfall of Hurricane Michelle, the island of New Providence
remained in darkness with 60% of the population without electricity. Additionally,
The Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC) also reported that
thousands of telephones were still out of order a week following the storm. Many
residents were also struggling with no water or low water pressure a week
following Michelle’s impact.
For several days following Michelle banks and government offices
remained closed, with the Police and Royal Bahamas Defence Force calling for
people to remain in their homes to allow for the clearing of the roads and the
restoration of utilities. (See Pictures B.10 – B.12)
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Picture B.10 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006)

Picture B.11 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006)
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Picture B.12 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006)
B.4.3 Hurricane Michelle Discussion
Although Hurricane Michelle was not as destructive as Hurricanes Andrew
or Floyd, the impact to Nassau highlighted the gaps in emergency response
capabilities at the national level. Hurricane Michelle response activities were
spearheaded by the Royal Bahamas Defence Force with disjointed support from
a variety of ministries and organizations. The impact of Michelle on the citizens
of Nassau and daily government activities shed light on the need for a well
coordinated emergency management structure.

The impact to the nation’s

capital, created the necessary advocacy seeking action helping to initiate the
birth of a coordinated and centralized emergency management structure.
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B.5

Hurricane Frances 2004
Hurricane Frances was the sixth named storm of the 2004 Atlantic

hurricane season and the fourth hurricane. Frances was also the first hurricane
since 1866 to impact the entire Bahamian Archipelago. Frances was a slow
moving storm with a very large eye, approximately 80 miles across, which
impacted the island chain for over 72 hours. The center of circulation remained
in the northwest Bahamas for an extraordinarily long time causing substantial
damage to the northern islands (Rolle & Simmons, 2004a). Map B.4 illustrates
the path that Frances took as he passed through The Bahamas.
B.5.1 Hurricane Frances Storm Development
According to the Bahamas Department of Meterology, Tuesday, August
24th satellite images indicated that a tropical depression had formed from a
strong topical wave in the Eastern Atlantic, approximately 870 miles westsouthwest of Cape Verde. Movement of the depression was to the west at 17
mph. Within less then 24 hours the depression gained strenth and was upgrated
to a tropical storm and given the name Frances. By Thursday August 26th,
Frances was again upgraded to hurricane status (Rolle & Simmons, 2004a).
Frances continued to strengthen rapidly and by Friday, August 27th it
reached category 3 status (winds of 111-130 mph). Exactly twenty-four hours
later Frances was upgraded to category 4 status (winds of 131-155 mph). On
August 31st, a hurricane warning was issued for the Turkes and Caicos Islands
and the Southeast Bahamas as Frances was approximately 600 miles eastsoutheast of the island of Inagua. A hurricane watch for the central Bahamas
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and a Hurricane Alert for the Northwest Bahamas was also issued by The
Bahamas Department of Meterology (Rolle & Simmons, 2004a).
At noon on September 1st, a hurricane warning for the entire archipelago
was issued. At this time Hurricane Frances was about 80 miles east-southeast
of the island of Mayaguana. Frances’ intensity fluctuated over the next few hours
before winds peaked at 145mph on September 2nd.
With sustained winds measuring 145mph Frances moved diretly over the
Island of San Salvador near to Cat Island. Frances was moving on average
13mph in a west to west-north-west direction. However, on September 3rd as
Frances moved over James Cistern, Eleuthera the forward speed decreased
dramaticly to 5 mph. Frances began to stall as it passed into the vicinity of
Abaco and directly over Grand Bahama. Although Frances was downgraded to a
category 3 and later to a category 2 storm the slow forward movement and the
abundance of rain created devistating flooding to the northwest islands.
Sunday, September 5th the center of the broad eye of Frances finally
moved inland over Florida provinding relief to The Bahamas. Frances impacted
the whole of the Bahamas and according to data from The Bahamas Department
of Meterology sustained hurricane force winds were experience in the islands of
Abaco, Grand Bahama, San Salvador, Rum Cay, Cat Island and Eleuthera as
the eye passed near or over. New Providence and many of the other islands
received sustained tropical storm force conditions. (See Picture B.13)
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Picture B.13 - Hurricane Frances Satellite Image as it approaches The Bahamas.
(Source: NOAA, 2004a)
B.5.1.1

Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Frances

Figure B.4 shows the related wind speed and central pressure associated
with Hurricane Frances. The data illustrate the relationship between the drop in
central pressure and the increase in wind speed. Hurricane Frances impacted
the Islands of The Bahamas over a 72 hour period September 1st – 3rd when the
hurricane was at peak intensity.
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Figure B.4: Hurricane Frances Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source:
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).
B.5.2 Impact of Hurricane Frances on the Islands
Hurricane Frances is a perfect example of why disasters should not be
classified merely by the number of deatlhs directly associated with the event.
Although the loss of live was small the livelyhoods of many were destroyed. For
instance, Hurricane Frances was the first storm since 1866 to impact the entire
archipelago. Frances strong winds and heavy rains caused substantial damage
especially to Grand Bahama where the storm stalled for over 24 hours.
According to the Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation (2004) storm
surge from Frances caused dramatic increase in chlorides in the trenches in the
North Andros Wellfields and the Grand Bahama Wellfields. The water supply to
New Providence, where over sixty percent of the population resides, was
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seriously affected due to the fact that the wellfields were inoperable as was the
Reverse Osmosis plant, due to power outages.
Further compounding water availability issues, damage to ports on almost
all the islands prevented the barging of water between islands. Freshwater
supplies were delayed for several days and in some cases several weeks.
(Bahamas Water and Sewerge Corporation, 2004)
Island infrastructure was heavily impacted by Hurricane Frances.
According to the Ministry of Public Works (2004), New Providence sustained
major damage to roadways as a reslut of inadequate storm surge protection.
Extensive damage was also done to the roads in James Cistern and Governor’s
Harbour, Eleuthera and Elbow Cay, Abaco. Other islands notably impacted were
Cat Island, Long Island and Mayaguana all suffing damage to roadways.
Docks and Ports throughout the country were heavily damaged and in
some cases they were completely destroyed. According to the Bahamas Port
Authority (2004) three docks in Lower Bogue, South Palmetto Point and James
Cistern, all settlements of the island of Eleuthera were destroyed. Similar
damage was seen on the island of Abaco. Docks in Cat Island, Long Island and
Mayaguana also suffered some degree of damage.
According to the Bahamas Airport Authority (2004) damage to airport
facilites at Freeport, Grand Bahama and Marsh Harbour, Abaco were completely
inundated with water as a result of sotrm surge and compromized the structural
integrity of the facility. There was no major damage to the Control Tower in
Grand Bahama closing the airport for more then a week.
337

The Bahamas Ministry of Education (2004) reported major damage to
public school facilities on the Berry Islands, and Grand Bahama. As a result
school opening were significantly delayed.
Bahamas Electric Corporation (BEC) (2004) reported widespread power
outages throughout the islands. Damages included downed power lines, downed
poles and structural damage to power station sites on many of the islands. The
impacts were minimized due to preplanning and mitigation efforts which allowed
for the shutting off of power before and during the storm. Grand Bahama, which
is part of a private electrical supply had the most extensive damage with over
1300 power poles downed (NEMA, 2004). (See Pictures B.14 - B.22)

Picture B.14 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.15 – Hurricane Frances on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas
(Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.16 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.17 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.18 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.19 – Hurricane Frances Damage in the settlement of Gregory Town on
the Island of Eleuthera, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.20 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Andros, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.21 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of New Providence, The
Bahamas (Source: Erin Hughey, 2004)

Picture B.22 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of New Providence, The
Bahamas (Source: Erin Hughey, 2004)
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B.5.3 Hurricane Frances Discussion
Hurricane Frances impacted the whole of The Bahamas. The key
concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emergency needs of fresh
drinking water and shelter. Extensive damage to well fields, and transportation
routs (airports, ports, and roadways) made difficult the movement of goods
between the islands as well as on the island. Hurricane Frances was the first
NEMA coordinated emergency response. Strong support came from the Royal
Bahamas Defence Force as well as a variety of ministries.

B.6

Hurricane Jeanne 2004
Hurricane Jeanne was the second hurricane of the 2004 season to hitt

The Islands of The Bahamas, making landfall less then three weeks after
Hurricane Frances. The tenth named storm of the 2004 season, the sixth
hurricane, and the fifth major hurricane (category 3 or greater) Jeanne developed
as an open water hurricane east of the Lesser Antilles. With plenty of time to
develop Jeanne gained and lost speed, twisted and turned, all before slamming
into the Northwestern Islands of The Bahamas. This erratic storm caused
problems for forecasters and emergency management officials who were not
sure were it was headed. While watching Jeanne, officials were also continuing
with Hurricane Frances response operations. Map B.5 illustrates the path that
Jeanne took through The Bahamas.
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B.6.1 Hurricane Jeanne Storm Development
According to the 5pm tropical report on Monday, September 13th issued by
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, tropical depression eleven had
formed from a tropical wave 70 miles east-southeast of Guadeloupe in the
Lesser Antilles. By the next morning the storm had been upgraded to a Tropical
Storm and was named Jeanne.
Jeanne was moving in a west-northwest direction at 8-12 mph and
attained hurricane strength two days later on September 16th. It was not long
before Jeanne lost strength and on September 17th it was downgraded to a
tropical depression as it moved across the Dominican Republic.
On September 18th, while near the southern Bahamian Island of Great
Inagua, a new center formed to the northeast and the previous circulation
dissipated. The 5pm report issued by The Bahamas Department of Meteorology
on September 20th indicated that the newly developed center of Jeanne had
strengthened again and becoming a hurricane for the second time.
Hurricane Jeanne meandered for days before moving in a westerly
direction towards the Northwest Bahamas. “This behavior was similar to that of
Hurricane Betsy of 1965 and presented numerous challenges for forecasters and
their models” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004b:3). Continuing to strengthen Hurricane
Jeanne headed toward the west, making landfall on the Island of Abaco in the
early morning of September 25th. “Shortly thereafter, it reached category 3 status
on the Saffir-Simpson scale and maintained this intensity as it passed over
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Grand Bahama during the remainder of the day” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004b:3).
(See Picture B.23)

Picture B.23 - Hurricane Jeanne Satellite Image as it impacts The Bahamas.
(Source: NOAA, 2004b)

B.6.1.1

Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Jeanne

Figure B.5 shows the related wind speed and central pressure associated
with Hurricane Jeanne. The data illustrates the relationship between the drop in
central pressure and the increase in wind speed. Hurricane Jeanne impacted the
Northwestern Bahamas on September 25th when the storm was at peak intensity.

345

Figure B.5: Hurricane Jeanne Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source:
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).
B.6.2 Impact of Hurricane Jeanne on the Islands
There were no deaths or reported injuries in association with Hurricane
Jeanne. However according to a report issued by The Bahamas Department of
Meteorology, “many residents in the extreme northwest Bahamas (Abaco and
Grand Bahama, in particular), had to undergo psychiatric evaluation after
experiencing two hurricanes in approximately three weeks and losing all of their
belongings” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004b:7).
Attempting to attribute damages exclusively to Hurricane Jeanne was
difficult since Frances impacted the same islands less then three weeks prior.
The northwestern Bahamas received the brunt of Hurricane Jeanne and
extensive flooding occurred. As a result local and national resources were
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heavily taxed during the 2004 hurricane season in response to both storms.
(See Pictures B.24 – B.29)

Picture B.24 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on Treasure Cay, The Bahamas
(Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.25 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Abaco (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.26 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas
(Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.27 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas
(Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.28 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Haitian Community on the Island of
Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.29 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Haitian Community on the Island of
Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
B.6.3 Hurricane Jeanne Discussion
Hurricane Jeanne impacted the northern islands of the Bahamas just three
weeks after the archipelago was impacted by Hurricane Frances. The key
concerns for the nation continued to be meeting the immediate emergency needs
of fresh drinking water and shelter. Logistics and communication were extremely
challenging as transportation routes and communication lines were damaged.
Hurricane Jeanne was the second NEMA coordinated emergency response and
it occurred simultaneously to the Hurricane Frances response. Strong support
came from a variety of ministries and organizations and was coordinated through
the National Emergency Operations Center in Nassau.
B.7

Hurricane Wilma 2005
The 2005 Hurricane Season experienced a record breaking 26 tropical

cyclones and two tropical depressions, it also also marked the first time that
meteorologists had to utilize the Greek alphabet for the naming of storms. Five
tropical cyclones impacted the Bahamian archipelago that year: Franklin, Katrina,
Ophelia, Rita and Wilma. However, it was Hurricane Wilma that “wreaked havoc
on the nations second largest city Freeport, in Grand Bahama” (The Bahamas
Department of Meteorology, 2005:1). Wilma was also the only storm of the
season that required a national response. Map B.6 illustrates the path that
Wilma took through The Bahamas.
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B.7.1 Hurricane Wilma Storm Development
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, on Saturday,
October 15th Hurricane Wilma developed from a tropical depression that formed
about 195 miles southeast of Grand Cayman. The system was monitored over
the next few days as the system moved slowly between a west and northwest
direction in the Western Caribbean Sea. The 11am report from the Department
of Meteorology on Tuesday, October 18th indicated that Wilma had officially
become the twelth hurricane of the season. Hurricane Wilma struck Cozumel,
Mexico and Honduras before making a turn to the northeast and accelerating
towards Florida on Sunday, October 23rd.
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology reported on Monday, October
24th that Hurricane Wilma was moving to the northeast near 25 miles per hour
and was passing within 60 nautical miles northwest of Freeport, Grand Bahama.
“Tropical storm force winds (sustained 39-73mph) were experienced by residents
in Grand Bahama from 7:00am through 8:00pm. However, during the period of
11:00am to 2:00pm hurricane force winds (winds of 74 mph or greater) were
experienced. The later event appeared synchronous with the intesnsification of
Wilma to Category 3 (115 mph) status around 1pm of the same day” (The
Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005:1). It was high tide (1:49pm) when
Hurricane Wilma hit the southwest shoreline of Grand Bahama and the Lucayan
Harbour. These areas sustained major damage from strong waves and high
storm surges. (See Picture B.30)
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Picture B.30 - Hurricane Wilma Satellite Image as it impacts The Bahamas.
(Source: NOAA, 2005)

B.7.1.1

Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Wilma

Figure B.6 below displays the relationship between wind speed and
central pressure associated with Hurricane Wilma. The data illustrate the
relationship between the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed.
Hurricane Wilma impacted the Northwestern Bahamas on October 24th luckily,
this was not at its peak intensity.
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Figure B.6: Hurricane Wilma Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source:
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).
B.7.2 Impact of Hurricane Wilma on the Islands
Hurricane Wilma was the only storm to cause any significant damage to
The Bahamas during the 2005 Hurricane Season. One death was reported as a
result of Hurricane Wilma and was directly related to storm surge inundation.
The concentration of damages was mainly in the vicinities of the northwestern
coastal areas. It was in this area that storm surge was measured at 12 feet (The
Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005). Early damage estimates were in
the amount of $6.5 million and ranged from widespread destruction of roofs and
vehicles to the uprooting of poles and trees and the displacement of tombs from
the graveyard near the coast (The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005).
(See Pictures B.31 – B.36)
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Picture B.31 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.32 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.33 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.34 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Picture B.35 – Bahamas Telecommunications Company Building Hurricane
Wilma Damage, Jones Town, Grand Bahama (Source: NEMA, 2004)

Picture B.36 – Hurricane Wilma Damage.
Grand Bahama (Source: NEMA, 2004)
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Ray of Hope Church, Hanna Hill,

B.7.3 Hurricane Wilma Discussion
Hurricane Wilma significantly impacted the northwestern Bahamas with
concentrated damage on the western portion of Grand Bahama. The islands of
Abaco and Bimini also sustained considerable damage. The key concerns for
the nation were meeting immediate emergency needs of fresh drinking water and
shelter. The response to Hurricane Wilma was coordinated by NEMA.

B.8

Conclusions
Chapter 5 provided the development characteristics of each hurricane

events as well as the impact each storm had on The Bahamas. Table B.1
provides a summary of the key characteristics of the six hurricanes. Of important
note is Hurricane Michelle, although Andrew and Floyd both violet category four
storms caused major destruction, it was the category two storm making landfall in
Nassau that triggered an overhaul to the emergency response structure.
The impact to government and 60% of the nations population highlighted
the within The Bahamas. response only a category two storm it was the first
storm to impact Nassau, the nation’s capital. Michelle, interrupted the business
of government raising
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SUMMARY TABLE
Date of
Landfall in
The Bahamas

Category
at
Landfall

Sustained
Wind Speed
At Landfall
(mph)

Barometric
Pressure
At Landfall
(mb)

Number
Dead

Andrew

8/23/1992

4

150

922

4

Floyd

9/14/1999

4

135

921

2

Michelle

11/05/2001

2

105

965

0

Frances

9/2-5/2004

4

145

936

2

Jeanne

9/25/2004

2

105

952

0

Wilma

10/24/2005

3

125

950

1

Hurricane
Name

Table B.1 – Study Hurricane Summary Table (Data Source: Bahamas
Department of Meteorology)
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Appendix C: Interview With Prime Minister Perry G. Christie

C.1

Interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie (January 25, 2007)
To assess the national governments position on emergency management

an interview was conducted with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie in January of
2007 (See Picture 5.1). The transcript and discussion of the interview is provided
below.
Question: What is your vision for NEMA and emergency
management in The Bahamas?
“Firstly, it is of critical importance that The Bahamas applies the same
level of interest in developing a disaster preparedness entity that it does in
developing its economy, because our ability to respond and manage
disasters will be directly related to our ability to secure our future. The
fact that we are a different kind of country than most countries in the
region, and in the hemisphere, in that we are a chain of islands separated
by expanses of water with sparse population centers throughout makes our
task even more onerous as well as more important. Therefore, the people
who are invited to be a part of NEMA must be prepared to be special
people in terms of the initiatives that they take, really the preparations
that they make to prepare themselves. They must ‘know’ the Bahamas and
so the government must be committed and in its commitment the
government must be sure to recruit the right people with the right
qualifications to lead NEMA. Those qualifications must be beyond
academic qualifications, they must I think, give a lot of weight to
leadership. The ability to lead and inspire people, get people to listen to
you and to understand is critical. They must have special qualities of
being able to ensure that they are able to lead a coordinated and
integrated sort of effort to ensure that all of the sectors of government and
private sector are working together. My vision is that we begin… I think I
should also add that through the leadership must also have people who
can easily work with persons from outside the country. It is necessary for
us to have good working relationships with those international agencies at
the regional level, or across border in the United States of America.
NEMA personnel must have the stature and ability to lead NEMA in that
direction on a sustained basis. Having done all of those things, having
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ensured that the right legislation is in place, the government must
demonstrate its continuing support for the strengthening of NEMA,
because of that level of importance that I have assigned when I spoke of it
being directly linked to the economy of the country, and therefore the
survival of our people. The final point I want to make about it is, because
we are a chain of islands we have to put a lot of effort into planning. So
the most important aspect of NEMA is anticipating the varying types of
disasters that could impact our country and creating models for the
necessary response that would be there. For example, when we are
confronted by the enormity of the potential impact; like an island really
having 200mph force coming into it. What do we do in terms of
evacuation? If one were to therefore look at the fact that we are a chain
of islands the question for the country is do we have an organization in
place that is efficiently empowered and funded to go through the various
studies and determinations that would be there to protect our country. It
therefore requires the political will and the political commitment to ensure
the success of that. Hopefully I have given you the right feel for my
vision”. (Prime Minister Perry G. Christie, January 25, 2007)
Prime Minister Christie’s response illustrates a clear awareness of the
importance of emergency management, and the economic and political impact a
major disaster could have on the Nation. Also revealed is his understanding that
the geography of The Bahamas places it at a high and recurrent risk of
hurricanes. Weeks after Prime Minister Christie took office Hurricane Michelle
impacted the nation’s capital. The interruption to government caused by Michelle
as well as the impact of September 11th on the world, created within the nation
an advocacy supporting action. As a result, the Prime Minister pushed for the
development of a national agency focused on managing disasters. Financial
support for the development of NEMA was provided by the office of the Prime
Minister and later legislated under the 2006 Disaster Preparedness and
Response Act.
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Strong support from the Prime Minister for the creation of NEMA and the
implementation of a CEM system has brought disaster awareness to the
forefront. Through this process resources have been made available to develop
planning and training initiatives in an effort to improve disaster response. The
political support provided by the Prime Minister has made emergency
management a national priority.

Question: The Bahamas has a unique Geography with over 700
islands and cays covering over 100,000 square miles. Is there one
thing that you think other island nations could learn from how The
Bahamas are managing disaster preparedness and response?
“Again it is difficult for me to comment on what other nations are doing in
terms of their levels of preparation. I would like to believe The Bahamas
in terms of our resent experiences, has gone about using all of our
resources and international help, like the International American Bank, to
affect an understanding to the entire country of the importance of working
together and not underestimating a potential impact always knowing that
the country could be cut-off and that we have to be prepared to deal with
that. I think if one were to look at The Bahamas over the last five to ten
year and see the rapid progress that we have made forging an
understanding that we have to be strong and we have to integrate the
necessary forces in the country. NEMA will never have the manpower
available to it, in terms of its own 1000 staff members and so therefore it
needs to forge relationships and models of participation that will be
triggered when disasters strike. Blend everyone into a working instrument
that would properly coordinate and properly manage, is the goal of
NEMA. So, I think the challenge for us is that that we look to the future to
develop a model of each island taking into consideration all of their
peculiarities so that this coordinating body at the center in the capital
would be able to coordinate. I think currently there are levels of that, but
we need to continue to move in that direction. My job would be to ensure
that those who are leading NEMA are in fact making progress and are
moving forward not just waiting for the next hurricane season and so it is
a full time preoccupation and something that we will manage effectively.”
(Prime Minister Perry G. Christie, January 25, 2007)
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Prime Minister Christie’s responses illustrate his understanding of the
critical nature of emergency management. He is committed to a comprehensive
preparedness and response campaign that requires an understanding of the
unique physical and social environment of the nation. His commitment has been
articulated through legislation and financial support for NEMA. He believes
strongly that his job is to ensure NEMA is properly equipped to effectively
manage disaster and protect the nation.

Picture 5.1 – Prime Minister Perry G. Christie and Erin Hughey, January 25,
2007. (Photographer: Gayle Outton-Moncur)
The intent of the interview with the Prime Minister was to assess the
national governments position on emergency management. Through strong
political and fiscal support for NEMA position of the government with regards to
emergency management is a proactive one. Prime Minister Christie personally
provided strong support to NEMA in response to Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne,
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and Wilma through participation in media briefings, active involvement in
discussions with Family Island Administrators, and contributions to the national
EOC. His involvement has raised awareness within the nation and facilitated the
development and implementation of a CEM system.
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